Brian W. Bolster
NEXTERA ENERGYAbout Brian W. Bolster
Executive Vice President, Finance and CFO of NextEra Energy (NEE) and FPL from May 6, 2024; appointed President and CEO of NextEra Energy Resources effective May 22, 2025, with Michael Dunne succeeding him as NEE/FPL CFO on that date . During 2024, NEE delivered GAAP net income of $6.946B ($3.37/share), record adjusted earnings of $7.063B and record adjusted EPS of $3.43; 2024 adjusted ROE was 14.7% and adjusted EPS growth was 8.2%, with NEE’s 10‑year TSR at 248% vs. 243% for the S&P 500 . Education and age are not disclosed in the proxy.
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| NextEra Energy & FPL | EVP, Finance & CFO | 2024–2025 | Oversaw finance during a year of record adjusted earnings and EPS; company achieved 2024 adjusted ROE 14.7% and adjusted EPS growth 8.2% . |
| NextEra Energy Resources | President & CEO | 2025–present | Leads NEER; cited as CEO in Point Beach nuclear license renewal press release (Sept 29, 2025) . |
External Roles
None disclosed.
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2024 | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | $628,462 | Prorated; annual rate $950,000 starting May 6, 2024 . |
| Target Bonus % of Salary | 70% | NEE annual incentive plan. |
| Actual Annual Incentive Paid | $1,236,900 | Based on 1.81 company performance rating . |
| Sign‑on Bonus | $1,500,000 | Subject to three‑year repayment terms . |
Performance Compensation
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual/Payout | Vesting/Timing |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual Incentive – Financial (Adjusted ROE) | 25% of total AIP | Industry matrix (10‑yr utilities) | 14.7% → Payout factor 2.00 | Paid Feb 2025 . |
| Annual Incentive – Financial (Adjusted EPS Growth) | 25% of total AIP | Industry matrix (10‑yr utilities) | 8.2% ; contributes to AIP 2.00 factor via matrix | Paid Feb 2025 . |
| Annual Incentive – Operational (FPL/NEER) | 50% of total AIP | Benchmark‑based goals | Overall operational factor 1.62 (FPL 1.65; NEER 1.59) | Paid Feb 2025 . |
| Overall AIP Payout | — | — | 181% of target (rating 1.81) | Paid Feb 2025 . |
| 2024 Performance Shares (target) | — | 31,202 shares | Grant‑date FV $3,144,288 | Three‑year performance to 12/31/2026; ±20% TSR modifier; vest at cycle end . |
| 2024 Performance‑based Restricted Stock | — | 9,543 shares | Grant‑date FV $679,939 | Vests one‑third annually contingent on adjusted earnings ≥$3.0B each year (2024–2026) . |
| 2024 Stock Options | — | 43,899 options @ $71.25 | Grant‑date FV $679,996 | 10‑yr term; vest 1/3 on 5/6/2025, 5/6/2026, 5/6/2027 . |
| 2024 Equity Mix (Bolster) | — | 60% PSUs; 20% Options; 20% RS | — | — |
Vesting schedules (specific):
- Performance‑based RS: 3,181 on 5/6/2025; 3,181 on 5/6/2026; 24,233 on 5/6/2027 .
- Stock options (5/6/2024 grant): 1/3 vest on 5/6/2025, 5/6/2026, 5/6/2027; expire 5/6/2034 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Ownership Detail | Amount |
|---|---|
| Shares Owned | 41,091 (incl. 37,554 restricted stock) . |
| Shares Acquirable Within 60 Days | 0 . |
| Phantom/Deferred Shares | 272 . |
| Total Beneficial Ownership | 41,091 . |
| Shares Pledged | None; company states no shares are pledged . |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | Senior executives: 3x base salary; compliance within 5 years of appointment . |
| Compliance Status | As of 12/31/2024, all NEOs except Bolster met guidelines; Bolster joined in 2024 and is in compliance period . |
| Anti‑Hedging/Pledging | Hedging prohibited; pledging prohibited per Trading Policy . |
| Clawback | Incentive compensation recoupment aligned to NYSE rules and financial restatements . |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Key Terms |
|---|---|
| Appointment & Roles | Joined May 6, 2024 as EVP Finance & CFO (NEE/FPL); appointed NEER President & CEO effective May 22, 2025 . |
| Severance Plan (non‑CIC) | Cash: 2× base + 2× target bonus (paid in two annual installments); equity vests pro rata and pays at end of performance periods; includes outplacement; subject to plan cap . |
| Retention Agreements (CIC) | Double‑trigger equity vesting for agreements entered since 2021; Bolster’s LTI does not vest upon change in control absent termination . |
| CIC Cash Severance | 3× (base + annual incentive, higher of target or 3‑yr average) payable within 45 days (subject to 409A) . |
| Potential Payment (CIC + Qualifying Termination) | Total $11,476,709 comprising: Cash severance $4,845,000; LTI awards $6,395,621; Welfare $137,338; Perquisites $75,000; Outplacement $23,750; No SERP increment; No gross‑up . |
| Severance Scenario (non‑CIC; 12/31/2024 hypothetical) | Total $4,632,880 comprising: Cash $3,230,000; PS pro‑rata $745,580; RS pro‑rata $602,980; Options pro‑rata $19,320; Perqs/outplacement $35,000 . |
| Non‑Compete/Non‑Solicit | Required under Severance Plan and equity agreements; equity agreements include non‑solicit and non‑compete provisions . |
| Trading Policy | Prohibits short sales, hedging, margin accounts, pledging . |
| Tax Gross‑ups | No excise tax gross‑ups in retention agreements entered since 2009/2021; Bolster’s agreement does not include gross‑up . |
Perquisites and Deferred Compensation (alignment/retention levers)
- Perquisites in 2024 included umbrella excess liability insurance, relocation expenses of $180,000, a pro‑rated cash perquisite allowance of $15,385 in lieu of executive vehicle program, matching gifts ($20,000 for educational institutions), and incremental personal aircraft use ($19,436); employer contributions to defined contribution SERP $17,684; SERP aggregate balance $19,469 .
Investment Implications
- Near‑term selling pressure: RS tranches vest on 5/6/2025 and 5/6/2026 (3,181 shares each) with a large 2027 tranche (24,233 shares), and options vest annually through 2027; these events can create mechanical share sales for tax withholding and liquidity, though hedging/pledging are prohibited and ownership guidelines require retention until compliance is met .
- Pay‑for‑performance alignment: AIP relies 50% on long‑term financial matrix (adjusted ROE/EPS vs 10‑yr utilities) and 50% on operational benchmarks; 2024 payout was 181% of target, evidencing strong linkage to company performance .
- Retention risk mitigants: Three‑year sign‑on bonus with repayment obligation, stock ownership guidelines (3× salary within five years), clawback policy, and double‑trigger CIC terms reduce flight risk and discourage opportunistic turnover around corporate events .
- Governance quality: Independent compensation consultant (FW Cook), anti‑hedging/pledging, no option repricing, annual say‑on‑pay with Board recommending “FOR” support, and robust shareholder outreach suggest disciplined compensation oversight .