William Wallace, IV
About William Wallace, IV
William Wallace, IV is Origin Bancorp’s Chief Financial Officer, age 50 as of March 13, 2025, and joined OBK in 2022 after roughly 20 years in financial services, most recently as a Managing Director and equity research analyst at Raymond James; he holds a B.A. in Anthropology from the University of Virginia and an MBA from The College of William & Mary . Company performance during his tenure shows 2024 net income of $76.5 million, ROAA of 0.77%, and OBK’s annual TSR of -4.64% (cumulative five-year TSR -4.77%), with normalized STIP metrics focused on profitability and credit quality . His 2024 individual scorecard was assessed at 126% of target, reflecting modeling work driving “Optimize Origin,” market profitability profiling, and banker profitability analytics .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Raymond James & Associates | Managing Director, Equity Research Analyst | 2011–2022 | Covered regional/community banks; led detailed financial statement analysis/forecasting and equity valuation; coverage included OBK . |
| Howe Barnes Hoefer & Arnett | Equity Research Analyst | 2010–2011 | Role prior to RJ acquisition; regional bank coverage and analytical modeling . |
| FBR Capital Markets | Assistant Vice President | Prior to 2010 | Supported coverage of mid-/large-cap regional and super-regional banks/thrifts . |
External Roles
No external public-company directorships or committee roles are disclosed for Mr. Wallace in the 2025 proxy .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 188,921 | 475,000 | 475,000 |
| Target STIP (% of salary) | 40% | 40% | 40% |
| STIP Opportunity Range (% of salary) | Threshold 20%; Max 60% | Threshold 20%; Max 60% | Threshold 20%; Max 60% |
Perquisites (2024): Employer 401(k) contribution $10,350; no auto allowance or country club dues disclosed for Wallace .
Performance Compensation
Short-Term Incentive Plan (STIP) – Design and Outcomes
| Financial Metric | Weighting (%) | Target | Actual (2024) | % of Target Earned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Normalized PTPP ROAA | 30.0 | 1.16% | 1.16% | 100.0% |
| Normalized Net Income | 25.0 | $76.9M | $76.9M | 100.0% |
| NPA Ratio | 10.0 | 1.00% | 1.04% | 90.0% |
| NCO Ratio | 10.0 | 0.25% | 0.25% | 100.0% |
| Financial Achievement (weighted) | 75.0 | — | — | 98.7% |
CFO bonus payout and components (2024): Financial factor 98.7%; Individual scorecard 126.0%; Combined 105.5%; Actual bonus earned $200,450 .
Wallace’s 2024 scorecard achievements:
- Built financial models driving “Optimize Origin” changes; deployed market profitability profiles using funding gap/excess; created banker profitability reporting analytics .
Long-Term Incentive (LTI) – Structure and Grants
| LTI Component | Metric(s) | Weighting | Grant Detail | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs (2024) | ROAA and ROAE (3-year avg) | ROAA 50%; ROAE 50% | Target value $95,000; target units 2,877; payout 50–150% of target based on 85–115% of goal | Vests Feb 20, 2027, based on 2024–2026 performance . |
| RSUs (2024) | Stock price exposure | — | Target value $95,000; 2,877 units | 33.3% annually; final tranche May 20, 2027 . |
| 2023 PSU/RSU | Same PSU metrics; time-based RSUs | — | 1,198 PSUs; 1,598 RSUs (unearned/unvested as of 12/31/24) | PSUs vest Feb 17, 2026; RSUs 33.3% annually; final tranche Feb 17, 2026 . |
| 2022 RSU (sign-on) | Stock price exposure | — | 6,678 RSUs unvested at 12/31/24 (market value $222,311) | 20% annually; final tranche Aug 18, 2027 . |
Note: Mr. Wallace did not receive the February 2022 PSU grant due to joining after the grant date .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Total beneficial ownership (shares) | 8,870 (less than 1% of shares outstanding) . |
| Shares in 401(k) | 1,792 . |
| Unvested RSUs (counts, market value) | 6,678 (2022 RSU), $222,311 . |
| Unearned PSUs/RSUs (counts, market value) | 1,598 RSUs (2023), $53,197; 1,198 PSUs (2023), $39,881; 2,877 RSUs (2024), $95,775; 4,315 PSUs (2024), $143,646 . |
| Stock ownership guideline | Senior Executive Officers: 2x base salary; all executives in compliance at 12/31/24 . |
| Hedging/Pledging policy | Hedging prohibited; pledging discouraged and requires prior approval; margin accounts not permitted . |
| Clawback | Mandatory recovery of incentive-based compensation upon restatement; applies to current/former executive officers; no indemnification . |
Potential insider selling pressure: RSUs vest ratably through 2027 (2024/2023 awards 33.3% annually; 2022 sign-on RSUs 20% annually), increasing deliverable shares over the next 2–3 years; PSUs vest in 2026–2027 contingent on ROAA/ROAE outcomes .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Key Terms |
