Brian W. Bolster
President and Chief Executive Officer, NextEra Energy Resources, LLC at NEE
Executive
About Brian W. Bolster
Executive Vice President, Finance and CFO of NextEra Energy (NEE) and FPL from May 6, 2024; appointed President and CEO of NextEra Energy Resources effective May 22, 2025, with Michael Dunne succeeding him as NEE/FPL CFO on that date . During 2024, NEE delivered GAAP net income of $6.946B ($3.37/share), record adjusted earnings of $7.063B and record adjusted EPS of $3.43; 2024 adjusted ROE was 14.7% and adjusted EPS growth was 8.2%, with NEE’s 10‑year TSR at 248% vs. 243% for the S&P 500 . Education and age are not disclosed in the proxy.
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| NextEra Energy & FPL | EVP, Finance & CFO | 2024–2025 | Oversaw finance during a year of record adjusted earnings and EPS; company achieved 2024 adjusted ROE 14.7% and adjusted EPS growth 8.2% . |
| NextEra Energy Resources | President & CEO | 2025–present | Leads NEER; cited as CEO in Point Beach nuclear license renewal press release (Sept 29, 2025) . |
External Roles
None disclosed.
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2024 | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | $628,462 | Prorated; annual rate $950,000 starting May 6, 2024 . |
| Target Bonus % of Salary | 70% | NEE annual incentive plan. |
| Actual Annual Incentive Paid | $1,236,900 | Based on 1.81 company performance rating . |
| Sign‑on Bonus | $1,500,000 | Subject to three‑year repayment terms . |
Performance Compensation
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual/Payout | Vesting/Timing |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual Incentive – Financial (Adjusted ROE) | 25% of total AIP | Industry matrix (10‑yr utilities) | 14.7% → Payout factor 2.00 | Paid Feb 2025 . |
| Annual Incentive – Financial (Adjusted EPS Growth) | 25% of total AIP | Industry matrix (10‑yr utilities) | 8.2% ; contributes to AIP 2.00 factor via matrix | Paid Feb 2025 . |
| Annual Incentive – Operational (FPL/NEER) | 50% of total AIP | Benchmark‑based goals | Overall operational factor 1.62 (FPL 1.65; NEER 1.59) | Paid Feb 2025 . |
| Overall AIP Payout | — | — | 181% of target (rating 1.81) | Paid Feb 2025 . |
| 2024 Performance Shares (target) | — | 31,202 shares | Grant‑date FV $3,144,288 | Three‑year performance to 12/31/2026; ±20% TSR modifier; vest at cycle end . |
| 2024 Performance‑based Restricted Stock | — | 9,543 shares | Grant‑date FV $679,939 | Vests one‑third annually contingent on adjusted earnings ≥$3.0B each year (2024–2026) . |
| 2024 Stock Options | — | 43,899 options @ $71.25 | Grant‑date FV $679,996 | 10‑yr term; vest 1/3 on 5/6/2025, 5/6/2026, 5/6/2027 . |
| 2024 Equity Mix (Bolster) | — | 60% PSUs; 20% Options; 20% RS | — | — |
Vesting schedules (specific):
- Performance‑based RS: 3,181 on 5/6/2025; 3,181 on 5/6/2026; 24,233 on 5/6/2027 .
- Stock options (5/6/2024 grant): 1/3 vest on 5/6/2025, 5/6/2026, 5/6/2027; expire 5/6/2034 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Ownership Detail | Amount |
|---|---|
| Shares Owned | 41,091 (incl. 37,554 restricted stock) . |
| Shares Acquirable Within 60 Days | 0 . |
| Phantom/Deferred Shares | 272 . |
| Total Beneficial Ownership | 41,091 . |
| Shares Pledged | None; company states no shares are pledged . |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | Senior executives: 3x base salary; compliance within 5 years of appointment . |
| Compliance Status | As of 12/31/2024, all NEOs except Bolster met guidelines; Bolster joined in 2024 and is in compliance period . |
| Anti‑Hedging/Pledging | Hedging prohibited; pledging prohibited per Trading Policy . |
| Clawback | Incentive compensation recoupment aligned to NYSE rules and financial restatements . |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Key Terms |
|---|---|
| Appointment & Roles | Joined May 6, 2024 as EVP Finance & CFO (NEE/FPL); appointed NEER President & CEO effective May 22, 2025 . |
| Severance Plan (non‑CIC) | Cash: 2× base + 2× target bonus (paid in two annual installments); equity vests pro rata and pays at end of performance periods; includes outplacement; subject to plan cap . |
| Retention Agreements (CIC) | Double‑trigger equity vesting for agreements entered since 2021; Bolster’s LTI does not vest upon change in control absent termination . |
| CIC Cash Severance | 3× (base + annual incentive, higher of target or 3‑yr average) payable within 45 days (subject to 409A) . |
| Potential Payment (CIC + Qualifying Termination) | Total $11,476,709 comprising: Cash severance $4,845,000; LTI awards $6,395,621; Welfare $137,338; Perquisites $75,000; Outplacement $23,750; No SERP increment; No gross‑up . |
| Severance Scenario (non‑CIC; 12/31/2024 hypothetical) | Total $4,632,880 comprising: Cash $3,230,000; PS pro‑rata $745,580; RS pro‑rata $602,980; Options pro‑rata $19,320; Perqs/outplacement $35,000 . |
| Non‑Compete/Non‑Solicit | Required under Severance Plan and equity agreements; equity agreements include non‑solicit and non‑compete provisions . |
| Trading Policy | Prohibits short sales, hedging, margin accounts, pledging . |
| Tax Gross‑ups | No excise tax gross‑ups in retention agreements entered since 2009/2021; Bolster’s agreement does not include gross‑up . |
Perquisites and Deferred Compensation (alignment/retention levers)
- Perquisites in 2024 included umbrella excess liability insurance, relocation expenses of $180,000, a pro‑rated cash perquisite allowance of $15,385 in lieu of executive vehicle program, matching gifts ($20,000 for educational institutions), and incremental personal aircraft use ($19,436); employer contributions to defined contribution SERP $17,684; SERP aggregate balance $19,469 .
Investment Implications
- Near‑term selling pressure: RS tranches vest on 5/6/2025 and 5/6/2026 (3,181 shares each) with a large 2027 tranche (24,233 shares), and options vest annually through 2027; these events can create mechanical share sales for tax withholding and liquidity, though hedging/pledging are prohibited and ownership guidelines require retention until compliance is met .
- Pay‑for‑performance alignment: AIP relies 50% on long‑term financial matrix (adjusted ROE/EPS vs 10‑yr utilities) and 50% on operational benchmarks; 2024 payout was 181% of target, evidencing strong linkage to company performance .
- Retention risk mitigants: Three‑year sign‑on bonus with repayment obligation, stock ownership guidelines (3× salary within five years), clawback policy, and double‑trigger CIC terms reduce flight risk and discourage opportunistic turnover around corporate events .
- Governance quality: Independent compensation consultant (FW Cook), anti‑hedging/pledging, no option repricing, annual say‑on‑pay with Board recommending “FOR” support, and robust shareholder outreach suggest disciplined compensation oversight .