Christopher H. Peterson
NEWELL BRANDSAbout Christopher H. Peterson
Christopher H. Peterson is President & CEO of Newell Brands (since May 2023) and a director (since 2023), age 58, with 30+ years in consumer goods, finance, and operations across Procter & Gamble, Ralph Lauren, and Revlon . Under his leadership in 2024, Newell improved core sales growth rates by 870 bps, expanded normalized gross margin by 460 bps, generated nearly $500M of operating cash flow, and delivered 18% TSR, placing NWL near the top of relevant peer sets for that year . 2024 PRSUs from the 2022 LTIP paid 0% based on three-year performance, while annual bonus paid 168% of target to recognize strong in-year execution against cash, EPS, productivity, and forecast accuracy targets .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Newell Brands | CEO; President; CFO; President, Business Operations; Interim CEO | CEO since 2023; President since 2022; CFO 2018–Jan 2023; President, Business Operations 2020–2022; Interim CEO Jun–Oct 2019 | Led turnaround plan, margin and cash improvements; prior CFO/operations leadership |
| Revlon | COO, Operations; CFO; EVP & COO, Operations | 2017–2018; EVP Apr–Aug 2018 | Operational and finance leadership at a global beauty company |
| Ralph Lauren | President, Global Brands; EVP, Chief Administrative Officer & CFO; SVP & CFO | 2012–2017 | Global brand, finance, and administrative leadership at a premium lifestyle brand |
| Procter & Gamble | Various financial management positions | 1992–2012 | 20 years in financial management at a global CPG company |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| BJ’s Wholesale Club Holdings, Inc. | Director | Current (as disclosed) | Public company board service |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $880,208 | $1,150,000 | $1,300,000 |
| Target Bonus (% of Earned Base) | Not disclosed | 150% (CEO rate set upon appointment in 2023) | 150% |
| Actual Bonus Paid ($) | $274,625 | $1,575,038 | $3,276,000 |
| Stock Awards Grant-Date Fair Value ($) | $2,694,447 | $22,612,298 | $7,499,987 |
| Option Awards Grant-Date Fair Value ($) | $1,381,963 | — | — |
| All Other Compensation ($) | $109,635 | $199,371 | $316,073 |
| Total ($) | $5,340,878 | $25,536,707 | $12,392,060 |
Performance Compensation
| Metric (Corporate Bonus Plan 2024) | Weight | Minimum | Target Zone | Max | Actual | Payout (% of Target) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Operating Cash Flow | 25% | >$250M | $375–$425M | $550M | $526M | 176% |
| Adjusted EPS | 25% | >$0.50 | $0.58–$0.62 | $0.70 | $0.68 | 175% |
| Core Sales | 20% | >$7.275B | $7.80–$7.87B | $8.16B | $7.81B | 100% |
| FUEL Productivity | 15% | >$150M | $225M | $325M | $341M | 200% |
| Weighted Forecast Accuracy | 15% | >35% | 38% | 45% | 45.6% | 200% |
| Final Corporate Bonus Payout | — | — | — | — | — | 168% (Peterson) |
| 2024 LTIP PRSUs (Grant 2/16/2024) | Weight | Year | Minimum | Target | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow Productivity | 16.67% | 2024 | >60% | 90% | 120% |
| Free Cash Flow Productivity | 16.67% | 2025 | >60% | 90% | 120% |
| Free Cash Flow Productivity | 16.67% | 2026 | >60% | 90% | 120% |
| Annual Adjusted EPS Performance | 16.67% | 2024 | >$0.50 | $0.60 | $0.68 |
| Annual Adjusted EPS Growth | 16.67% | 2025 | >0% | 8% | 15% |
| Annual Adjusted EPS Growth | 16.67% | 2026 | >0% | 8% | 15% |
| 2024 LTIP Award Structure (CEO) | Target Value | PRSUs Granted | TRSUs Granted | Grant Date | Grant Price |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Peterson | $7,500,000 | 488,917 | 488,917 | Feb 16, 2024 | $7.67 |
| 2022 LTIP PRSU Outcome (3-year) | Core Sales Growth (2022/2023/2024) | Cumulative Free Cash Flow | TSR Modifier |
|---|---|---|---|
| Payout | 0%/0%/0% (below threshold) | $457M vs $2.0B target (0% payout) | 10th of 11 comparators → 0% overall so no impact |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial ownership: 1,132,773 shares for Peterson (includes 617,198 vested options); less than 1% of outstanding shares .
- Stock ownership guidelines: CEO must hold 6x annual salary; all NEOs in compliance; 75% net-after-tax RSU retention until guidelines met .
- Anti-hedging/anti-pledging: Company prohibits hedging and pledging of Company securities for executives and directors .