|---|---|
| CIC Agreement | Effective Aug 8, 2022; initial 3-year term; auto-renews for successive 1-year terms unless notice 90 days prior to end of term . |
| CIC Severance (double trigger) | If terminated without Cause or for Good Reason within two years following a CIC (or specified pre-CIC periods): lump sum 2x current base salary + 2x average STIP bonus paid over prior three years (or fewer years employed) . |
| Non-solicit | For one year following a CIC: cannot solicit OBK customers in specified parishes/counties; cannot recruit/hire employees (six-month lookback) . |
| Clawback on STIP | STIP bonuses subject to clawback per policy . |
| Company-paid life insurance | 2x salary up to $500,000 . |
Potential Payments Upon Termination/CIC (as of 12/31/2024):
| Scenario | CIC Agreement ($) | Life Insurance ($) | STIP ($) | RSU/PSU Accelerated Vesting ($) | Accrued PTO ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| For Cause | — | — | — | — | 49,327 | 49,327 |
| Other Than Cause | — | — | — | 85,047 | 49,327 | 134,374 |
| Death | — | 500,000 | 200,450 | 456,330 | 49,327 | 1,206,107 |
| Disability | — | — | 200,450 | 456,330 | 49,327 | 706,107 |
| CIC | 1,263,969 | — | — | 546,822 | 49,327 | 1,860,118 |
| Retirement | — | — | 200,450 | 456,330 | 49,327 | 706,107 |
Equity acceleration terms: RSUs accelerate 100% on death, disability, CIC (if not substituted/converted), or qualified retirement; PSUs accelerate pro rata based on elapsed time, with 100% of target if PSUs are not assumed/equivalently substituted at CIC or terminated without cause within 12 months post-CIC; valuation uses $33.29/share at Dec 31, 2024 .
Performance & Track Record
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Income ($MM) | 87.7 | 83.8 | 76.5 |
| ROAA (%) | 1.01 | 0.84 | 0.77 |
| OBK Annual TSR (%) | -13.30 | -1.22 | -4.64 |
| Net Interest Income ($MM) | — | 299.6 | 300.4 |
Highlights: NIM-FTE stable at 3.22% (vs 3.23% in 2023); provision for credit losses down 55.5% to $7.4M; BVPS up 7.0% to $36.71; nonperforming LHFI to total LHFI rose to 0.99%; net charge-offs to average LHFI increased to 0.18% .
Compensation Governance & Peer Benchmarking
- 2024 compensation peer group of 20 banks used to set targets and LTI values; Meridian Compensation Partners served as independent consultant advising on peer trends, CEO/executive/director pay vs peers, and CD&A reviews .
- Mix emphasizes at-risk pay: other NEOs’ target pay 48% performance-based/at-risk (including RSUs) .
- Governance “do/don’t” framework: no excise tax gross-ups, no option repricing without shareholder approval, no hedging, pledging discouraged, minimum 3-year vesting, no single-trigger CIC equity acceleration in plan documents, clawback policy in place .
Compensation & Ownership Detail (Multi-year)
| Component ($) | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary | 188,921 | 475,000 | 475,000 |
| Bonus (sign-on) | 250,000 | — | — |
| Stock Awards (grant-date fair value) | 500,026 | 189,954 | 190,054 |
| Non-Equity Incentive (STIP) | 95,145 | 175,358 | 200,450 |
| All Other Compensation | 4,750 | 9,900 | 10,350 |
| Total Compensation | 1,038,842 | 850,212 | 875,854 |
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Pledging discouraged and requires pre-approval; hedging prohibited; margin accounts prohibited—alignment-positive .
- No option grants to NEOs for 2022–2024 (reduces repricing risk) .
- Clawback applies to incentive comp for restatements (both “Big R” and “little r”) regardless of fault .
- Say-on-pay approval 98.0% in April 2024 indicates strong shareholder support of program design .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Wallace’s 2024 bonus exceeded target (105.5%) driven by above-target individual contribution while financial metrics achieved ~99%—suggests execution focus on profitability analytics and “Optimize Origin” initiatives .
- Retention risk mitigated by CIC protections (2x salary + 2x bonus average) and considerable unvested RSUs/PSUs vesting through 2026–2027, which tie compensation to ROAA/ROAE and stock outcomes .
- Insider selling pressure: Scheduled RSU vesting across 2025–2027 plus PSU vesting in 2026–2027 may incrementally increase deliverable shares, but hedging bans and ownership guidelines (2x salary; in compliance) reduce misalignment risk; no pledged shares disclosed for Wallace .
- Company performance headwinds (lower 2024 net income and ROAA; negative TSR versus peers) make PSU outcomes sensitive; monitoring ROAA/ROAE trajectory and credit metrics (NPA/NCO) is a key forward indicator for LTI realizable value and potential equity-related selling windows .