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John Kober

Chief Financial Officer at MACOM Technology Solutions HoldingsMACOM Technology Solutions Holdings
Executive

About John Kober

Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of MACOM Technology Solutions (since May 2019), age 55. Prior roles include MACOM VP Finance/Corporate Controller (2015–2019) and CIRCOR International VP Corporate Controller & Treasurer (2005–2015); B.S.B.A. in Accounting (University of Rhode Island) and MBA in Finance (Seton Hall) . MACOM’s recent pay-versus-performance shows strong TSR and use of Adjusted EPS/Adjusted Operating Income in incentive plans: cumulative TSR value of a $100 initial investment reached $329.94 in FY2024, with peer TSR at $234.89 . Stock ownership guidelines require CFOs to hold 2x base salary in shares; all NEOs are in compliance or within the phase-in period .

Company performance overview:

MetricFY 2022FY 2023FY 2024FY 2025 (TTM)
Revenues ($USD)$675,170,000*$648,407,000*$729,578,000*$967,258,000*
EBITDA ($USD)$189,903,000*$168,653,000*$148,615,000*$193,047,000*

Values retrieved from S&P Global.*

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
MACOM Technology SolutionsVP Finance, Corporate Controller2015–2019 Built controllership and finance processes ahead of promotion to CFO
CIRCOR InternationalVP Corporate Controller & Treasurer2005–2015 Led controllership/treasury for multi-industry manufacturer

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
No external board roles disclosed

Fixed Compensation

MetricFY 2022FY 2023FY 2024
Base Salary ($)$475,000 $500,000 $520,000
Target Bonus (% of Salary)80% 85%
Actual Cash Incentive Paid ($)$524,400 $56,000 $8,840

Notes:

  • FY2024 short-term cash incentives use two six-month performance periods tied to non-GAAP Adjusted Operating Income; 1H payout at 4% of first-half target; no 2H payout; aggregate FY2024 earned 2% of annual target .

Performance Compensation

Equity mix: ~81% performance-based PSUs and ~19% time-based RSUs at target for Kober in FY2024 .

Incentive TypeMetricWeightingTarget(s)ActualPayoutVesting
PSUs (Adjusted EPS)Adjusted EPS growth (non-GAAP) ~81% of total equity at target Tranches with Threshold 2.5%, Target 10%, Upside 15%, Max 20% (FY2024; multi-year tranches use CAGR) FY2024 Adjusted EPS decreased; FY2024 tranche forfeited; FY2022–2024 tranche earned at 60% 0% for FY2024 tranche; 60% for FY2022–2024 tranche Settles after results announcement; forfeited tranches do not retest
PSUs (rTSR)Relative TSR vs PHLX Semiconductor Index constituents Included in ~81% PSUs >25% and ≤50%: 50–100%; >50% and ≤75%: 100–200%; >75%: 200% FY2022–2024 rTSR rank 88% Earned 200% of target FY2024 grant: 3-year period 9/30/2023–10/2/2026
RSUs (time-based)Service-based~19% of total equity at target 3-year vesting; FY2024 grant vests 11/8/2024, 11/8/2025, 11/8/2026

FY2024 grants (Kober):

Grant TypeGrant DateTarget Shares (#)Grant Date Fair Value ($)
rTSR PSUs11/8/202314,172 $1,259,607
Adjusted EPS PSUs11/8/20237,865 $574,224
RSUs11/8/20235,243 $382,791

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Total beneficial ownership41,507 shares (less than 1%)
Shares outstanding (basis for % calc)74,308,815
Ownership as % of shares outstanding~0.056%
Unvested/Outstanding awards (as of 9/27/2024)rTSR PSUs 28,344 target (reported at max for future periods) ; Adjusted EPS PSUs 1,310 (FY2024 tranche at threshold, forfeited) and 2,622 remaining tranches at threshold ; RSUs 5,243
Market value of unvested/outstanding equityrTSR PSUs $3,160,923; Adjusted EPS PSUs $146,091 and $292,405; RSUs $584,699 (all at $111.52/share closing price on 9/27/2024)
OptionsNone disclosed for Kober outstanding (as of 9/27/2024)
Hedging/PledgingCompany policy prohibits hedging and pledging by directors and officers
Ownership guidelinesCFO required 2x base salary; compliance or within phase-in as of 9/27/2024

Employment Terms

TermDetail
Start date and tenureCFO since May 23, 2019
Contract typePromotion letter (not a full employment agreement)
Cash incentive programTwo six-month periods; metric is non-GAAP Adjusted Operating Income; payouts capped at 200% of target
Severance (non-CIC)Not disclosed for Kober; only CEO has non-CIC severance agreement
Change-in-control (CIC)1.5x base salary + target annual bonus lump sum; prorated bonus; 18 months health benefits (grossed-up for taxes); full vesting of all outstanding equity; excise tax gross-up applies to participants pre-1/1/2022 (Kober qualifies)
CIC illustrative payout (as of 9/27/2024)Severance $1,885,000; Health benefits $63,000; Equity acceleration $16,632,539; Excise tax $9,642,598; Total $28,223,137
Restrictive covenantsConfidentiality & invention assignment; non-solicitation of employees/customers/partners/vendors during employment and for 12 months post-termination
Clawbacks2018 policy (VP+ level) for misconduct-related restatements; 2023 Dodd-Frank compliant policy for Section 16 officers covering incentive-based compensation on restatement

Investment Implications

  • Pay-for-performance alignment: Kober’s equity is predominantly performance-based (≈81%), with metrics tied to Adjusted EPS and rTSR versus PHLX Semiconductor peers; FY2022–2024 rTSR PSUs paid at maximum (200%) on an 88% percentile rank, while certain Adjusted EPS tranches were forfeited due to FY2024 performance decline—demonstrating balanced upside/downside sensitivity .
  • Retention and potential overhang: Significant CIC economics including full equity acceleration and a 1.5x salary+bonus multiple (plus tax gross-up) could mitigate near-term retention risk, but may create selling pressure at vest/settlement if performance cycles pay out at high levels .
  • Ownership alignment: Beneficial ownership is modest (~0.056%) but subject to strict anti-hedging/pledging policies and 2x-salary ownership guidelines; NEOs are compliant or within phase-in, and say-on-pay support was strong (97.5% in 2024), indicating shareholder acceptance of the program design .
  • Execution risk: Short-term bonuses are tightly linked to Adjusted Operating Income with tough thresholds—FY2024 payouts were de minimis (2% of annual target)—which heightens sensitivity to cyclical semiconductor demand and underscores operational execution requirements amid industry volatility .