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Robert Dennehy

Senior Vice President, Operations at MACOM Technology Solutions HoldingsMACOM Technology Solutions Holdings
Executive

About Robert Dennehy

Robert Dennehy (age 51) is Senior Vice President, Operations at MACOM Technology Solutions, serving in this role since October 2013; he previously was Vice President, Operations (March 2011–October 2013) and Managing Director of MACOM’s Cork, Ireland subsidiary (2006–March 2011) . He holds an Associate’s degree in Electronic Engineering and a Diploma in Business Administration from Henley Business School, London . Company performance context during his tenure includes cumulative TSR of $329.94 on a $100 fixed investment by FY2024 vs $234.89 for the PHLX Semiconductor peer index, net income of $76.859 million in FY2024, and FY2024 Adjusted EPS of $2.56; Adjusted EPS declined in FY2024, causing forfeiture of certain EPS-linked awards .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
MACOM Technology SolutionsSenior Vice President, OperationsOct 2013–present
MACOM Technology SolutionsVice President, OperationsMar 2011–Oct 2013
MACOM Technology Solutions (Cork, Ireland subsidiary)Managing Director2006–Mar 2011

External Roles

No external public-company directorships or outside roles are listed in Mr. Dennehy’s executive officer biography in the proxy .

Fixed Compensation

YearBase Salary ($)Target Bonus (% of Base)Maximum Bonus (% of Base)Actual Bonus Paid ($)
FY2024430,000 60% 120% 5,160
FY2023414,000 55% 31,878
FY2022400,000 303,600

Performance Compensation

Short-Term Cash Incentives (Program Mechanics and Outcomes)

  • Metric: Non-GAAP adjusted operating income; two six-month periods per fiscal year with threshold/target/maximum goals; executive bonuses capped at 200% of target .
  • FY2024 outcomes: First-half payout at 4% of half-year target; second-half payout 0%; aggregate FY2024 payout equaled 2% of annual target for each named executive officer, yielding $5,160 for Mr. Dennehy .
PeriodThreshold Adjusted Op. Inc. ($mm)Target ($mm)Maximum ($mm)Actual ($mm)% of Target Earned
FY2024 H180.4 93.0 108.0 80.9 4%
FY2024 H298.6 104.6 122.6 98.0 0%
FY2024 Aggregate2% of annual target
ExecutiveAnnual Target Cash Incentive ($)FY2024 Cash Incentive Paid ($)
Robert Dennehy258,000 5,160

Performance-Based Equity (PSUs) – Adjusted EPS Growth

  • 2024 grant sized at 4,781 target PSUs for Mr. Dennehy; three tranches with performance thresholds at 2.5% (50% payout), 10% (100%), 15% (200%), and 20% (300%) Adjusted EPS growth; straight-line interpolation; FY2024 goals were reduced vs prior years to align with peers .
  • FY2024 single-year tranche: forfeited due to Adjusted EPS decline .
  • FY2023–2024 tranche (from prior grants): forfeited at November 7, 2024 .
  • FY2022–2024 tranche: achieved 6% Adjusted EPS growth and paid at 60%; Mr. Dennehy’s earned shares from the 2021 grant tranche were 913 .
Grant YearPerformance PeriodTarget PSUs (Dennehy)PerformancePayoutVesting Timing
2024FY20244,781 Adjusted EPS decreased 0% (forfeited)
2023FY2023–2024Prior grantNot achieved 0% (forfeited)
2022FY2022–2024Prior grant6% Adjusted EPS growth 60% payout Vested Nov 7, 2024; 913 shares (actual)

Performance-Based Equity (PSUs) – Relative TSR (rTSR)

  • 2024 grant sized at 11,719 target PSUs for Mr. Dennehy, measured vs PHLX Semiconductor Index constituents over FY2024–FY2026; payout 0% if ≤25th percentile, 50–100% if >25th–≤50th, 100–200% if >50th–≤75th, and 200% at >75th percentile; linear interpolation .
  • 2022 grant (FY2022–FY2024 performance period): achieved rTSR at 88th percentile and paid at 200% of target; for Mr. Dennehy, 24,546 shares were earned and vested on Nov 7, 2024 (reported at actual performance) .
Grant YearPerformance PeriodTarget PSUs (Dennehy)Actual rTSR RankPayoutVesting Timing
2024FY2024–FY202611,719 Ongoing0–200% schedule If earned, vests Nov 2026
2022FY2022–FY2024Prior grant88% 200% Vested Nov 7, 2024; 24,546 shares (actual)

Time-Based RSUs (Retention)

  • 2024 time-based RSUs: 3,187 for Mr. Dennehy; vest in equal annual installments on Nov 8, 2024, Nov 8, 2025, and Nov 8, 2026, subject to continued service .
Grant DateRSUs (Dennehy)Vesting Schedule
Nov 8, 20233,187 1/3 on Nov 8, 2024; 1/3 on Nov 8, 2025; 1/3 on Nov 8, 2026

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Beneficial Ownership

HolderShares Beneficially OwnedOwnership %
Robert Dennehy18,568 <1% (asterisk in table)
  • Policy prohibits hedging and pledging of Company stock by directors and officers, improving alignment and reducing pledging risk .
  • Executive stock ownership guidelines require at least 1x base salary for other executive officers; executives must comply within 48 months of designation, and as of Sept 27, 2024 all NEOs were either compliant or within phase-in .

