Daniel R. Hanchera
MURPHY OILAbout Daniel R. Hanchera
Senior Vice President, Business Development at Murphy Oil Corporation. Age 67, 17 years with Murphy as of February 18, 2025, with 70,000 shares owned outright, making him a long-tenured NEO aligned with shareholder outcomes through equity and performance-based incentives . Company performance context for incentives: FY2024 ROACE 23.1% and Net Income $407,171 thousand; cumulative TSR value of $131.19 for a $100 investment from 12/31/2019 to 12/31/2024, underpinning PSU outcome mechanics .
Past Roles
Not detailed in the 2025 and 2024 DEF 14A materials beyond current title; the NEO listing confirms his role as Senior Vice President, Business Development and tenure .
External Roles
No external directorships or public-company roles disclosed for Hanchera in the proxy materials .
Fixed Compensation
Multi-year compensation (NEO Summary Compensation Table):
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | 416,505 | 429,555 | 446,463 |
| Stock Awards ($) | 1,232,261 | 990,685 | 944,105 |
| Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation ($) | 484,358 | 340,389 | 416,726 |
| Change in Pension Value and Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Earnings ($) | — | 393,557 | 326,206 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 26,339 | 26,678 | 26,573 |
| Total ($) | 2,159,463 | 2,180,864 | 2,160,073 |
Base salary history and target annual bonus:
| Metric | 2019 | Feb 2020 | Apr 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 410,568 | 418,779 | 314,085 | 400,000 | 430,600 | 447,900 | |
| Target Bonus (% of Base) | — | — | — | 75% | 75% | 75% | 80% |
2024 AIP payout specifics:
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| 2024 Base Salary ($) | 447,900 |
| Target Bonus (%) | 80% |
| Target Bonus ($) | 358,320 |
| Earned Award ($) | 416,726 (116.3% of target) |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) structure and 2024 results:
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Payout Achieved | Weighted Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EBITDA/ACE (ROACE proxy) | 30% | 20.9% | 25.8% | 33.4% | 23.1% | 72% | 21.6% |
| AIP Free Cash Flow ($MM) | 25% | 464 | 799 | 1,332 | 641.8 | 77% | 19.3% |
| Lifting Costs + G&A | 25% | 17.54 | 16.20 | 14.94 | 15.33 | 169% | 42.3% |
| TRIR | 5% | 0.44 | 0.31 | 0.00 | 0.22 | 129% | 6.5% |
| Spill Rate (bbl/MMBOE) | 5% | 4.00 | 2.00 | 0.00 | 0.09 | 196% | 9.8% |
| GHG Emissions Intensity (tCO2e/MMBOE) | 5% | 13,400 | 12,150 | 10,900 | 10,456 | 200% | 10.0% |
| Sustainability Basket (evenly weighted) | 5% | — | — | — | See sub-metrics | 140% | 7.0% |
| Total AIP Payout | — | — | — | — | — | — | 116.3% |
Long-term incentives and vesting:
| 2024 Equity Grants (Grant Date 2/6/2024) | Units | Vesting |
|---|---|---|
| Time-Based RSUs (Hanchera) | 9,450 | Generally cliff-vest on third anniversary of grant date |
| Performance-Based RSUs (PSUs) (Hanchera) | 14,190 | Earned based on 3-year TSR percentile vs peer group (80% weight) and ROACE (20%); TSR payout capped at target if absolute TSR negative |
2022–2024 PSU cycle outcome:
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| PSUs Granted in 2022 (Hanchera) | 21,200 |
| PSU Payout (% of target) | 108.84% |
| PSUs Earned (excl. dividends) | 23,074 |
2024 vested shares and value realized:
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Shares Acquired on Vesting (2024) | 100,220 |
| Value Realized on Vesting ($) | 3,817,535 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Ownership, unvested equity, and policies:
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Shares Owned Outright (as of 2/18/2025) | 70,000 |
| Unvested RSUs (#, market value at 12/31/2024) | 48,229; $1,459,420 |
| Unearned PSUs at Target (#, market/payout value at 12/31/2024) | 26,423; $799,551 |
| Options Outstanding | None (no options/SARs outstanding per equity plan table) |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines (SVP multiple) | 2x base salary; all NEOs in compliance during 2024 |
