Troy Standish
NAVIENTAbout Troy Standish
Troy Standish, age 50, is Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Navient (appointed October 11, 2024). He joined Sallie Mae in 2000 and has held multiple operational leadership roles, most recently managing loan operations and leading business processing operations before becoming COO; he continues to lead execution of Navient’s strategic actions (outsourced servicing, business processing divestitures, shared services streamlining) . In 2024 Navient returned $249 million to shareholders, delivered “Core Earnings” EPS of $2.00, and grew refinance and in-school originations, with incentive design linking pay to rTSR, ROE and transformation milestones; 2022–24 PSUs paid at 46% amid mixed outcomes, underscoring pay-for-performance alignment .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Navient | EVP & Chief Operating Officer | Oct 2024–present | Oversees operations, outsourced servicing relationships, and execution of strategic actions |
| Navient | EVP, Asset Management & Business Processing Operations | Apr 2024–Oct 2024 | Led asset management and BPO during portfolio simplification |
| Navient | SVP, Asset Management & Servicing Operations | Jul 2018–Apr 2024 | Managed loan operations for student loan portfolio |
| Sallie Mae | Various operational leadership roles | 2000–2014 (and continuing into Navient) | Long-tenured operator through Sallie Mae/Navient transformation |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pennsylvania Early Learning Investment Commission | Commissioner | n/a | Business-leader coalition prioritizing early childhood investment |
| United Way of Wyoming Valley | Chair of the Board (former) | n/a | Community leadership in Wilkes-Barre, PA |
| Greater Wilkes-Barre Chamber of Business & Industry | Chair of the Board (former) | n/a | Regional economic development |
Fixed Compensation
| Item (2024) | Amount | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | $375,000 | Increased by $95,000 in April 2024 upon promotion to EVP, with no further change at COO promotion in Oct 2024 |
| Target Annual Bonus (% of salary) | 125% | 2024 Management Incentive Plan (MIP) target |
| Target Annual Bonus ($) | $468,750 | 125% × $375,000 |
| Actual 2024 MIP Paid | $46,875 | 10% corporate score applied to target |
| One-time Cash Bonus | $100,000 | Paid Feb 2024 for work on strategic actions preparation |
| 2024 STIP (one-time transformation plan) Target | 125% of salary ($468,750) | STIP period Jul–Dec 2024 |
| 2024 STIP Paid | $539,062 | 115% of target based on outsourcing, divestments, and expense reductions |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive – 2024 MIP design, results, and payout
| Metric | Weight | Target | Actual 2024 | Payout Factor | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Diluted “Core Earnings” EPS | 60% | $2.20 | $1.19 | 0.0% | Below threshold |
| Adjusted “Core Earnings” Efficiency Ratio | 25% | 66.2% | 68.6% | 0.0% | Above threshold (worse), 0% |
| Business Processing EBITDA ($mm) | 15% | $53.3 | $46.2 | 66.9% | Partial achievement |
| Corporate Score | — | — | — | 10.0% | Applied to individual target |
| Executive | Target ($) | Corporate Score | MIP Paid ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Troy Standish | $468,750 | 10.0% | $46,875 |
One-time Strategic Transformation Incentive Plan (STIP) – 2H 2024
| Category | Key measures | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Outsource Servicing | Transfer ~80% segment expenses; employee transfer; rebranding/borrower transition; oversight & TSAs | Achieved transfer of ~80% expenses by YE 2024; 900 employees transferred by July; rebranding/2.7M loans transition in Oct 2024 |
| Business Processing Unit (BPU) Divestment | Close value-creating sales; transfer ~80% direct+overhead; TSAs | Healthcare sale closed Sep 2024; government services sale signed Dec 2024 and closed Feb 2025; $412m proceeds, above expectations |
| Reduce Shared Service Expenses/Footprint | 4Q24 Y/Y reduction ≥20%; multi-year plan; org streamlining | 4Q24 shared services down 24% Y/Y vs 20% goal; multi-year plan adopted |
| Executive | STIP Target | STIP Payout % | STIP Paid ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Troy Standish | 125% of salary ($468,750) | 115% | $539,062 |
Long-Term Incentives (LTI)
| Award | Grant date | Units (target) | Grant-date fair value ($) | Vesting/Performance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RSU | Feb 9, 2024 | 12,507 | 202,488 | Vests 1/3 on 2/9/2025, 2/9/2026, 2/9/2027 |
| PSU (rTSR) | Feb 9, 2024 | 4,733 | 67,492 | 3-year (2024–26) rTSR vs S&P 600 Financials; 0–150% payout; 1-year post-vest holding |
| RSU (promotion) | May 23, 2024 | 7,697 | 114,993 | Vests 1/3 on 5/23/2025, 5/23/2026, 5/23/2027 |
| PSU (rTSR, promotion) | May 23, 2024 | 10,008 | 114,991 | 3-year (2024–26) rTSR vs S&P 600 Financials; 0–150% payout; 1-year post-vest holding |
Additional context on LTI performance plans:
- 2024–26 PSUs: sole metric rTSR vs S&P 600 Financials; 50th percentile = 100% payout, 75th = 150%, <25th = 0%; 1-year post-vest holding .
