Christopher L. Grashoff
Option Care HealthAbout Christopher L. Grashoff
Christopher L. Grashoff (age 45) is Chief Growth Officer of Option Care Health (OPCH) since December 2023; he joined OPCH in May 2019 and previously held senior commercial roles. He has over 20 years of global healthcare experience at Baxter and Eli Lilly, with a B.A. in economics (DePauw) and an MBA (Harvard Business School) . Company performance in 2024: net revenue rose 16.2% to $4,998.2M, Adjusted EBITDA grew 4.4% to $443.8M, and adjusted diluted EPS increased 10.5% to $1.58 . OPCH total shareholder return (fixed $100 basis from 12/31/2019) was $155.50 in 2024 versus $225.80 in 2023 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Option Care Health | Chief Growth Officer | Since Dec 2023 | Achieved top-line growth metrics; strengthened and realigned commercial team |
| Option Care Health | SVP, Chronic Sales & Marketing | Nov 2023–Dec 2023 | Supported commercial execution |
| Option Care Health | SVP, Ambulatory Infusion Suites & New Business Ventures | Jun 2022–Nov 2023 | Growth initiatives in AIS/new ventures |
| Option Care Health | VP, New Venture Operations & Patient Experience | Jan 2021–Jun 2022 | Patient experience; new venture ops |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Baxter | Various leadership roles | Not disclosed | Industry and commercial expertise |
| Eli Lilly & Co. | Various roles | Not disclosed | Pharma and healthcare experience |
Fixed Compensation
| Year | Base Salary ($) | Target Bonus % of Salary | Actual Bonus Paid ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 400,000 | 90% | 320,400 (89% of target) |
Performance Compensation
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout | Vesting/Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Incentive EBITDA (Funding Threshold) | N/A | $452M | $470M | Threshold achieved → plan funded | Gate to enable MIP payouts |
| Adjusted EBITDA | 50% | $450.0M (Threshold $435.5M; Max $495.0M) | $443.8M | Contributed to 89% formulaic payout for the 80% company metrics component | Non-GAAP definition in Appendix A |
| Revenue | 30% | $4.791B (Threshold $4.636B; Max $5.266B) | $4.998B | Contributed to 89% formulaic payout for the 80% company metrics component | Drives top-line emphasis |
| Individual leadership goals | 20% | Role-specific | Achieved for Mr. Grashoff | 89% of target | Goals included top-line growth and commercial team alignment |
| PSUs (2024 grant) | 60% of LTI mix | 3-year avg CFO growth (50%) + 3-year avg Revenue + Adjusted EBITDA growth (50%) | Ongoing (2024–2026) | 50–200% payout range | Vests Feb 2027, subject to continued employment |
| RSUs (2024 grant) | 40% of LTI mix | Time-based | Time-based | N/A | 33%, 33%, 34% vest on Feb 20, 2025/2026/2027 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Stock ownership and retention: OPCH prohibits hedging and pledging of company securities; executives are subject to robust stock ownership and retention policies .
- Clawbacks: Dodd-Frank–compliant clawback plus supplemental misconduct clawback covering SVP+ .
Beneficial Ownership and Deferred Comp
| Item | Amount | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership | 32,968 shares; <1% of class | Includes options exercisable within 60 days (20,895 shares) |
| Deferred Compensation balance | $20,824 | Executive contributions $19,904; aggregate earnings $920 (2024) |
2024 Grants (Long-Term Incentives)
| Award | Grant Date | Target Shares / Units | Grant Date Fair Value ($) | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs | Feb 20, 2024 | 17,938 target (up to 200% achievable) | 600,026 | Performance period 2024–2026; vests Feb 2027 |
| RSUs | Feb 20, 2024 | 11,961 | 400,095 | 33/33/34% on Feb 20, 2025/2026/2027 |
Outstanding Awards and 2024 Vesting
| Instrument | Quantity | Value ($) | Key Dates |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs (unvested tranche A) | 11,961 | 277,495 | Final vest Feb 2027 |
| RSUs (unvested tranche B) | 3,249 | 75,377 | Legacy RSUs |
| RSUs (unvested tranche C) | 1,044 | 24,221 | Legacy RSUs |
| RSUs (unvested tranche D) | 626 | 14,523 | Legacy RSUs |
| PSUs (2024 cycle, unearned) | 17,938 | 416,162 | Scheduled to vest Feb 20, 2027 (performance-dependent) |
| 2023 PSUs (earned) | Earned at 166% of target | — | Scheduled to vest May 19, 2025 |
| Options (exercisable/unexercisable) | 3,678/1,226 @ $18.97 exp 02/23/2031; 8,974/— @ $25.75 exp 10/21/2031; 2,026/2,026 @ $23.96 exp 02/17/2032; 1,989/5,967 @ $28.86 exp 02/22/2033 | — | Standard 10-year terms; scheduled vesting per footnotes |
| 2024 RSU vesting realized | 10,531 shares | 322,587 | Value realized on vesting in 2024 |
| 2024 option exercises | — | — | No options exercised in 2024 |
Employment Terms
- Executive Severance Plan (eligible as NEO): Outside CIC, severance equals base salary × 1.25 multiple; 12-month benefits continuation; prorated current-year bonus based on actuals; accelerated vesting of next scheduled options/RSUs and prorated PSUs at target, subject to release and restrictive covenants (confidentiality, non-compete, non-disparagement) .
