Christopher Jensen
About Christopher Jensen
Christopher Jensen (born 1969, American) is Executive Vice President and Chief People Officer at NXP Semiconductors, serving in this role since June 2020; he oversees global human resources, people strategy, and culture, and was integral to the cultural integration following NXP’s merger with Freescale in 2015 . He holds a B.S. in organizational behavior from the University of San Francisco and an MBA from Baylor University (Beta Gamma Sigma) . Company performance context for 2024: revenue $12.61B (-5% YoY), GAAP gross margin 56.4% (-50 bps), operating margin 27.1% (-50 bps), diluted EPS $9.73, cash from operations $2.78B; non-GAAP gross margin 58.1% (-40 bps), operating margin 34.6% (-50 bps), non-GAAP FCF $2.09B, capital return $2.4B (TTM) . NXP’s pay program is heavily at-risk: on average, other NEOs (including Jensen) had ~86% of target compensation at risk and ~64% directly linked to performance in 2024 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| NXP Semiconductors | Executive VP, Chief People Officer | Since June 2020 | Leads global HR, people strategy, culture; integral to post-merger cultural integration |
| NXP (post-Freescale merger) | Senior HR leadership | Since 2015 | Drove cultural integration after 2015 merger |
| Freescale Semiconductor | Executive HR positions | Not disclosed | Led HR functions including change management and comp/benefits; M&A experience |
| Applied Materials | Executive HR positions | Not disclosed | HR leadership (change management, comp/benefits) |
| Tandem Computers | Executive HR positions | Not disclosed | HR leadership roles |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Detail |
|---|---|
| Annualized Base Salary (as of Dec 31, 2024) | $540,000; 6% YoY increase |
| Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) Target | 80% of base salary |
Multi-year salary (from SCT):
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | $490,154 | $510,000 | $525,000 |
Performance Compensation
AIP structure and outcomes:
- AIP components and weights (2024): 1H Revenue (20%), 1H Adjusted Gross Margin (20%), 2H Revenue (20%), 2H Adjusted Gross Margin (20%), Annual Sustainability Scorecard (20%); sustainability portion only pays if non-GAAP operating margin ≥32%; overall AIP payout capped at 200% of target .
- 2024 AIP target and payout for Jensen: target $432,000; payout $265,248 (61.4% of target) .
| Metric | Weighting | Target / Thresholds | Actual / Notes | Payout Impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1H Revenue | 20% | Set by HRCC vs AOP (not disclosed) | Not disclosed | Included in 61.4% overall payout |
| 1H Adjusted Gross Margin | 20% | Set by HRCC vs AOP (not disclosed) | Not disclosed | Included in 61.4% overall payout |
| 2H Revenue | 20% | Set by HRCC vs AOP (not disclosed) | Not disclosed | Included in 61.4% overall payout |
| 2H Adjusted Gross Margin | 20% | Set by HRCC vs AOP (not disclosed) | Not disclosed | Included in 61.4% overall payout |
| Annual Sustainability Scorecard | 20% | No payout if non-GAAP Op Margin <32% | Detailed achievements below | Included in 61.4% overall payout |
2024 Sustainability Scorecard achievements:
| Goal | Achievement |
|---|---|
| Retention | 3/3 points; retention met stretch goal |
| Team Member Engagement | 2/3 points; IDL engagement index between 75th–90th percentile |
| Women in the Workforce (IDL) | 1/3 points; below 2024 aspiration |
| Energy Efficiency | 2/3 points; 5% emissions reduction |
| Water Efficiency | 3/3 points; recycled water at stretch goal |
| Scope 3 Emissions Program | 1/3 points; below pre-established goal |
Long-Term Incentive (LTI) program and grants:
- Design: 70% PSUs (RTSR vs peer group), 30% RSUs; PSUs cliff-vest 3 years, pay 0–2x shares based on RTSR; RSUs vest 1/3 annually over 3 years .
- 2024 LTI target (granted 11/5/2024, grant-date close $224.65): total $3,000,000; PSUs $2,100,000 (9,348 target units); RSUs $900,000 (4,007 units) .
