Cristina Méndez
About Cristina Méndez
Executive Vice President & Chief Financial Officer of Otis since August 23, 2024; age 44 at appointment, promoted from SVP Finance EMEA & Transformation after 15+ years in senior finance roles at Telefónica Group, including SVP Director Controlling at Telefónica Deutschland (2018–2022) . Company performance context in 2024: organic sales +1.4%, adjusted EPS $3.83 (+8.2% YoY), adjusted operating margin +50 bps, operating cash flow $1.56B; modernization orders +12% and backlog +13% at constant currency, maintenance portfolio ~2.4M units (+4.2%) . Otis cumulative TSR since 2020: value of $100 initial investment at $209 in 2024 vs peer group $253 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Otis Worldwide | SVP, Finance EMEA & Transformation | 2022–2024 | Led FP&A, M&A and transformation; EMEA responsible for >50% of global Service portfolio; drove growth and efficiency initiatives . |
| Telefónica Deutschland | SVP, Director Controlling | 2018–2022 | Managed multi‑billion P&L, led growth, efficiency and transformation projects across the telecom portfolio . |
| Telefónica Group | Senior Finance Executive (various) | ~2003–2018 | Strategic and financial planning roles across geographies; transformation leadership experience . |
External Roles
No public company directorships or disclosed external committee roles .
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Amount | Effective Date/Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | $770,000 | Effective Aug 23, 2024; paid monthly in CHF (13 installments with 13th in November), using 5‑yr avg USD/CHF FX at quarter‑end . |
| Target STI (annual bonus) | 100% of base salary | Effective Aug 23, 2024; 2024 prorated for pre/post‑promotion periods . |
| 2024 STI Paid | $750,373 | Based on salary $786,705 (CHF→USD), financial factor 120%, ESG +7.5%, individual factor 105% . |
| Expatriate Benefits | $5,000/mo housing; utilities cap $645/mo; relocation CHF 12,792 | Long‑term assignment to Farmington, CT; tax equalization to Switzerland; schooling, international health coverage . |
Performance Compensation
2024 STI Design and Outcomes (Company-Level Metrics)
| Metric (Weight) | Threshold | Target | Maximum | 2024 Actual | Payout Factor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Net Income (40%) ($M) | 1,475 | 1,552 | 1,630 | 1,564 | 46% |
| Adjusted Free Cash Flow (30%) ($M) | 1,421 | 1,579 | 1,737 | 1,571 | 29% |
| Organic Sales Growth (15%) (%) | -2.3 | 2.8 | 6.0 | 1.4 | 13% |
| New Equipment Orders Growth (15%) (%) | -12.3 | -2.5 | 7.2 | -7.6 | 11% |
| ESG Multiplier | — | — | ±10% | +7.5% | Applied to total |
Notes: 2024 metrics and weightings unchanged; ESG assessed holistically across safety, environment, people, governance with +7.5% outcome . Final company financial payout ≈ 99% before ESG/individual adjustments .
Méndez 2024 STI Payment Calculation
| Input | Value |
|---|---|
| Salary used for STI | $786,705 (CHF→USD) |
| Target STI % | 71.1% proration (full target 100%) |
| Financial Performance Factor | 120% (prorated corporate/region mix) |
| ESG Multiplier | 1.075 |
| Individual Performance Factor | 105% |
| STI Payment | $750,373 |
Long-Term Incentives (LTI) Structure and Grants
| Award Type | 2024 Annual Target | 2024 Supplemental (Promotion) | Vesting | Performance Goals |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs (50%) | Included in $2,700,000 LTI | $2,390,000 × 50% | Cliff in early 2027 (2024–2026 cycle) | 3‑yr cumulative adjusted EPS (60%) target $12.23 and 3‑yr avg organic sales growth (40%) target 3.1%; ±20% TSR multiplier vs S&P 500 Industrials; max 200% . |
| RSUs (25%) | Included | $2,390,000 × 25% | 1/3 annually over 3 years | Time‑based; dividend equivalents . |
| SARs (25%) | Included | $2,390,000 × 25% | 1/3 annually; 10‑yr term | Time‑based; strike set at grant; value only if stock appreciates . |
Outstanding Equity (as of Dec 31, 2024)