2024 Vested and Outstanding Awards Snapshot

CategorySharesNotes
Stock awards vested in FY202413,301 Value realized $961,651
Market-based PSUs earned (FY2022–FY2024)24,546 rTSR at 200% payout; vested Nov 7, 2024
Adjusted EPS PSUs earned (FY2022–FY2024)913 60% payout; vested Nov 7, 2024
2023–2025 rTSR PSUs (unearned potential)30,788 Assumed at 200% maximum for table display; eligible to vest Nov 2025 if earned
2024–2026 rTSR PSUs (unearned potential)23,438 Assumed at 200% maximum for table display; eligible to vest Nov 2026 if earned
2023–2025 EPS PSUs (remaining tranche assumption)955 Assumed at threshold 50% for table display; eligible to vest Nov 2025 if earned
2024–2025 and 2024–2026 EPS PSUs (remaining tranches assumption)1,594 Assumed at threshold 50% for table display; eligible to vest Nov 2025/Nov 2026 if earned
Time-based RSUs unvested3,187 Vesting Nov 8, 2024/2025/2026
Employee stock options (exercisable)None disclosed for Mr. Dennehy; options shown for another NEO (Hwang)

Employment Terms

ItemDetail
Employment AgreementEffective Oct 1, 2013; SVP, Operations
Base Salary (FY2024)$430,000
Short-Term Cash Incentive Opportunity (FY2024)Target 60% of base; maximum 120% of base
Restrictive CovenantsConfidentiality and invention assignment; non-solicitation of employees/consultants/customers/vendors during employment and for 12 months post-termination
Clawbacks2018 policy for VP+ covers incentive pay linked to restated results if employee conduct materially contributed to restatement; 2023 Dodd-Frank compliant policy mandates recovery of incentive comp based on restated financials for Section 16 officers
Hedging/PledgingProhibited for directors, officers, employees, and consultants (e.g., collars, forwards, swaps)
Stock Ownership GuidelinesOther executive officers: ≥1x base salary; compliance or phase-in status achieved by all NEOs as of Sept 27, 2024
Say-on-Pay97.5% approval at 2024 annual meeting

Change-in-Control (CIC) Economics (Plan Participation)

Scenario (Illustrative as of Sept 27, 2024)Severance ($)Health Benefits ($)Equity Acceleration ($)Excise Tax ($)Total ($)
Involuntary termination w/o cause or resignation for good reason within 3 months before or 24 months after CIC946,000 33,600 11,490,909 12,470,509
  • CIC Plan: Lump-sum equal to the sum of base salary + target annual bonus; prorated bonus; lump-sum for medical/dental/vision continuation for 12 months grossed up for taxes; full vesting of all outstanding equity awards; performance awards deemed earned at maximum immediately prior to CIC but vest at end of performance/service periods unless qualifying termination occurs .
  • Note: Excise tax gross-up applies to pre-2022 participants if excise tax is triggered; the illustrative table shows no excise tax amount for Mr. Dennehy under stated assumptions .

Investment Implications

  • Pay-for-performance alignment: Dennehy’s FY2024 long-term equity award was ~84% performance-based (Adjusted EPS and rTSR PSUs), with only ~16% time-based RSUs, aligning compensation with multi-year outcomes .
  • Execution scorecard: rTSR outperformed peers over FY2022–FY2024 (88th percentile), yielding 200% PSU payout and significant vested shares; however, Adjusted EPS declined in FY2024, causing forfeiture of near-term EPS-linked tranches and a minimal cash bonus (2% of annual target, $5,160), tempering realized cash comp and signaling emphasis on profitable growth over the cycle .
  • Retention risk vs selling pressure: Substantial unearned PSU blocks are scheduled to vest contingent on FY2023–FY2025 and FY2024–FY2026 performance (e.g., 30,788 and 23,438 rTSR PSUs shown on a maximum basis for table display), plus remaining EPS PSU tranches and time-based RSUs, creating retention hooks; hedging/pledging prohibitions reduce alignment risk and limit collateral-pledge red flags .
  • Governance and shareholder support: Strong 2024 say-on-pay approval (97.5%) and robust clawback/anti-hedging policies underpin compensation governance; ownership guidelines (≥1x salary) with compliance/phase-in status bolster skin-in-the-game expectations, though Dennehy’s beneficial holdings are <1% of outstanding shares (18,568 shares), indicating moderate personal exposure .