Jason Glickman
PG&EAbout Jason Glickman
Jason M. Glickman, 44, serves as Executive Vice President, Engineering, Planning & Strategy at Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E’s Utility) and is one of the Utility’s principal executive officers (PEOs). He joined PG&E on May 3, 2021 after serving as Global Head of Utilities & Renewables and Partner at Bain & Company (2007–2021) . During his tenure, PG&E’s incentive outcomes included 2024 short‑term incentive payout at 103.6% of target and industry‑leading three‑year TSR ranking at 100th percentile for the 2022–2024 PSU cycle, with non‑GAAP core EPS reaching $1.36, up 10.6% year over year .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bain & Company | Global Head of Utilities & Renewables | 2020–2021 | Led utilities/renewables practice; strategic programs across decarbonization and utility transformation |
| Bain & Company | Partner | 2014–2021 | Senior leadership delivering operational and strategy initiatives for energy clients |
| Bain & Company | Consultant | 2007–2013 | Consulting engagements in utilities, energy, and infrastructure |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Not disclosed | — | — | No external board roles disclosed for Glickman in PG&E filings |
Fixed Compensation
Multi-year summary compensation for Glickman (titles as of each year end):
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | 712,500 | 743,100 | 769,529 |
| Bonus ($) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Stock Awards ($) | 1,854,956 | 1,912,843 | 1,783,968 |
| Non-Equity Incentive (STIP) ($) | 630,392 | 947,689 | 597,924 |
| Change in Pension Value ($) | 8,826 | 24,557 | 20,385 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 112,784 | 120,340 | 137,708 |
| Total ($) | 3,319,458 | 3,748,529 | 3,309,513 |
2024 base salary rate and incentive target:
| Item | 2024 |
|---|---|
| Annualized Base Salary ($) | $773,890 |
| STIP Target (% of Base) | 75% |
| STIP Target ($) | $577,146 |
| STIP Actual Payout ($) | $597,924 (103.6% of target) |
Performance Compensation
Short-Term Incentive Plan (STIP) – 2024 company scorecard
| Performance Metric | Weight | Threshold (50%) | Target (100%) | Maximum (200%) | Actual | Unweighted Score | Weighted Score |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Weather-normalized CPUC-reportable fire ignitions rate | 25% | 0.95 | 0.90 | 0.85 | 1.41 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Quality pass rate | 10% | 0.50 | 1.00 | 2.00 | 2.00 | 2.000 | 0.200 |
| Gas dig-in rate | 5% | 1.22 | 1.17 | 1.10 | 1.00 | 2.000 | 0.100 |
| Preventable motor vehicle incident rate | 5% | 2.34 | 2.25 | 2.21 | 2.38 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| DCPP reliability and safety indicator | 5% | 95.0 | 97.5 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 2.000 | 0.100 |
| Safe dam operating capacity | 5% | 97.0% | 97.5% | 97.9% | 98.0% | 2.000 | 0.100 |
| Serious injury actual count | 5% | 2 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| CEMI‑5 and CEMI‑10 index | 10% | 0.500 | 1.000 | 2.000 | 0.500 | 0.500 | 0.500 |
| Non‑GAAP core EPS ($) | 20% | $1.31 | $1.33 | $1.35 | $1.36 | 2.000 | 0.400 |
| Operating cash flow ($mm) | 10% | $7,124 | $8,382 | $9,639 | $8,035 | 0.862 | 0.086 |
| Company Score (after negative discretion) | — | — | — | — | — | — | 1.036 |
Individual modifier range 0–120%; 2024 IPMs approved at ~100–101%. Glickman’s STIP: target $577,146, actual $597,924 (103.6%) .
Long-Term Incentive Plan (PSUs)
- 2024 LTIP: 100% PSUs; Glickman target value $1,750,000, converted using $16.60 share price on Mar 1, 2024; three‑year performance period 1/1/2024–12/31/2026 with vest three years after grant (AB 1054 holding) .
- 2024 PSU metrics and weights: Safety 40%, Customer 25%, Relative TSR 35% .