- During CIC (within 24 months): severance equals base × 2.25; prorated target bonus; full acceleration of options/time-based RSUs; PSUs vest at greater of target or actual performance .
- Change-in-control mechanics: EIP provides double-trigger acceleration if awards are assumed/replaced; if not assumed, awards vest at CIC .
- Clawbacks: Required (accounting restatement) and supplemental (misconduct) recovery policies apply .
- Hedging/pledging: Strict prohibitions for directors, officers, and employees .
- Tax gross-ups/perqs: No excise tax gross-ups; no significant perquisites; matching contributions only in “All Other Compensation” for NEOs .
- Deferred Compensation Plan: Eligible; 2024 participation and balances as above .
Potential Payments (As of Dec 31, 2024)
| Scenario | Severance ($) | Accelerated Equity ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Termination without cause | 891,763 | 288,164 | 1,179,927 |
| Death or disability | 1,860,000 | 288,164 | 2,148,164 |
| CIC termination (double-trigger within 2 years) | 1,651,763 | 812,964 | 2,464,727 |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix shift to performance: 2024 long-term incentives eliminated stock options; increased PSUs to 60% and RSUs to 40%, strengthening at-risk pay .
- Rigor and horizon: PSU performance period extended from 2 to 3 years (matching time-based vesting), emphasizing multi-year execution .
- Annual plan design: Individual performance weight reduced from 30% to 20%; added detailed disclosure of company targets (Adjusted EBITDA and revenue) .
- Stockholder feedback response: After a 50.6% say-on-pay approval in 2024, OPCH ceased one-time awards in 2024 and tightened use of special grants to extraordinary cases .
Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 2024 advisory vote approval: 50.6% .
- Historical context: 2019–2023 average ~96% approval; 2023 was 97% .
- Actions taken: No one-time awards in 2024; longer PSU performance periods; reduced individual MIP weighting; expanded disclosure .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
| Ownership guidelines | Robust ownership and retention policies for executives; “no hedging or pledging” |
| Beneficial ownership | 32,968 shares; <1% of class; includes 20,895 options exercisable within 60 days |
| Upcoming vesting | RSUs vest 33/33/34% on Feb 20, 2025/26/27; 2023 PSUs vest at 166% on May 19, 2025; 2024 PSUs scheduled Feb 2027 (performance-dependent) |
| Option overhang | Multiple option lines outstanding with expirations 2031–2033; standard 10-year terms; staged vesting |
Performance & Track Record
- 2024 achievements cited for Mr. Grashoff: “Successfully achieved top-line growth metrics; strengthened and realigned commercial team to help maximize growth” .
- Company results (2024): Net revenue $4,998.2M (+16.2% YoY); Adjusted EBITDA $443.8M (+4.4% YoY); adjusted diluted EPS $1.58 (+10.5% YoY) .
- TSR context: 2024 TSR value $155.50; peer group TSR $123.45 (fixed $100 basis from 2019) .
Employment Terms (Additional)
- Plan governance: Independent compensation consultant (Pearl Meyer); peer benchmarking and annual risk assessment .
- Equity grant practice: Regular annual grants in February post-year results; no options granted in 2024 .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and incentives: A high proportion of Mr. Grashoff’s compensation is at risk via PSUs tied to multi-year cash flow growth and revenue/Adjusted EBITDA growth (60% of LTI), supplemented by RSUs and a performance-funded annual bonus—supporting pay-for-performance and long-term value creation .
- Retention dynamics: Meaningful unvested RSU tranches and PSUs vesting through 2025–2027, plus severance protection (1.25× outside CIC; 2.25× in CIC) and double-trigger equity acceleration, reduce near-term retention risk .
- Trading signals and supply: He did not exercise options in 2024 and realized $322,587 on RSU vesting; scheduled RSU/PSU vesting dates indicate predictable potential share deliveries, mitigated by strict prohibitions on hedging/pledging and stock retention provisions .
- Governance and shareholder response: 2024’s low say-on-pay prompted structural changes (no one-time awards; longer PSU periods; reduced individual MIP weight), improving alignment and reducing headline risk going forward .