- PSU historical realizations: 2018 grant vested 2021 at 135.29%; 2019→2022 at 84.21%; 2020→2023 at 173.68%; 2021→2024 at 76.32% .
| LTI Component | Grant Date | Target Value ($) | Units | Vesting | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs (RTSR) | 11/5/2024 | $2,100,000 | 9,348 | Cliff vest at 3 years (Nov 2027) | 0–2x shares based on RTSR vs peer group; per-share fair value $258.19 |
| RSUs | 11/5/2024 | $900,000 | 4,007 | 1/3 per year over 3 years | Time-based retention |
Value realized on vesting (2024):
| Metric | 2024 |
|---|---|
| Shares vested | 9,969 |
| Value realized ($) | $2,334,021 |
Summary Compensation (Jensen only):
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | $490,154 | $510,000 | $525,000 |
| Stock Awards ($) | $2,776,173 | $3,009,558 | $3,283,800 |
| AIP (Non-Equity) ($) | $586,704 | $500,208 | $265,248 |
| All Other Comp ($) | $15,250 | $20,233 | $20,650 |
| Total ($) | $3,868,281 | $4,039,999 | $4,094,698 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial ownership: 6,713 common shares; less than 1% of outstanding shares .
- Ownership guidelines: Section 16 officers (including NEOs) must hold 3x base salary; compliance window 5 years; all NEOs are in compliance; count shares owned and unvested time-based RSUs toward guideline; retain 100% of net shares from LTI until guideline met .
- Hedging/pledging: Hedging, pledging, hypothecating, short selling prohibited; derivatives transactions disallowed .
Beneficial ownership:
| Holder | Shares | % Outstanding |
|---|---|---|
| Christopher Jensen | 6,713 | * (less than 1%) |
Outstanding equity (as of Dec 31, 2024; close $207.85):
| Award Type | Tranche | Unvested Units (#) | Market Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs | 2022 grant | 1,582 | $328,819 |
| RSUs | 2023 grant | 2,961 | $615,444 |
| RSUs | 2024 grant | 4,007 | $832,855 |
| PSUs (unearned) | 2022 grant | 11,064 | $2,299,652 |
| PSUs (unearned) | 2023 grant | 10,361 | $2,153,534 |
| PSUs (unearned) | 2024 grant | 9,348 | $1,942,982 |
| Stock Options | — | None outstanding | — |
Employment Terms
- Employment agreement: US-based executive agreement with NXP USA; 3 months’ notice by either party; immediate termination for misconduct .
- Severance (non-CoC): If terminated absent misconduct, lump sum of one year base salary and pro-rata AIP for period worked, contingent on release; 12-month non-compete and non-solicit; confidentiality obligations .
- Change-of-control (double-trigger): If terminated without cause or resigns for good reason within 12 months post-CoC, benefits include minimum 24 months base pay and 2x target bonus or higher local program, accelerated vesting per award terms, 12 months benefits continuation for US-based NEOs; no excise tax gross-ups .
- Clawbacks: Dodd-Frank compliant clawback adopted in 2023; Dutch law clawbacks for performance-based compensation; no recoveries to date .
Potential payments (assumes event on Dec 31, 2024; stock $207.85):
| Scenario | Cash ($) | Equity ($) | Benefits ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Involuntary (Company convenience, no cause) | $805,248 | $2,245,196 | — | $3,050,444 |
| Death | $265,248 | $4,934,983 | — | $5,200,231 |
| Disability | $265,248 | $2,245,196 | — | $2,510,444 |
| CoC + termination within 12 months | $2,209,248 | $4,934,983 | $25,487 | $7,169,718 |
Investment Implications
- Strong pay-for-performance alignment: Jensen’s compensation is predominantly at-risk, with AIP tied to revenue/gross margin halves and a rigorous sustainability scorecard; 2024 AIP paid 61.4% of target amid a softer market, evidencing payout sensitivity to operating conditions .
- Long-term equity design drives retention and alignment: RSUs vest evenly over three years and PSUs cliff-vest at three years with RTSR gating; historical PSU realizations have varied with market/peer TSR, reducing windfall risk and reinforcing performance linkage .
- Limited selling pressure and governance safeguards: EOP requires retention of net shares until guidelines are met, and hedging/pledging is prohibited—mitigating forced selling/pledging risk; clawback policies further strengthen downside accountability .
- Defined severance economics: Non-CoC severance is modest (one-year base + pro-rata AIP), while CoC double-trigger economics (2x base + 2x target AIP, accelerated vesting) are competitive but not excessive (no excise tax gross-ups), limiting payout inflation risk .