Gregg Krug
Matador ResourcesAbout Gregg Krug
Executive Vice President—Marketing & Midstream Strategy at Matador Resources Company. Joined Matador in April 2012; promoted to EVP in April 2019. Holds a BBA from Oklahoma City University (1996). In 2024, Matador achieved net income of $885 million, Adjusted EBITDA of $2.3 billion, generated $807 million Adjusted Free Cash Flow, grew oil production 33%, achieved “Upper 50%” TSR vs the peer group, and delivered San Mateo Adjusted EBITDA of $253 million; Krug led Marketing and Midstream units, negotiated the Pronto transaction, and served on San Mateo’s Board, aligning his remit with these performance outcomes .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| The Williams Companies | Various roles incl. Williams Natural Gas Pipeline and Williams Energy Services trading | 1983–2000 | Gas pipeline operations and trading experience foundational to marketing leadership |
| Samson Resources | Gas Scheduling Supervisor | 2000–2005 | Led natural gas sales scheduling and supply procurement on Samson-owned gathering systems |
| Matador Resources Company | Marketing Manager | 2005–2006 | Early Matador marketing leadership; returned later to scale business |
| Unit Petroleum Company | Marketing Manager | 2006–2012 | Led marketing, measurement, contract administration, production reporting across core regions |
| Matador Resources Company | Marketing Manager | 2012 | Rejoined Matador to build marketing capabilities |
| Matador Resources Company | VP Marketing; VP Longwood Gathering & Disposal Systems, LP | 2013 | Took responsibility for oil & gas marketing and midstream JV roles |
| Matador Resources Company | SVP—Marketing & Midstream | 2016 | Expanded oversight of marketing and midstream operations |
| Matador Resources Company | EVP—Marketing & Midstream Strategy | 2019–present | Overall responsibility for marketing and Longwood; strategic midstream leadership |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| San Mateo Midstream | Board of Directors member | 2024 (disclosed) | Governance on midstream JV; aligned with Pronto-San Mateo combination |
| Longwood Gathering & Disposal Systems, LP | Vice President | 2013 (disclosed) | Oversight of business aspects for Longwood midstream operations |
Fixed Compensation
| Year | Base Salary ($) | Target Bonus % of Salary | Actual Bonus Paid ($) | Stock Awards Fair Value ($) | All Other Compensation ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 850,000 | 100% | 1,933,750 | 1,505,150 | 24,150 | 4,313,050 |
Performance Compensation
2024 Annual Cash Incentive Plan (Company-wide metrics and assessment)
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Assessment | Payout / Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Debt / Adjusted EBITDA | No specific weightings applied | 1.42x | 1.05x | Exceeded Maximum | Cash payout: $1,933,750 (paid Feb 2025) |
| Cash operating costs per BOE (ex-interest) | No specific weightings applied | $13.90/BOE | $12.42/BOE | Exceeded Maximum | Cash payout: $1,933,750 (paid Feb 2025) |
| ROACE | No specific weightings applied | 28% | 32% | Exceeded Maximum | Cash payout: $1,933,750 (paid Feb 2025) |
| TSR vs Peer Group | No specific weightings applied | Upper 50% | Upper 50% | Achieved Target | Cash payout: $1,933,750 (paid Feb 2025) |
| ESG | Qualitative | N/A (qualitative goals) | Qualitative review | Committee assessed strong ESG performance | Cash payout: $1,933,750 (paid Feb 2025) |
| Strategic Objectives Adjustment | Capped at 30% | Up to +30% | 30% for Krug | Applied for exceptional contributions | Included in 2024 cash award |
2024 Long-Term Incentive Awards (granted Feb 14, 2024)
| Incentive Type | Metric | Target | Maximum | Grant Date | Grant Value ($) | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Performance Stock Units (PSUs) | Relative TSR vs peer group | 10,000 PSUs | 20,000 PSUs | 2/14/2024 | 663,800 | 3-year performance to 12/31/2026; vest post certification within 60 days; capped at target if absolute TSR is negative |
| Phantom Units (cash-settled) | Service-based | 15,000 units | N/A | 2/14/2024 | 841,350 | Ratably over 3 years on each anniversary; cash settlement |
PSU performance schedule (percentile rank → vesting multiple) ranges from 0% at 0th percentile to 200% at 100th percentile; 50th percentile vests 100% of target; interpolation applies between points .
