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Michael Gilfeather

Michael Gilfeather

President and Chief Executive Officer at Orange County Bancorp, Inc. /DE/
CEO
Executive
Board

About Michael Gilfeather

Michael J. Gilfeather, 67, has served as President & Chief Executive Officer of Orange County Bancorp, Inc. (Orange Bank & Trust) since April 2014 and is a director of the Company, the Bank, and HVIA; he holds a B.S. in Psychology from Union College and an MBA from Pace University . Under his leadership in 2024, the Company reached $2.5B in assets, with loans up 3.9% to $1.8B and deposits up 5.6% to $2.2B; HVIA and the Bank’s trust department managed $1.8B in AUM, evidencing balanced growth in banking and fee businesses . The CEO role is paired with board service (not independent), but the Board is chaired by an independent director, maintaining separation of chair/CEO and regular independent-only sessions .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
The Bank of New YorkDivision Head, responsible for all retail banking in Manhattan10 years Large-market retail leadership, distribution and operating scale experience
Hudson Valley BankEVP & Chief Administrative Officer (Branch Banking, Trust, HR)n/dMulti-line oversight (branches, trust, HR), human capital and client coverage breadth

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
New York Bankers AssociationPast Chairmann/d Policy/industry leadership and statewide relationship network
Orange County PartnershipChairman (concluded 2022); Executive Committee memberThrough 2022; continuing exec committee Regional economic development influence; business attraction
Orange Regional Hospital Foundation; Orange County Chamber of Commerce; United Way of Orange & Dutchess CountiesDirector/Board roles (prior)n/d Community ties; stakeholder engagement

Fixed Compensation

Component2024Notes
Base Salary$670,000 As disclosed in 2024 SCT; 2024 employment agreement initially set at $670,000
Current Base Salary$700,000 Amended & restated agreement; term extension to 3/31/2028

Performance Compensation

Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – Cash

MetricWeightingTargetActual/Payout
Bank performance (pre-tax, pre-provision operating income; efficiency ratio)80% (2024) n/dCompany performance achieved slightly above target
Individual goals20% (2024) n/dAchieved
CEO payout as % of base52.24% of base pay for 2024
Prior year structure70% Bank / 30% Individual (2023) n/dCEO payout 60% of base pay for 2023

Notes: AIP participants must be employed on payment date; at least one Company metric must be met at threshold to earn awards . CEO’s AIP target opportunity is at least 40% of salary per employment agreement .

Long-Term Incentive (LTIP) – RSUs

Grant/ProgramMetric(s)Grant detailVesting
2024 LTIP awardROAA and Net Interest Margin vs peers CEO received 8,583 RSUs (2024 LTIP tranche within total 2024 grants) 33% per year over 3 years; accel on death/disability/qualifying CoC termination
2023 LTIP awardROAA and TBV growth + dividends vs peers CEO received 4,944 RSUs (2023) 33% per year over 3 years; similar accel provisions

2024 and 2023 CEO Compensation (Summary Compensation Table)

Metric20232024
Salary$650,000 $670,000
Stock Awards (RSUs grant date fair value)$262,032 $523,966
Non-Equity Incentive Plan (AIP)$390,000 $350,000
Nonqualified Deferred Comp Earnings$1,119
All Other Compensation$330,742 $348,803
Total$1,633,893 $1,892,769

All Other Compensation (2024 detail): Perqs $27,465; Life insurance $21,663; 401(k) $39,675; Performance SERP contribution $260,000 .

Retention Economics (Special)

  • Cash Retention Bonus: $375,000 if employed through 12/31/2026; $125,000 if employed through 12/31/2027; payable earlier upon death/CoC; payable if terminated without cause/for good reason post-release .
  • RSU Retention Bonus: Annual grants equal to 20% of base salary in 2024–2026; cliff vest 12/31/2026, with accel on death, CoC, involuntary termination without Cause or voluntary for Good Reason; cash in lieu if not all grants awarded before such event .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Beneficial Ownership and RSUs (as of 3/31/2025)

HolderShares Owned% OutstandingRSUs (not yet settled)
Michael J. Gilfeather76,981 (includes 15,850 IRA) <1% 66,045 total; includes 21,688 RSUs payable upon separation; 10,411 RSUs payable 12/31/2026
  • Anti-hedging/anti-pledging: Directors/executive officers are prohibited from short sales, hedging/derivatives; pledging is generally prohibited; no exceptions have been approved by the Board .
  • Ownership guidelines (effective 1/1/2025): CEO must hold ≥3x base salary; compliance window to 1/1/2027 for those subject as of effective date .
  • No stock options outstanding to executives; equity is RSUs under the 2023 plan .

Outstanding CEO Equity Awards (Unvested at 12/31/2024)

Grant dateUnits unvestedMarket value @ $27.79/shVesting terms
2/15/20222,144 $59,582 33%/year (service-based)
3/10/20236,592 $183,192 33%/year (service/performance plan RSUs)
1/23/20245,164 $143,508 33%/year (LTIP/retention)
3/21/202417,166 $477,043 33%/year (LTIP)

Note: Values reflect post 2-for-1 stock split effective January 10, 2025; closing price used $27.79 (12/31/2024) .