| Hedging/Pledging | Hedging prohibited; pledging restricted until ownership targets met; any pledging requires compliance and advance disclosure |
Nonqualified deferred compensation:
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Executive Contributions ($) | 76,296 | 76,352 |
| Registrant Contributions ($) | 5,973 | 5,830 |
| Aggregate Earnings ($) | 232,244 | 351,100 |
| Aggregate Balance ($) | 1,913,839 | 2,347,121 |
Pension/SERP benefits:
| Plan | Credited Service (Years) | Present Value at 12/31/2023 ($) | Present Value at 12/31/2024 ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Qualified Retirement Plan | 16.922 | 865,914 | 918,288 |
| Supplemental Executive Retirement Plan (SERP) | 16.922 | 1,354,671 | 1,628,503 |
| Average Compensation used in pension formula ($) | — | 737,937 | 846,733 |
| Retirement Eligibility (as of 12/31/2024) | — | — | Hanchera retirement eligible |
Employment Terms
Severance Protection Agreement (entered 2022): Double-trigger change-in-control required (CIC plus involuntary termination without cause/disability or resignation for good reason within 24 months) for equity acceleration; cash severance equals two times the sum of base salary and average bonus over the prior three years (Hambly/Mireles at 3x, not applicable to Hanchera); continued life/accident/health insurance for 30 months; certain relocation benefits; no tax gross-ups; post-CIC non-compete/non-solicit for one year . Equity awards are subject to double-trigger acceleration; if awards are not assumed in a CIC, immediate vesting/lapse of restrictions applies, with performance treated at actual-to-date or target whichever greater; awards subject to clawback .
Estimated payments (as if event occurred on 12/31/2024):
| Category | Normal Termination ($) | Change of Control ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Severance | — | 1,723,449 |
| Non-Equity Compensation (AIP) | 416,726 | 416,726 |
| Performance-Based RSUs (Accelerated) | 693,873 | 1,493,425 |
| Time-Based RSUs (Accelerated) | 765,547 | 765,547 |
| Stock Options | — | — |
| Retirement Plan | 233,100 | 190,632 |
| Total | 2,109,246 | 4,589,779 |
Clawback and governance policies:
- Mandatory clawback policy per Dodd-Frank and NYSE 303A.14; supplemental clawback for reputational harm; dividends on awards paid only if vested; consistent grant timing; no perquisites or tax gross-ups for NEOs .
- Say-on-Pay support: 98% approval at 2024 annual meeting (2025 proxy) .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: AIP paid at 116.3% on balanced financial and ESG metrics; PSUs tied to 3-year relative TSR (capped if absolute TSR negative) and ROACE; 2022–2024 PSU payouts at 108.84% indicate execution discipline without excessive upside leverage .
- Vesting and potential selling pressure: 2024 RSU/PSU grants generally vest on the third anniversary (Feb 2027), while Hanchera held 48,229 unvested RSUs and 26,423 target PSUs at year-end; he realized $3.82M on 100,220 shares vested in 2024; visibility to Form 4 activity around scheduled vest dates is a relevant signal .
- Retention and transition risk: Retirement eligible at 12/31/2024 with meaningful pension/SERP values, but ongoing equity and clawback frameworks plus double-trigger CIC terms mitigate entrenchment risk and align incentives for continued performance .
- Alignment safeguards: Hedging prohibited; pledging restricted until ownership targets met; NEO guideline compliance (SVP 2x salary) reduces misalignment; strong say-on-pay support (98%) and absence of related-party transactions in 2024 further lower governance risk .
- Peer benchmarking and dilution discipline: PSU TSR uses a defined E&P peer set; 2024 full-value awards totaled 0.84% of shares with clear share caps and no option repricing; overhang and share pool disclosures support equity discipline .