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Jonathan Puckett

Chief Financial Officer at OrionOrion
Executive

About Jonathan Puckett

Jonathan “Jon” Puckett, 56, was appointed Chief Financial Officer of Orion S.A. effective December 1, 2025, after 14 years at Celanese in progressively senior finance and operations roles, including segment CFO for the Acetyl Chain and leadership of Corporate FP&A and Shared Services; earlier career stints were at Affiliated Computer Services, PwC, and KPMG . Orion’s recent performance context for executive incentives: 2024 Net Income $44 million and Adjusted EBITDA $302.2 million alongside Company TSR value of $56.94 on a $100 initial investment (2023: $104 million Net Income, $332.3 million Adjusted EBITDA, TSR $137.14) . His compensation structure emphasizes at‑risk pay with a 65% STI target and 150% LTI target, predominantly PSUs (70%) tied to rTSR and ROCE plus ESG/engagement metrics, aligning with Orion’s pay‑for‑performance framework .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
CelaneseVice President, Global Supply Chain, Engineered MaterialsAug 2025–Nov 2025Led global supply chain in the EM segment, operational execution and cost discipline .
CelaneseVice President Finance; CFO, Acetyl Chain; Global Leader of Shared ServicesNov 2023–Aug 2025Segment P&L stewardship, capital discipline; scaled shared services efficiency .
CelaneseVice President Finance; Global Leader FP&A and Shared ServicesNov 2020–Nov 2023Corporate planning rigor, analytics, and shared services optimization .

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Affiliated Computer Services, Inc.Senior financial rolesFinance leadership in services/IT context .
PwC LLPSenior financial rolesAudit/advisory grounding, controls orientation .
KPMG LLPSenior financial rolesAudit/advisory grounding, controls orientation .

Fixed Compensation

ComponentValueNotes
Base Salary$500,000 $19,230.77 bi‑weekly .
Target Bonus %65% of base salary Eligible beginning January 1, 2026 .
LTI Target150% of base salary 70% PSUs (3‑yr cliff), 30% RSUs (ratable over 3 years) .
Sign‑on Cash Bonus$140,000 $70k within 30 days of hire; $70k by end of March 2026; subject to repayment if voluntary resignation within 24 months .
Sign‑on RSU Grant$250,000 grant‑date value Units based on closing share price at hire; vests ratably over 3 years from hire anniversary .
Relocation/Transition Support$30,000 gross‑up Paid within 30 days of hire; net‑of‑tax .
401(k) Match2% at 100% match + next 4% at 75% Available immediately upon hire .
Severance (Cash)One year base salary + one year target bonus Triggered on termination without Cause or resignation for Good Reason; release required .

Performance Compensation

Short‑Term Incentive (STI) – Program Design

MetricWeightingNotes
Adjusted EBITDA65% Financial performance vs annual plan .
Safety5% OSHA recordables target framework .
Sustainability5% Independent ESG assessments (e.g., EcoVadis) .
Key Strategic Projects25% Execution of designated initiatives supporting long‑term value .

STI Target Framework (2023 example for NEO program)

MeasureWeightThreshold (50%)Target (100%)Maximum (200%)
Adjusted EBITDA65% $333.0MM $370MM $407MM
Safety (OSHA Recordables)5% 3 2 1
Sustainability (EcoVadis Score)5% 63 65 67

Long‑Term Incentive (LTI) – PSU Performance Mix

MetricWeightingVesting
Relative TSR (rTSR)50% 3‑year cliff; 0–200% payout .
ROCE25% Measured annually, prorated over 3 years .
Sustainability12.5% Based on latest independent assessments .
Employee Engagement12.5% Based on latest independent assessments .

RSU Vesting Conventions

Grant TypeVesting ScheduleNotes
Annual LTI RSUs1/3 each year over 3 years Time‑based retention; settled in shares per program .
Puckett Sign‑on RSUsRatable over 3 years from hire anniversary Grant within 30 days of hire; units based on hire‑date price .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

  • Stock ownership guidelines: CFO must hold 3x base salary; CEO 5x; other EVPs 2x .
  • Clawback: Incentive pay in cash or equity tied to “financial reporting measures” subject to recovery for material misstatements, restrictive covenant violations, or misconduct triggering for‑cause termination; certain award agreements include additional clawback beyond SEC/NYSE rules .
  • Pledging/hedging: The company’s policy prohibits pledging of Company stock by directors, officers, and employees while not permitted to trade or in possession of MNPI; no option repricing and no resetting of TSR targets .

Employment Terms

TermDetails
Appointment effective dateDec 1, 2025 .
Employment typeAt‑will; Company may change policies/benefits; letter governs; conditions include confidentiality/NDA, credential verification, background check, pre‑employment physical incl. illicit substances screen .
Severance (no‑CIC)Cash equal to then annual base salary + target bonus upon termination without Cause or resignation for Good Reason; subject to release; Good Reason includes material diminishment of duties, compensation reduction, or breach of agreement with cure periods .
Change‑in‑control (CIC)No explicit CIC multiple specified in Offer Letter .
BenefitsStandard health/welfare programs; 401(k) plan per company match schedule .
Equity programsEligible for STI and LTI beginning Jan 1, 2026 (70% PSUs / 30% RSUs) .

Performance & Track Record (Company Context)

YearCompany TSR (Value of $100 Initial Investment)Net Income ($MM)Adjusted EBITDA ($MM)
2020132.45 18.0 200.0
2021151.95 135 268.4
2022124.63 106 312.3
2023137.14 104 332.3
202456.94 44 302.2

Investment Implications

  • Strong pay‑for‑performance linkage: Puckett’s 65% STI and 150% LTI targets, with 70% PSUs tied to rTSR/ROCE plus ESG/engagement, align incentives to profitability, capital efficiency, and shareholder returns; Orion’s 2024 STI included strategic project execution, emphasizing operational value creation .
  • Vesting cadence and potential selling pressure: Sign‑on RSUs vest ratably over three years from the hire anniversary, creating predictable vesting windows; PSUs vest on a 3‑year cliff schedule, which typically reduces interim selling incentives but may concentrate events at maturity—monitor Form 4 activity around initial grant (Dec 2025) and annual anniversaries/hard vest dates .
  • Retention economics: Severance equal to one year base + one year target bonus provides downside protection without an explicit CIC multiple in the offer letter, suggesting governance discipline on parachute risk relative to CEO/CFO practices historically disclosed for incumbents; ownership guidelines at 3x salary further reinforce alignment .
  • Governance risk mitigants: Formal clawback policy, restrictions on pledging, and no option repricing reduce headline governance red flags; peer‑benchmarked pay overseen by an independent consultant (Korn Ferry) supports market‑aligned compensation .