Employment Terms

TermDetail
Agreement termAmended & restated; initial term through 3/27/2027; extended on 2/20/2025 through 3/31/2028; auto-renews one year to 3/31/2029 unless either party gives notice 90 days before 3/31/2028 .
Base salary$700,000 current (may increase, not decrease) .
Target incentivesAIP ≥40% of salary; LTIP ≥50% of salary .
Severance (no CoC)Lump sum equal to (1) base salary + (2) average of last three AIP bonuses; pro-rated AIP for year of termination; pro-rata vesting of LTIP RSUs; 12 months COBRA premium payments .
Change-in-Control (CiC)3x (base salary + three-year average AIP bonus) lump sum; lump sum equal to 18x monthly COBRA; best-net (280G) cutback if needed .
Protective covenants1-year non-compete; 2-year non-solicit (employees/customers); covenants do not apply upon CiC termination within 12 months .
Retention awardsCash ($375k by 12/31/2026; $125k by 12/31/2027) and RSU Retention Bonus (20% of base in 2024–2026; cliff 12/31/2026), with specified accel and cash-in-lieu provisions .

Pension, Deferred Compensation, and SERP

  • Gilfeather SERP: One-time $15,000 contribution (2014); fully vested; pays lump sum within 45 days after separation or 30 days post-CoC; credited 3.00% in 2024 .
  • Performance-Based SERP: CEO eligible for $260,000 annual contribution (conditions include employment on 12/31, asset threshold, ≥80% of annual goals); fully vested at age 65; credited 3.00% in 2024; distribution in five annual installments upon separation (except CiC termination = lump sum) .
  • Pension Plan (frozen): Participant; traditional defined benefit plan; accruals frozen 12/31/2015; retirement benefit formulas and options disclosed .
  • 401(k): Safe harbor and discretionary contributions; age-based discretionary contribution of 8.5% of base pay applicable for CEO (subject to IRS limits) .

Board Governance (Director Role)

  • Board service: Director since 2014; not independent given executive status .
  • Board leadership: Independent Chair (Jonathan Rouis); independent-majority board; periodic independent-only meetings; annual CEO performance evaluation by independent directors .
  • Committees: Audit & Risk; Compensation; Nominating & Corporate Governance — all composed of independent directors; CEO is not a member .
  • Attendance: No director or committee member attended fewer than 75% of meetings in 2024 .
  • Director pay: Employee directors (CEO, Scacco) receive no additional board compensation .

Related Policies and Risk Controls (Alignment)

  • Insider Trading/Anti-Hedging/Pledging: Robust prohibitions; no Board-approved exceptions to pledging/hedging; reduces misalignment/forced selling risk .
  • Stock Ownership Guidelines: CEO ≥3x salary; measurement uses greater of year-end price or fiscal-year average; compliance window until 1/1/2027 for incumbents .
  • Grant practices: No stock options historically; policies avoid grants around material nonpublic info and blackout windows .

Equity Overhang and Potential Selling Pressure

  • Standard RSUs vest ratably over 3 years, creating periodic settle-and-sell windows each year .
  • Concentrated 12/31/2026 event: RSU Retention Bonus cliff (plus 10,411 RSUs disclosed as payable on 12/31/2026) may create a lumpier settlement event; 21,688 RSUs settle upon separation, representing deferred supply tied to tenure/exit .

Compensation Committee & Peer Benchmarking

  • Compensation Committee: Keane (Chair), Holcombe, Rowley — all independent; met five times in 2024 .
  • Independent consultant: AON engaged to evaluate executive and director compensation and succession planning; peer banks in NYC metro area, $1.5–$5.0B assets .

Performance & Track Record (selected operating KPIs)

KPI (FY 2024)Value
Total assets$2.5 billion
Loans$1.8 billion (+3.9% YoY)
Deposits$2.2 billion (+5.6% YoY)
AUM (Trust + HVIA)$1.8 billion

Director Compensation (for context)

  • Non-employee director equity: Annual RSU grants vest 100% at 1 year; directors may defer into stock-based plan .
  • Employee directors (CEO) receive no director fees or equity separate from executive programs .

Investment Implications

  • Pay-for-performance and retention: The CEO’s mix shifted toward equity in 2024 (stock awards ~$524k vs $262k in 2023), with a layered retention structure (cash+RSU) through 2026–2027, aligning tenure with strategic growth initiatives but creating a concentrated vesting event at YE 2026 .
  • Alignment and leakage risk: Strict anti-hedging/pledging and meaningful ownership guidelines (3x salary) mitigate misalignment and leverage risks; no options outstanding reduces repricing risk .
  • Change-in-control economics: 3x base+bonus and full COBRA multiplier represent above-median protection for a bank of this size, potentially increasing deal frictions but also ensuring leadership continuity; best-net cutback avoids punitive excise taxes .
  • Supply technicals: Regular 3-year RSU vesting implies ongoing, modest settlement flow; RSU Retention cliff in 2026 (and specific RSUs scheduled for 12/31/2026) could add near-term selling pressure if not managed via 10b5-1 plans .
  • Execution track: 2024 balance sheet and AUM growth alongside disciplined deposit mix underscore operating delivery in a dynamic rate backdrop; AIP payouts tracked outcomes (52.24% of salary), balancing performance with prudence .

Overall: Compensation design skews toward multi-year equity and SERP accruals with clear retention hooks through 2026–2027, robust anti-pledging controls, and governance separation (independent chair). Watch YE 2026 vesting/event risk, any 280G exposure in strategic scenarios, and continued delivery on growth-profitability metrics that drive LTIP outcomes .