- 2022–24 PSUs (legacy): Cumulative Net Student Loan Cash Flows (55%) + annual Core Earnings ROE tranches (3×15%) with rTSR multiplier; earned at 46% of target for the period .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total beneficial ownership | 222,967 shares/units as of Mar 4, 2025 |
| Composition detail | Includes 85,344 RSUs/PSUs/DEUs with no voting/dispositive control; 801 deferred stock units |
| % of shares outstanding | ~0.22% (222,967 of 101,848,898 outstanding as of Mar 4, 2025) |
| Ownership guidelines (EVP) | Lesser of 200,000 shares or $1,000,000 value; must meet within 5 years; NEOs in compliance or within initial period |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited for directors and officers; compliance affirmed |
| 10b5-1 plans | Pre-clearance required; only adopt/modify in open window while not in possession of MNPI |
| Options | Company has not issued stock options to executive officers since 2018 |
Note: Ownership percentage is computed from reported beneficial units and total shares outstanding (222,967 / 101,848,898) with both inputs from company disclosures .
Vesting schedule and potential selling windows:
- RSUs granted Feb 9, 2024 vest 1/3 annually each Feb 9 (2025–2027) .
- RSUs granted May 23, 2024 vest 1/3 annually each May 23 (2025–2027) .
- PSUs (2024–26) cliff-vest based on rTSR after Dec 31, 2026, with a mandatory 1-year post-vesting holding period on earned shares .
Employment Terms
| Topic | Provision |
|---|---|
| Employment agreement | Navient has individual employment agreement only for CEO; other NEOs (including Standish) are covered by company severance plans |
| Executive Severance Plan | For EVPs: lump sum cash = 1× (base salary + average annual incentive over last 24 months) + pro‑rated target annual incentive for year of termination; 18 months medical + outplacement; equity continues per award terms (no acceleration specified) |
| Change-in-Control (CIC) Severance Plan | Double-trigger; lump sum cash = 2× (base salary + average annual incentive) + pro‑rated target annual incentive; 24 months medical; no excise tax gross‑ups; equity accelerates only if not assumed or upon qualifying termination |
| Potential payouts (illustrative, if event on 12/31/2024) | CIC + termination: Equity vesting $729,700; Cash $2,073,767; Medical/Outplacement $37,857; Total $2,841,324 |
| Retirement treatment | Standish is eligible for retirement vesting per equity retirement policy (awards continue to vest on schedule if age/service conditions met) |
| Clawback | Enhanced clawback policies (Dodd‑Frank compliant and supplemental) apply to senior officers’ cash and equity awards |
Investment Implications
- Alignment and leverage: 2024 LTI split 50% PSUs (rTSR) and 50% RSUs for EVPs, plus 1‑year post‑vest PSU holding; anti‑hedging/pledging and ownership guidelines further align incentives with shareholder returns . The 2022–24 PSU payout at 46% demonstrates downside sensitivity to underperformance .
- Near-term vesting/selling pressure: Multiple RSU tranches vest in 2025–2027 (Feb 9 and May 23 cycles) and PSU cliff in 2026 with a 1‑year hold thereafter, creating predictable windows of potential share sales for tax/liquidity (subject to 10b5‑1 and policy pre‑clearance) .
- Retention risk: Participation in severance and CIC plans with market multiples and continued vesting/acceleration constructs provides retention support; retirement-eligibility provisions further reduce flight risk for a long-tenured operator leading transformation .
- Pay-for-performance and governance: 2024 MIP paid at 10% after below‑threshold Core EPS and efficiency results, while STIP paid at 115% for executing transformation milestones (outsourcing, divestitures, cost takeout), indicating disciplined use of incentives tied to value-driving actions; say‑on‑pay support remained high at 98.4% in 2024 .
- Execution focus: As COO, Standish’s remit is tightly linked to the drivers of expense reduction and portfolio value realization outlined in 2024–2026 plans (variable servicing, BPU exit, shared services streamlining); his incentives (STIP 2024 and rTSR‑only PSUs 2024–26) reinforce operational delivery and shareholder returns during transformation .