| Grant Date | Instrument | Unvested Units/Shares | Market Value ($) | Strike/Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8/23/2024 | PSUs | 12,468 | $1,154,661 | 2024–2026 cycle . |
| 8/23/2024 | RSUs | 6,234 | $577,331 | 1/3 annual vest . |
| 8/23/2024 | SARs | 24,161 unexercisable | — | $94.20; expire 8/22/2034 . |
| 2/6/2024 | PSUs | 1,795 | $166,235 | 2024–2026 cycle . |
| 2/6/2024 | RSUs | 897 | $83,071 | 1/3 annual vest . |
| 2/6/2024 | SARs | 3,341 unexercisable | — | $91.94; expire 2/5/2034 . |
| Prior awards | RSUs/SARs | Various (2022–2023) | — | Local vesting schedules . |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership | 4,415 shares; 1,121 SARs exercisable within 60 days; <1% of shares outstanding . |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | CFO required to hold 4× base salary; 5‑year compliance window from appointment; RSUs/DSUs count; PSUs/SARs excluded . |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for directors, officers, colleagues; no short sales/hedging/pledging allowed . |
| Vested vs Unvested | Significant unvested PSUs/RSUs/SARs through 2027 (see Outstanding Equity); dividend equivalents accrue on PSUs/RSUs . |
Implications: Unvested multi‑year awards and ownership guidelines reduce near‑term selling pressure; pledging/hedging bans strengthen alignment .
Employment Terms
| Term | Provision |
|---|---|
| Contract | Open‑ended; effective Aug 23, 2024; no trial period; 3‑month mutual notice period . |
| Work Location | Long‑term assignment to Farmington, CT; repatriation to Switzerland per policy . |
| Non‑Compete | 2 years worldwide post‑employment; includes hiring ban; per‑breach contractual penalty = 12 months salary + target STI; injunctive relief available . |
| Non‑Solicit | 2 years post‑employment . |
| Severance Plan | ELG Severance: lump‑sum 1× (CEO 1.5×) salary + target STI; prorated STI at actual results; 12 months healthcare; 12 months outplacement; requires restrictive covenants . |
| Change‑in‑Control (CIC) Plan | Double trigger; lump‑sum 2× salary + target STI (CEO 3×); prorated target STI; 12 months healthcare, outplacement, financial planning; equity vests at greater of actual/target . |
| Excise Tax | “Best‑net” approach (cut or pay, whichever yields higher after‑tax); no excise tax gross‑ups . |
| Clawbacks | Two recovery policies: restatement (NYSE‑compliant 3‑year lookback) and broader conduct‑based policy (Cause, non‑compete/solicit violations, misconduct causing material harm, recalculation of outcomes); committee discretion . |
| Compensation Currency | Base/bonus paid in CHF using 5‑yr avg FX; 13 monthly installments (13th in Nov) . |
| Pension | Swiss Base Plan PV $66,324; Swiss Supplementary 1e Plan PV $214,063 at 12/31/24; death/disability values specified . |
| Perquisites | Housing, utilities cap, relocation allowance, schooling, international health coverage, tax equalization . |
Potential Payments (Proxy Illustrations at 12/31/2024)
| Scenario | Cash Severance | Prorated STI | Equity (Stock/SARs) | Pension | Other Benefits | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Involuntary Termination (without Cause) | $1,346,104 | $750,373 | $522,855 | $214,063 | $56,073 | $2,675,405 |
| Death/Disability | — | $750,373 | $2,936,948 | $12,095,277 (death PV) | — | $3,687,321 (after subtracting vested) |
| CIC + Qualifying Termination (double trigger) | $2,692,208 | $750,373 | $2,936,948 | $214,063 | $72,073 | $6,451,602 |
Notes: Equity values reflect proxy valuation methodology; equity forfeited for termination “for cause” .
Performance & Track Record
- Investor engagement: Méndez (as CFO) participated with CEO and senior leaders in extensive meetings with institutional investors/analysts; management met ~80% of top 50 active holders and ~65% of top 100 in 2024 .
- 2024 Company results underpin STI/LTI: Service organic sales +6.8%; maintenance portfolio +4.2%; adjusted EPS +8.2%; cash flow ~$1.6B; capital returns ~$1.6B (buybacks $1.0B, dividends $0.6B) .
