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James C. Ryan III

James C. Ryan III

Chief Executive Officer at OLD NATIONAL BANCORP /IN/OLD NATIONAL BANCORP /IN/
CEO
Executive
Board

About James C. Ryan III

James “Jim” C. Ryan III is Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Old National Bancorp (ONB), serving as CEO since 2019; he joined ONB in 2005 and previously served as Senior EVP and CFO (2016–2019). He is 53 and holds a BBA from Grand Valley State University (1994) . Under his leadership, ONB reported 2024 adjusted EPS of $1.86, adjusted ROATCE of 16.9%, and a 3‑year TSR of 38.8% (86th percentile vs. KRX), reflecting strong operating execution; ONB had ~$54B in assets as of 12/31/2024 and completed CapStar (Apr 1, 2024) while announcing a $1.4B Bremer transaction slated to close May 1, 2025 .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
Old National BancorpChairman & CEO2019–presentLed scaled growth (assets ~$54B), delivered adj. EPS $1.86, adj. ROATCE 16.9%, 3‑yr TSR 38.8%; executed CapStar integration and announced Bremer deal .
Old National BancorpSenior EVP & CFO2016–2019Financial leadership, M&A/integration experience prior to CEO transition .
Old National BancorpDirector of Corporate Development & Mortgage Banking; Integration Executive; TreasurerPre‑2016Roles focused on growth, integration and treasury capabilities .
Wells Fargo Home Mortgage; Old Kent Financial Corp.Senior finance rolesPre‑2005Built large‑bank finance/mortgage skillset later applied at ONB .

External Roles

OrganizationCapacityNotes
American Bankers AssociationDirector; Chair, American Bankers CouncilNational industry leadership and policy engagement .
Mid-Size Bank Coalition of AmericaDirectorPeer collaboration and advocacy .
Deaconess Health SystemVice Chair (board)Regional healthcare governance .
Evansville Regional Business Committee; Southwest Indiana Regional Development Authority; Central Indiana Corporate Partnership; Evansville Regional Economic Partnership; Orr Fellowship; Golf Gives BackBoard or leadership rolesCommunity and economic development engagement in core markets .

Board Service & Governance

  • ONB board service: Director since 2019; Chairman & CEO; member and Chair of the Executive Committee .
  • Independence and structure: All directors are independent except Mr. Ryan; ONB maintains a Lead Independent Director (Daniel S. Hermann) with robust responsibilities (executive sessions at least quarterly, CEO evaluation, agenda/input oversight) to mitigate combined Chair/CEO concerns .
  • Board attendance: The Board met five times in 2024; all directors attended ≥75% of meetings, with 13 of 15 at 100% .

Fixed Compensation

Component (CEO, 2024)DetailSource
Base salary rate$1,224,300 (effective March 2024)
Salary paid (SCT)$1,210,973 (reflects timing within year)
Target annual bonus (% of salary)125% of base salary
Actual annual bonus paid (AICP)$1,740,774 (Non‑Equity Incentive Plan Compensation, 2024)
Perquisites (illustrative)Personal aircraft use $16,094; home security $9,395; financial planning $15,000; country club, executive physical; company retirement contributions included in “All Other Comp”
Cash/equity mix~79% of CEO target TDC is at‑risk (annual + equity)

Performance Compensation

Annual Incentive Plan (AICP) – 2024 Outcome

MetricWeightThresholdTargetMaximumActual for payoutPayout
Adjusted EPS100%$1.62 $1.75 $2.06 $1.83 (committee‑adjusted from $1.86) 115% of target

Notes: Adjusted EPS excludes merger‑related charges, CECL Day 1 provision, pension distribution, FDIC special assessment, separation, and securities losses; GAAP EPS was $1.68 .

Long‑Term Incentives (LTI)

  • 2024 LTI design (grant date 3/1/2024): PSUs (performance‑based) and time‑based Restricted Stock (RS). Mix: CEO 60% PSUs / 40% RS. PSU metrics: 3‑year Relative TSR (50%) and 3‑year Relative ROATCE (50%) vs KRX; payout curve: <25th pct = 0%, 25th = 50% of target, 50th = 100%, 90th = 200%; RS vests ratably over 3 years .
  • CEO 2024 grants: 118,041 PSUs (grant‑date FV $2,228,612) and 122,084 RS ($2,000,957); no options granted in 2024 .

PSU performance result (prior cycle):

PSU cycleMetricRelative performancePayout
2022–2024TSR~86th percentile vs. KRX 191% of target
2022–2024ROATCE~82nd percentile vs. KRX 179% of target
Combined 2022–202450% TSR / 50% ROATCE~184.75% of target, paid Mar 2025

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Beneficial ownership (3/20/2025)825,218 ONB common shares; less than 1% of outstanding (319,312,019 shares) .
Unvested RS at 12/31/2024188,371 shares across 2022–2024 grants (21,197; 45,090; 78,694; 43,390) .
2024 CEO equity grants118,041 PSUs; 122,084 RS (3‑yr ratable vest) .
DividendsRS: cash dividends during vest; PSUs: dividends accrue and paid in stock only if earned .
Ownership guidelinesCEO: 5× salary or 200,000 shares; all NEOs met guidelines as of proxy date .
Hedging/pledgingProhibited from short sales, options, derivatives, hedging; pledging/margin restricted and requires approval of CLO .