Peer group for 2024 PSUs (selected for TSR measurement): APA, Civitas, Coterra, Diamondback, Magnolia, Marathon, Murphy, Ovintiv, Permian Resources, SM Energy, Vital Energy, plus SPDR S&P Oil & Gas E&P index proxy .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial Ownership
| Holder | Shares Beneficially Owned | Percent of Class |
|---|---|---|
| G. Gregg Krug | 225,910 | <1% (“*”) |
- Stock ownership guidelines: EVPs must hold shares equal to 2.5x base salary; newly appointed officers have 5 years to achieve; must hold at least 50% of net shares for 12 months post vesting; counts time-based restricted stock; excludes options, phantom units, and unearned performance awards. As of Dec 31, 2024, each NEO owned shares in excess of minimum .
- Anti-hedging and anti-pledging: Hedging prohibited; pledging >25% of holdings restricted without committee consent .
- Clawback policy maintained; part of risk-mitigation features in compensation program .
Outstanding Equity Awards at 12/31/2024
| Award Type | Unvested / Unearned Units (#) | Market/Payout Value ($) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Phantom units | 33,046 | 1,859,168 (based on $56.26) | Service-based; cash-settled |
| PSUs (assumed target/max per SEC rules) | 30,000 | 1,687,800 (based on $56.26) | Performance-based; target 2023 PSU, max 2024 PSU assumption |
| Total unvested shares and units | 63,046 | N/A | Summary of unvested units |
| Stock options | 0 unexercised | — | No options outstanding |
Vesting Schedule (as of 12/31/2024)
| Vesting Date | Award Type | G. Gregg Krug Units |
|---|---|---|
| 02/14/2025 | Phantom units | 5,000 |
| 02/16/2025 | Phantom units | 5,000 |
| 02/17/2025 | Phantom units | 8,046 |
| 12/31/2025 | PSUs (end of performance period) | 10,000 (assumption per SEC table note) |
| 02/14/2026 | Phantom units | 5,000 |
| 02/16/2026 | Phantom units | 5,000 |
| 12/31/2026 | PSUs (end of performance period) | 20,000 (assumption per SEC table note) |
| 02/14/2027 | Phantom units | 5,000 |
2024 vested awards and value realized: 49,820 shares/units vested; $2,925,199 realized; phantom units settled in cash (no share acquisition upon vesting) .
Employment Terms
- Employment agreement: Effective February 2016; amended July 2019 .
- Severance (without “just cause” or for “good reason,” non-CoC): 1.5x base salary plus 1.5x average annual cash bonus (prior two years) for Krug .
- Change-in-control (CoC) economics: Double-trigger; 3x base salary plus 3x average annual cash bonus (prior two years) if terminated without “just cause” or for “good reason” within 30 days before or 12 months after CoC; all equity awards vest immediately prior to termination; PSUs vest based on performance through abbreviated period .
- Payment timing and 409A: Lump sums generally paid 60 days post termination; CoC-related payments for certain NEOs are paid six months after termination (or earlier upon death), consistent with Section 409A compliance .
- Non-compete / non-solicit / confidentiality: Agreements include confidentiality (during and after employment), non-compete and non-solicit covenants; compliance required to receive severance; separation agreement and release required; no excise tax gross-ups .
- Insider Trading Policy: Formal policy filed as an exhibit; prohibits hedging; restricts pledging beyond thresholds .
Investment Implications
- Strong pay-for-performance alignment: Krug’s variable compensation is heavily driven by company outcomes (Net Debt/EBITDA, unit costs, ROACE, TSR) and capped Strategic Objectives Adjustments; PSUs use rigorous relative TSR with downside cap when absolute TSR is negative, reinforcing shareholder alignment .
- Limited forced-selling pressure: Significant portion of long-term awards are cash-settled phantom units vesting ratably, reducing need to sell shares upon vesting; PSUs settle post three-year period, with immediate vesting upon CoC, which can be a catalyst for equity delivery in M&A scenarios .
- Ownership and risk controls: EVP-level stock ownership guidelines (2.5x salary), mandatory post-vesting holding, anti-hedging, and restricted pledging materially reduce alignment risks; as of YE2024, NEOs met minimum ownership requirements .
- Retention mechanics and CoC dynamics: 1.5x severance outside CoC and 3x severance under double-trigger CoC increase retention and reduce near-term turnover risk, but create potential CoC-related payout magnitudes; absence of tax gross-ups is shareholder-friendly .
- Execution track record: Krug’s leadership across marketing and midstream, negotiation of the Pronto transaction, and governance roles at San Mateo correspond with 2024 financial and operational records, suggesting continued strategic value in the midstream platform and commodity marketing strategy .