- Pay‑for‑performance governance: strong clawbacks, ownership requirements, no hedging/pledging, no option repricing, no excise tax gross‑ups; say‑on‑pay approval ~89% in 2024 .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Cash vs Equity Mix: For NEOs, compensation heavily at‑risk via STI/LTI; Méndez annual LTI target $2.7M plus $2.39M supplemental at promotion emphasizes retention and performance alignment .
- Metrics Rigor: STI weights earnings (40%) and FCF (30%) with growth metrics (15%/15%); PSU targets require ~7.2% EPS CAGR and 3.1% avg organic growth, plus ±20% relative TSR adjustment .
- One‑time awards: Not applicable to Méndez; supplemental grant at promotion follows standard terms, indicating continuity rather than discretionary repricing .
- Ownership Alignment: CFO 4× salary guideline and multi‑year vesting reduce misalignment and near‑term selling pressure; pledging prohibited .
Equity Ownership & Alignment Details
| Measure | Value | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| Shares Beneficially Owned | 4,415 | As of Mar 17, 2025 . |
| SARs Exercisable within 60 days | 1,121 | As of Mar 17, 2025 . |
| % of Outstanding Shares | <1% | Ownership under 1% . |
| Stock Ownership Guideline | 4× salary | 5‑year compliance window; RSUs/DSUs count, PSUs/SARs excluded . |
| Pledging/Hedging | Prohibited | Policy applies to executives . |
Employment & Contracts (Retention Risk, Transition)
| Topic | Key Facts |
|---|---|
| Tenure in Role | CFO since Aug 23, 2024 . |
| Notice/Auto‑Renewal | 3‑month notice; open‑ended, no auto‑renewal mentioned . |
| Non‑Compete/Non‑Solicit | 2‑year global non‑compete and hiring ban; contractual penalty per breach (12 months salary + target STI) . |
| Severance Multiples | 1× salary+target STI (ELG Severance); 2× salary+target STI (CIC) . |
| Garden Leave/Consulting | Not disclosed. |
| Deferred Comp/Pension | Swiss plans PV $66,324 (Base) and $214,063 (Supplementary) at 12/31/24 . |
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Hedging/pledging: prohibited for executives (positive) .
- Clawbacks: robust dual policies covering restatements and misconduct (positive) .
- Options Repricing: prohibited (positive) .
- Excise Tax Gross‑ups: none; best‑net approach (positive) .
- Insider selling: No Form 4 data provided here; equity largely unvested through 2027 (neutral to positive for selling pressure) .
- Say‑on‑pay: strong approval (~89%) indicates investor support (positive) .
Compensation Peer Group (Benchmarking)
Peer group for 2024 (unchanged from 2023) includes: Carrier, Cummins, Dover, Eaton, Fluor, Fortive, Illinois Tool Works, Johnson Controls, Lear, Motorola Solutions, Parker Hannifin, Rockwell Automation, Stanley Black & Decker, TE Connectivity, Trane Technologies, Wabtec, Western Digital .
Say‑On‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
Say‑on‑pay approval ~89% in 2024; Committee engages with investors and uses feedback to refine programs; extensive outreach conducted, including ESG engagement and discussions around one‑time equity grants (for other executives) .
Expertise & Qualifications
- Finance and transformation leadership across industrials and telecoms; strategic FP&A, M&A execution; multi‑region experience (EMEA); no formal education credentials disclosed in filings .
- Investor‑facing CFO role with active engagement alongside CEO .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: High at‑risk pay with rigorous STI/LTI metrics and relative TSR modifier; robust clawbacks and ownership rules reduce agency risk .
- Retention: Multi‑year PSUs/RSUs/SARs vesting through 2027 and global non‑compete/non‑solicit (with penalties) materially lower near‑term attrition risk .
- Selling Pressure: Beneficial ownership is modest (<1%), but meaningful unvested equity and ownership guideline suggest limited discretionary selling; pledging/hedging bans further mitigate pressure .
- Change‑in‑Control Economics: Double‑trigger 2× cash multiple and accelerated equity could be costly in a transaction; however, no excise tax gross‑ups and best‑net provision moderate parachute optics .
- Execution: Méndez’s EMEA transformation background aligns with Otis’ Service‑led model and UpLift program; 2024 results support pay outcomes and indicate operational discipline under current leadership .
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