John S. Abbott
About John S. Abbott
Senior Vice President, Manufacturing Platform; President, Varistar Corporation since February 11, 2015, leading OTTR’s Manufacturing and Plastics segments (appointed in 2015; Form 3 filed April 13, 2015) . Age 66 (as of FY 2024 10-K), tenure ~10 years at OTTR . Prior experience includes 20 years at Pentair (culminating as President and Global Business Unit Leader, Water Filtration) and eight years at Standex (Group VP, Food Service Equipment) . Company performance under the NEO framework tied to Corporate EPS and ROE, segment net income, and multi-year TSR/ROE LTI metrics: 2024 EPS $7.17, ROE 19.3%, net income $302M; three-year TSR (2022–2024) 23% at the 65th percentile of EEI peers; three-year adjusted ROE 22.33% (maxed) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pentair | President & Global Business Unit Leader, Water Filtration Division | 20 years | Led global water filtration business; progressed from product manager to BU leader, overseeing strategy and operations . |
| Standex International (Food Service Equipment Group) | Group Vice President | 8 years (last 5 as Group VP) | Responsible for all strategic and operational aspects; multi-P&L oversight and M&A integration experience . |
External Roles
- No external public company board memberships disclosed in OTTR filings for Abbott .
Fixed Compensation
Multi-year (USD):
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | 409,000 | 434,000 | 451,360 |
| Bonus ($) | 93,254 | 91,140 | 89,369 |
| Non-Equity Incentive Plan ($) | 368,100 | 413,864 | 424,280 |
| Stock Awards ($) | 389,414 | 461,358 | 527,352 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 82,007 | 86,162 | 101,939 |
| Total Compensation ($) | 1,341,775 | 1,486,524 | 1,594,300 |
Additional 2024 plan design parameters:
- Target annual incentive opportunity: 60% of salary (Abbott) .
- ERPP contributions (retirement) included in “All Other”: $64,283 (Abbott); also 401(k) match $31,050, executive physical $5,504, and year-end gift card $1,103 .
Performance Compensation
Annual incentive (2024) – metrics, weights, targets vs actuals, payouts:
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout (% of Target) | Notes/Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Corporate EPS | 30% | $5.30 | $7.17 | 200% | GAAP; no adjustments in 2024 . |
| Manufacturing Platform Net Income | 40% | $138,000 | $214,428 | 200% | GAAP; no adjustments in 2024 . |
| Individual Performance | 20% | — | — | 171% average NEO payout; Abbott subject to CEO/Committee approval . | Discretionary component within plan governance . |
| Safety (ESG component) | Max 10% of target incentive | Case rate below 3-year industry avg | Achieved | 100% of maximum | Binary payout (0%/100% of max) . |
| DEI (ESG component) | Max 5% of target incentive | Exceed targets on Diverse Slate & Training | Manufacturing achieved partial | 33% of maximum | Sliding scale above target; Manufacturing 33% of max in 2024 . |
| Environmental (ESG component – Sustainability) | Max 5% of target incentive | Complete framework and draft sustainability report | Completed | 100% of maximum | Abbott was not eligible for renewable generation metric; sustainability paid at 100% of max . |
Long-term incentives (equity):
- 2024 PSU grant: target 4,200 shares (threshold 2,100; max 6,300) split 50% TSR vs EEI Index and 50% three-year adjusted ROE; payout range 0–150%; performance period 2024–2026 . TSR targets: 25th/50th/75th percentile (cap at target if negative TSR); ROE targets: 10.0%/12.0%/14.0% .
- 2024 RSU grant: 1,400 units; vest 25% per year on Feb 6, 2025–2028; dividends paid in cash, subject to forfeiture .
- 2022–2024 PSU outcome: TSR 23% at 65th percentile (weighted ~65% of half); 3-yr adjusted ROE 22.33% (max); combined payout ~140% .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial ownership and awards:
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total beneficial shares (12/31/2024) | 55,494; less than 1% of outstanding . |
| Shares outstanding reference | 41,827,967 at 12/31/2024 . |
| Recent vesting included in ownership | 1,775 RSUs vested 2/6/2025; 7,560 PSUs vested 2/12/2025 . |
| Shares pledged | None; no pledging permitted . |
| Stock ownership guideline | 2× base salary for Abbott; include unvested RSUs; must hold 100% of net shares until guideline met; all executives met guidelines . |
| Hedging/pledging policy | Hedging and pledging prohibited . |
| Stock vested in 2024 | 13,825 shares; value realized $1,290,287 . |
Outstanding equity awards at 12/31/2024:
RSUs – Unvested units and market value:
| Grant Year | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs unvested (#) | 575 | 800 | 1,350 | 1,400 |
| RSUs market value ($) | 42,458 | 59,072 | 99,684 | 103,376 |
PSUs – Unearned (reported at max) and market value:
| Grant Year | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs unearned (#, at max) | 8,100 | 8,400 | 6,300 |
| PSUs market value ($) | 598,104 | 620,256 | 465,192 |
Employment Terms
- Role and start date: Senior Vice President, Manufacturing Platform; President, Varistar since Feb 11, 2015 .
- No individual NEO employment contract; Abbott participates in Executive Severance Plan (ESP) .
- Severance (non–change in control): ESP provides 1.5× base salary + target annual incentive (lump sum) upon termination without cause or resignation for good reason; subject to release, non-compete, non-solicit, non-disparagement covenants .
