Perry Zheng
About Perry Zheng
Peiming (Perry) Zheng serves as Executive Vice President & Chief Product, Delivery and Customer Officer and was one of Otis’s named executive officers (NEOs) for 2024 . He is retirement-eligible (noted in equity vesting disclosures) and previously operated on an international assignment based in China through March 2023, underscoring deep operating experience in Otis’s key market . Company performance under the current leadership delivered 2024 results of Service organic sales +6.8%, maintenance portfolio +4.2%, adjusted operating profit margin +50 bps, adjusted diluted EPS +8.2%, operating cash flow ~$1.6B and adjusted free cash flow ~$1.6B; modernization orders +12.1% and modernization backlog up 13% at constant currency .
Fixed Compensation
Multi‑Year Summary Compensation (Otis reported, USD)
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | $635,000 | $671,667 | $694,250 |
| Bonus ($) | – | – | – |
| Stock Awards ($) | $1,024,830 | $1,447,259 | $4,839,430 |
| Option/SAR Awards ($) | $330,255 | $461,380 | $589,840 |
| Non‑Equity Incentive (STI) ($) | $493,000 | $574,000 | $701,000 |
| Change in Pension/Deferred Comp ($) | – | – | – |
| All Other Compensation ($) | $1,423,362 | $2,020,908 | $985,782 |
| Total ($) | $3,906,447 | $5,175,214 | $7,810,302 |
STI Target and Payment (2024)
| Salary ($) | Target STI % | Financial Performance Payout Factor % | ESG Multiplier | Individual Performance Payout Factor % | STI Payment ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| $700,000 | 90% | 99% | 1.075 | 105% | $701,000 |
All Other Compensation Detail (2024)
| Vehicle ($) | Company Deferred Contributions ($) | Financial Planning ($) | Health ($) | International Assignment ($) | Misc. ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| $26,065 | $115,411 | $16,000 | $21,190 | $805,550 (net tax settlement China→U.S.) | $1,566 | $985,782 |
Performance Compensation
2024 STI Design and Outcomes
| Metric | Weighting (%) | Target | Actual | Payout Factor (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Net Income ($M) | 40 | 1,552 | 1,564 | 46 |
| Adjusted Free Cash Flow ($M) | 30 | 1,579 | 1,571 | 29 |
| Organic Sales Growth (%) | 15 | 2.8 | 1.4 | 13 |
| New Equipment Orders Growth (%) | 15 | -2.5 | -7.6 | 11 |
| Total (before ESG/individual) | — | — | — | 99 |
| ESG Multiplier | — | — | — | +7.5% (1.075) |
| Individual Performance Factor | — | — | — | +5% (105%) |
PSU Design (Annual LTI; 2024–2026 cycle)
| Metric | Weighting (%) | Performance Period | Vesting Terms | Relative TSR Multiplier |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cumulative Adjusted EPS | 60 | 2024–2026 | Vests after 3‑yr period, subject to performance and continued employment; exceptions for death, disability, retirement, CIC double‑trigger and certain qualifying involuntary terminations | Applied as multiplier to link payouts to shareholder value |
| Average Organic Sales Growth | 40 | 2024–2026 | Same as above | Applied |
One‑Time RSU Award (Retention)
| Grant | Target Value | Vesting Schedule | Terms |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs granted 12/3/2024 | $3,000,000 | One‑third at first anniversary; remaining two‑thirds at third anniversary | Same as standard annual LTI RSUs except removal of accelerated vesting retirement provisions |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial Ownership (as of March 17, 2025)
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Total Shares Beneficially Owned | 32,322 |
| SARs Exercisable within 60 Days | 25,521 (net shares if exercised) |
| Ownership as % of Class | <1% (Otis discloses all listed individuals are <1%) |
Outstanding Equity Awards at FY‑End (Selected detail for Perry Zheng)
| Type | Grant Date | Unvested / Unearned Units (#) | Market/Payout Value ($) | Exercise Price ($) | Expiration |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs | 12/3/2024 | 29,926 | $2,771,447 | — | — |
| PSUs (2024 grant, target) | 2/6/2024 | 13,031 | $1,206,801 | — | — |
| RSUs | 2/6/2024 | 6,515 | $603,354 | — | — |
| SARs (unexercisable) | 2/6/2024 | 24,246 | — | $91.94 | 2/5/2034 |
| PSUs (2023 grant, target) | 2/7/2023 | 19,006 | $1,760,146 | — | — |
| RSUs | 2/7/2023 | 3,038 | $281,349 | — | — |
| SARs | 2/7/2023 | 10,487 (unexercisable) | — | $83.63 | 2/6/2033 |
| PSUs (2022 grant, target) | 2/3/2022 | 8,396 | $777,554 | — | — |
| RSUs | 2/3/2022 | 1,280 | $118,541 | — | — |
| SARs | 2/3/2022 | 5,417 (unexercisable) | — | $81.85 | 2/2/2032 |
| SARs | 2/5/2021 | 22,064 (exercisable) | — | $63.93 | 2/4/2031 |
| SARs | 2/4/2020 | 43,461 (exercisable) | — | $80.97 | 2/3/2030 |
| SARs | 2/5/2019 | 51,965 (exercisable) | — | $63.92 | 2/4/2029 |
2024 Exercises and Vested Shares
| Metric | Shares (#) | Value Realized ($) |
|---|---|---|
| SARs Exercised | 40,687 | $1,274,964 |
| Stock Awards Vested (RSUs/PSUs) | 25,829 | $2,374,138 |
| Note | Shares withheld to satisfy FICA taxes on unvested RSUs due to retirement eligibility | — |
Ownership Policies
- Stock ownership guideline for “Other NEOs”: 3x annual base salary; failure to meet by deadline restricts discretionary selling until compliant; counts common stock, RSUs and DSUs (excludes options, SARs, unvested PSUs) .