Employment Terms

ProvisionKey terms
Agreement structureEmployment Agreements auto‑renew annually (unless 60‑day notice); separate Confidentiality & Restrictive Covenants (CRC) agreements .
Non‑compete / Non‑solicitApply during employment and for 1 year post‑termination (extendable if in breach) .
ClawbackSEC/Nasdaq‑compliant 3‑year lookback for erroneously awarded incentive‑based pay; applies to cash and equity .
Severance (non‑CIC)Prorated annual bonus + 2× target cash comp (salary + target bonus) for CEO/COO/CEO-Commercial/CFO; 1× for CCO/CAO; pro‑rata treatment of equity (PSUs settle on schedule) .
Severance (CIC, double‑trigger within 24 months)Prorated bonus + 3× target cash comp for CEO/COO/CEO-Commercial/CFO; 2× for CCO/CAO; equity vests immediately at target for PSUs .
Benefits continuationGenerally 24 months medical for most NEOs; special continuation for COO until Medicare eligibility per letter agreement .
No tax gross‑upsPayments reduced to safe harbor if excise tax would apply .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Strong pay‑for‑performance: AICP tied solely to adjusted EPS with pre‑set curve; LTI heavily performance‑based with relative TSR and ROATCE vs KRX; no in‑year goal changes; at‑risk pay is ~79% of CEO target compensation .
  • Shareholder alignment safeguards: Ownership guidelines, clawback, anti‑hedging/pledging, no liberal share recycling, double‑trigger CIC, independent comp consultant (WTW) and peer benchmarking targeted near median .

Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • 2024 Say‑on‑Pay support: ~91% approval, indicating strong shareholder endorsement of program design .
  • Engagement: Reached out to holders of ~60% of outstanding shares; ~20% accepted meetings covering strategy, compensation, governance, and performance .

Performance & Track Record

  • 2024 highlights: Adjusted EPS $1.86; adjusted net income $578M; adj. ROATCE 16.9%; adj. ROAA 1.14%; adjusted efficiency 52.2%; core deposit growth 4.8% and loan growth 4.1% (ex‑CapStar); net loan charge‑offs 0.13% .
  • Strategic M&A: CapStar closed Apr 1, 2024; Bremer announced Nov 25, 2024 with regulatory approvals in Mar 2025 and expected close May 1, 2025 (total value ~$1.4B) .
  • Governance quality: 93% independent board; Lead Independent Director; robust committee system and executive sessions .

Multi‑Year Financial Context (S&P Global)

MetricFY 2019FY 2020FY 2021FY 2022FY 2023FY 2024
Revenues ($)196,568,000*220,486,000*207,449,000*388,818,000*317,975,000*341,368,000*

Values retrieved from S&P Global.*

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • Positive indicators: High Say‑on‑Pay support (91%); no related‑party transactions requiring disclosure in 2024; no tax gross‑ups; double‑trigger CIC; anti‑hedging/pledging policies; strong board independence with a Lead Independent Director .
  • Items to monitor: Significant ongoing PSU and RS vesting through 2027 may create periodic liquidity windows; pledging requires CLO approval (policy‑restricted) .

Compensation Committee & Peer Benchmarking

  • Committee composition (independent directors): Chair Kathryn J. Hayley; Vice Chair Peter J. Henseler; members Boigegrain, Hermann, Kitchell, Ramirez, Salmon, Skillman .
  • Independent consultant: Willis Towers Watson (WTW); target pay opportunities generally set near peer median; 16‑company peer group spanning $35–$88B assets (median $56B) .

Equity Grant Detail (CEO, 2024)

Grant dateInstrument# Units/SharesVesting/PerformanceGrant‑date fair value
3/1/2024PSUs118,0413‑yr (2024–2026), 50% TSR and 50% ROATCE vs KRX; 0–200% payout $2,228,612
3/1/2024RS122,0841/3 per year (2025–2027) $2,000,957

Ownership Snapshot (CEO)

ItemAmount
Beneficial ONB shares825,218
Unvested RS (12/31/2024)188,371
PSUs outstanding (examples)2024 grant: 118,041 target PSUs; 2022–2024 cycle paid at ~184.75% in Mar 2025 .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Program is heavily performance‑weighted (PSUs with relative metrics; EPS‑based AICP), strong governance controls (clawback, ownership rules, hedging/pledging prohibitions), and robust shareholder support—favorable for long‑term alignment .
  • Retention and selling pressure: Material unvested RS and multi‑cycle PSUs through 2027 support retention but create episodic vesting windows; policy restrictions curb speculative activity; note continued monitoring of Form 4 insider activity around vest dates .
  • Downside protection and risk: No gross‑ups; double‑trigger CIC; severance multiples (up to 3× target cash comp post‑CIC) are market‑aligned—limited governance overhang .
  • Execution track record: Solid operating metrics and top‑quartile relative returns (ROATCE, TSR) alongside active M&A suggest continued value creation potential if integration and credit discipline persist amid rate/credit cycles .