- 2024 RSU vesting and option holdings (selected): TRSUs/PRSUs and options outstanding per year-end schedule below .
| Peterson Outstanding Awards at 12/31/2024 | Count/Value |
|---|---|
| Unvested TRSUs (selected tranches) | 488,917 ($4,869,613) |
| Unvested PRSUs (selected tranches) | 488,917 ($4,869,613); 1,724,137 ($17,172,405); 217,857 ($2,169,856); 123,741 ($1,232,460) |
| Options (exercisable/unexercisable) | 22,133/11,067 @ $22.59 (exp. 5/5/2032); 123,259/61,630 @ $25.86 (exp. 2/18/2032); fully vested grants @ $23.79 (2021), $20.02 (2020) |
| Upcoming Vesting Dates (Peterson) | Shares |
|---|---|
| TRSUs: 2/16/2025 (162,972); 2/17/2025 (41,247); 2/18/2025 (24,651); 5/5/2025 (4,426); 5/16/2025 (72,619); 2/16/2026 (162,972); 2/17/2026 (41,247); 5/16/2026 (72,619); 2/16/2027 (162,973) | |
| PRSUs: 2/18/2025 (61,629); 5/5/2025 (11,066); 2/17/2026 (123,741); 2/27/2026 (1,724,137); 5/16/2026 (217,857); 2/16/2027 (488,917) |
Employment Terms
- Severance Plan (no CIC): CEO receives 2x base + target bonus; pro-rata bonus based on actual; pro-rata vesting of equity/options per plan; up to 2 years medical/dental at active rates; 12 months outplacement; restrictive covenants including non-compete/non-solicit for duration equal to severance period (≤2 years) .
- Severance Plan (with CIC, double trigger): All NEOs receive 2x base + target bonus; pro-rata target bonus; full vesting of equity at target for uncompleted performance; extended option exercise window (≥3 years or remaining term) .
- CEO-specific offer letter: For retirement-eligible or involuntary termination (other than for Good Cause), continued vesting of all post-offer awards; options survive up to 5 years; pro-rata annual bonus based on actual corporate performance; Severance Plan amendments cannot reduce his benefits .
- Clawback: Mandatory recovery of incentive-based compensation for material financial restatements per SEC/Nasdaq 10D-1; applies to EPS/TSR-linked awards .
- Tax gross-ups: None; plan includes cutback to avoid 280G excise tax unless paying excise yields higher net benefit .
| Potential Payments (as of 12/31/2024) | Death/Disability | Qualifying Termination (No CIC) | Qualifying Termination (Within 24 Months of CIC) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Severance Payment | — | $6,500,000 | $6,500,000 |
| Pro-rata Bonus | $3,276,000 | $3,276,000 | $1,950,000 (target basis) |
| Unvested RSUs/Options (value) | $33,595,807 | $33,540,698 | $33,595,807 |
| Health & Welfare | — | $24,115 | $24,115 |
| Outplacement | — | $30,000 | $30,000 |
| Total Estimated Value | $36,871,807 | $43,370,813 | $42,099,922 |
Board Governance
- Board service: Director since 2023 (management director, not independent) .
- Committee roles: CEO is not listed as a member of standing committees; committees are fully independent (Audit; Compensation & Human Capital; Nominating/Governance) .
- Dual-role implications: NWL maintains an independent non-executive Chair (Bridget Ryan Berman since May 8, 2024), separating Chair/CEO; if combined, Board would appoint a Lead Independent Director; non-management directors held four executive sessions in 2024 .
- Attendance: Board held six meetings in 2024; all directors attended at least 75% of Board and committee meetings and the 2024 annual meeting .
Performance & Track Record
- 2024 company execution highlights: fully operationalized new strategy and operating model; core sales growth rate improved by 870 bps; normalized gross margin up 460 bps; operating cash flow ~ $500M enabling de-leveraging; achieved stretch forecast accuracy and improved fill rates; delivered 18% TSR .
- Pay outcomes consistent with performance: 2022–2024 LTIP PRSUs paid 0%; 2024 bonus paid 168% for Peterson .
Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 2024 Say-on-Pay vote: ~43% support; proposal did not pass .
- Company response: streamlined metrics in Bonus Plan (6→5) and LTIP (3→2); discontinued one-time special awards except in extraordinary cases; enhanced disclosure of in-process LTIP targets; removed TSR from 2024–2025 LTIP PRSUs to focus on EPS and free cash flow productivity .
Compensation Peer Group
Avery Dennison; Bath & Body Works; Church & Dwight; Colgate-Palmolive; Electrolux AB; Fortune Brands Innovations; General Mills; Helen of Troy; Kimberly-Clark; Masco; Mattel; Reckitt Benckiser; Spectrum Brands; Stanley Black & Decker; The Clorox Company; VF Corporation; Whirlpool .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: High “at risk” pay with 53% of 2024 CEO target total direct compensation contingent on performance; PRSUs tied to EPS growth and free cash flow productivity over 2024–2026 .
- Retention risk: CEO offer letter grants continued vesting and extended option exercise upon retirement eligibility or certain terminations, reducing flight risk; severance is double-trigger in CIC events; non-compete/s non-solicit covenants apply for up to two years .
- Trading signals: Anti-hedging/anti-pledging policies and 75% post-vest retention to meet ownership guidelines mitigate selling pressure, but sizable scheduled RSU vestings through 2027 create periodic supply events around vest dates and may result in tax-related sales; monitor Form 4s for timing and net disposition volumes .
- Pay-for-performance credibility: 0% payout on 2022 LTIP PRSUs demonstrates rigor; 2024 bonus overachievement reflects in-year execution on cash/EPS/productivity/forecast accuracy; ongoing focus on earnings and cash generation in LTIP supports deleveraging and margin expansion strategy .