- Hedging and pledging of Otis stock prohibited; no single‑trigger vesting on change‑in‑control; no excise tax gross‑ups .
Employment Terms
Severance and Change‑in‑Control
- Severance Plan: lump‑sum cash equal to 1x salary + target STI (CEO 1.5x), prorated STI for year of termination based on actual results, continued healthcare and outplacement up to 12 months; clawback/netting reduces any cash severance by value of ELG RSU vesting and other severance benefits—net cash severance for Mr. Zheng would be zero assuming 12/31/2024 termination due to ELG RSU netting .
- Equity on death/disability: RSUs/PSUs vest (PSUs at target unless Committee increases), SARs vest and are exercisable for up to three years (subject to award term) .
- PSUs/RSUs include double‑trigger protection: vesting exceptions apply for qualifying terminations within two years following a change‑in‑control .
- Non‑compete and non‑solicit agreements required for Executive Leadership Group members (where permitted by law) .
- Strong clawback provisions maintained .
Event Economics (Otis estimates for Perry Zheng)
| Event | Severance Cash ($) | STI Payment ($) | Option/SAR Value ($) | Stock Awards Value ($) | Other Benefits ($) | Less: Vested Pension & Equity ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Death/Disability | – | $701,000 | $183,185 | $8,757,043 | – | -$2,383,469 | $7,257,759 |
| CIC + Qualifying Termination | $2,660,000 | $701,000 | $183,185 | $8,757,043 | $58,148 | -$2,383,469 | $9,975,907 |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- LTI target value increased from $1.8M to $2.25M in 2024 to maintain competitiveness with Otis’s peer group and in recognition of performance; plus a one‑time $3.0M RSU award for retention, materially shifting pay mix toward equity and at‑risk compensation .
- NEO compensation mix is weighted heavily toward at‑risk pay via STI and LTI (policy description) .
- STI metrics and weightings emphasize earnings (40%) and cash generation (30%), with growth KPIs (organic sales and new equipment orders, 15% each); 2024 results yielded a 99% financial payout factor, adjusted upward by ESG (+7.5%) and individual performance (+5%) in Perry’s case .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and retention: One‑time RSU award with multi‑year vesting (1/3 at year 1, 2/3 at year 3) plus ELG RSU netting that drives zero cash severance on a standard termination indicates strong retention hooks and shareholder‑friendly severance mechanics for Zheng .
- Near‑term supply dynamics: 2024 saw meaningful exercises (40,687 SARs; $1.27M value) and vesting (25,829 shares; $2.37M value); upcoming one‑time RSU tranches (12/3/2025, 12/3/2027) may create additional taxable events and potential selling, though Otis prohibits pledging and restricts sales before meeting ownership guidelines .
- Pay‑for‑performance: STI tied predominantly to earnings and FCF, with 2024 corporate outcomes near target (99%), aligns cash incentives with core value drivers; PSUs tied to three‑year EPS and organic sales with a relative TSR multiplier further reinforce long‑term performance orientation .
- Change‑in‑control economics: Double‑trigger vesting and no excise tax gross‑ups, with total CIC‑related package for Zheng estimated at ~$9.98M, balances protection with governance discipline .
- Ownership: Beneficial ownership is modest (<1% of class) and SARs are significant, but hedging/pledging prohibitions and ownership requirements mitigate misalignment risks .
Best AI for Equity Research
Performance on expert-authored financial analysis tasks