- Change-in-control (double trigger): Severance equal to 2× (highest salary in prior two years + average annual incentive for prior two years), plus two years of life/health/disability, legal fee reimbursement, and termination of non-compete; stock awards double-trigger accelerate (PSUs at target; RSUs immediately vest); amended agreements tighten CIC definitions and set a 24-month protection window .
- Clawback policies: SEC/Nasdaq-compliant Incentive Compensation Recovery Policy filed with 10-K; Supplemental policy (Feb 2025) enables recoupment for detrimental misconduct across cash/equity awards .
- No excise tax gross-ups; hedging/pledging barred; ownership holding requirements enforced .
- Equity grant timing policy: Grants scheduled at February board meetings for executive officers (no options granted in 2024) .
Performance & Track Record
- Segment execution: Manufacturing NI exceeded maximum target in 2024 (payout 200%), reflecting strong platform performance under Abbott’s remit .
- Corporate outcomes (context for incentive alignment): 2024 EPS $7.17, ROE 19.3%, net income $302M; dividend increased to indicated $2.10 in Feb 2025 .
- Long-term value metrics: 2022–2024 PSU cycle paid ~140% on combined TSR/ROE (TSR at 65th percentile; ROE above max), reinforcing pay-for-performance linkage .
- Say-on-Pay: 96.0% approval at 2024 annual meeting; compensation design viewed favorably by shareholders .
- Peer benchmarking: WTW-supported peer group (utility-weighted mix) and survey data underpin target levels and mix .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- At-risk pay emphasis: ~70% of executive target direct compensation at risk, with caps of 200% for annual incentive and 150% for PSUs; inclusion of safety, DEI, environmental metrics .
- Shift to RSUs/PSUs: LTI delivered via PSUs (TSR/ROE) and RSUs with four-year ratable vesting; no options granted in 2024 .
- Discretionary element: Individual performance component paid at 171% average in 2024; still subject to committee governance and caps .
- Clawbacks tightened: Adoption of SEC-compliant and supplemental misconduct recoupment policies in 2024–2025 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment (Guidelines and Compliance)
- Ownership guideline multiple (Abbott 2× salary), inclusion of unvested RSUs, 100% net share hold-until-met; all executives in compliance .
- Prohibitions: Hedging and pledging prohibited for executives/directors; insider trading policy reviewed annually .
- No pledged shares among directors/NEOs at year-end 2024 .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Option repricing: None disclosed; no options granted in 2024 .
- Hedging/pledging: Prohibited; none pledged by Abbott .
- Clawback enforcement history: Not disclosed; policies in place .
- Legal proceedings: Company-level antitrust class actions involving PVC manufacturers disclosed; no Abbott-specific proceedings .
Compensation Peer Group & Say-on-Pay
- Peer companies (2024): Utility/manufacturing/natural gas distribution cohort, including ALLETE, Avista, Black Hills, IDACORP, Portland General Electric, etc.; peer data used to validate survey benchmarks .
- Say-on-Pay approval: 96.0%, indicating strong investor support for pay design .
Expertise & Qualifications
- Deep manufacturing leadership across Pentair and Standex; M&A integration experience; multi-P&L oversight .
Work History & Career Trajectory
| Organization | Role | Years | Notable Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Otter Tail Corporation | SVP, Manufacturing Platform; President, Varistar | ~10 years (since 2015) | Leads Manufacturing and Plastics segments; segment NI exceeded max target in 2024 (200% payout) . |
| Pentair | President & Global BU Leader, Water Filtration | 20 years | Drove global operations and strategy . |
| Standex International | Group VP, Food Service Equipment | 8 years | Led strategic and operational performance; P&L oversight/M&A . |
Employment Terms (Severance & CIC Economics)
| Scenario | Cash Multiple | Benefits | Equity Treatment | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Non-CIC termination (ESP) | 1.5× base + target annual incentive (Abbott) | Lump-sum; covenants (non-compete, non-solicit, non-disparagement), release | Plan-specific; historically includes pro-rata vesting treatment per award terms (company tables quantify outcomes) | ESP applies to Abbott; CEO has 2.0× . |
| CIC + termination (double trigger) | 2× salary + average incentive (prior 2 yrs) | 2 years life/health/disability; legal fees; terminate non-compete | PSUs vest at target; RSUs immediately vest | Amended CIC definitions; 24-month protection period . |
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Strong pay-for-performance via Corporate EPS/ROE and Manufacturing NI (Abbott’s primary lever) plus TSR/ROE PSUs; 2024 delivered maximum payouts on key financial metrics, and 2022–2024 PSUs paid ~140%—supports management confidence but sets a high bar for future cycles .
- Retention risk: ESP and double-trigger CIC protections reduce near-term attrition risk; RSU four-year ratable vesting and PSU multi-year horizons build stickiness; no pledging allowed, and ownership guidelines enforced .
- Trading signals: Award grants/vests cluster in early February (policy-driven grant cadence; RSU tranches vest Feb 6; PSU certifications mid-Feb), creating potential liquidity events; recent Feb 2025 vesting (RSUs 1,775; PSUs 7,560) may influence insider trading windows, subject to policy controls .
- Risk controls: Robust clawbacks (SEC/Nasdaq-compliant and supplemental), hedging/pledging prohibitions, and shareholder-supported pay design (96% Say-on-Pay) mitigate governance risks .