- 2022 PSU cycle outcome: Overall score 1.181 (118.1% of target) including TSR at 100th percentile; customer SAIDI achieved (2.000 unweighted score); affordability and system hardening effectiveness scored as disclosed below .
| 2022 PSU Metric | Weight | Threshold (50%) | Target (100%) | Max (200%) | Actual | Unweighted | Weighted |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Customer satisfaction | 15% | 73.0 | 76.0 | 78.5 | 66.7 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| SAIDI | 15% | 341.3 | 334.6 | 327.9 | 276.7 | 2.000 | 0.300 |
| System hardening effectiveness (risk miles) | 20% | adj. | 1,360 | 1,411 | 1,272 | 0.672 | 0.134 |
| Enhanced vegetation management effectiveness | 20% | n/a | 1,924 | n/a | 1,924 | 1.000 | 0.200 |
| Greater affordability for customers ($mm) | 15% | $(150) | $(104) | $(59) | $(75) | 1.644 | 0.247 |
| Relative TSR | 15% | 25th %ile | 50th %ile | 90th %ile | 100th %ile | 2.000 | 0.300 |
| Overall 2022 PSU Score | — | — | — | — | — | — | 1.181 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial ownership: 116,169 PG&E Corp shares as of March 15, 2025; less than 1% of shares outstanding; no pledged shares . Prior snapshot: 152,400 shares as of March 7, 2024 (less than 1%) .
- Outstanding equity at FY2024: No stock options; unvested RSUs/earned PSUs and unearned PSUs as below (values at $20.18 close on 12/31/2024) .
| Category | Units | Market/Payout Value ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Unvested RSUs (incl. earned 2022 PSUs) | 175,012 | $3,531,742 |
| Unearned PSUs (2023–2024 awards, as presented) | 217,532 | $5,926,220 |
| Options (exercisable/unexercisable) | 0 / 0 | — |
Vesting schedule (units):
- Earned 2022 PSU vest 3/1/2025: 175,012
- 2023 PSU scheduled vest 3/1/2026: 112,109 (unearned, subject to performance)
- 2024 PSU scheduled vest 3/1/2027: 105,423 (unearned, subject to performance)
Shares vested and value realized in 2024: 152,401 shares; $2,674,638 .
Ownership policy and alignment:
- Anti‑hedging/anti‑pledging: Prohibited for officers; cannot hold in margin or pledge as collateral .
- Stock ownership guidelines: EVPs must hold stock equal to 300% of base salary; officers have 5 years to comply; until met, 100% net shares from vesting must be held; all NEOs have met or are expected to meet within the period .
Employment Terms
- Start date and role: EVP, Engineering, Planning & Strategy since May 3, 2021; Utility PEO designation .
- Severance policy:
- Termination without cause: Lump sum equal to 1x base salary + 1x STIP target; pro‑rata PSU vesting; continued RSU vesting for 12 months; limited COBRA and outplacement .
- Change in Control (double‑trigger): 2x base + 2x STIP target for EVPs; accelerated or continued LTIP vesting per award treatment; RSUs vest per schedule; options vest and exercisable per term; parachute payments >2.99x require shareholder approval .
- Covenants: 12‑month non‑solicit; non‑compete to extent permitted by law; confidentiality; cooperation; release required .
Estimated potential payments (as of 12/31/2024; PG&E stock at $20.18):
| Scenario | Pension ($) | Stock Awards Vesting ($) | Severance ($) | STIP Award ($) | Health Care ($) | Career Transition ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Resignation/Retirement | 67,141 | — | — | 597,924 | — | — | 665,065 |
| Termination for Cause | 67,141 | — | — | — | — | — | 67,141 |
| Termination Without Cause | 67,141 | 5,283,503 | 1,354,308 | 597,924 | 57,427 | 19,500 | 7,379,802 |
| Disability | 67,141 | 7,459,006 | — | 597,924 | — | — | 8,124,070 |
| Death | 80,684 | 7,459,006 | — | 597,924 | — | — | 8,137,613 |
| Change in Control | 67,141 | 7,459,006 | 2,708,616 | 580,418 | 57,427 | 19,500 | 10,892,107 |
Clawbacks and compliance:
- Dodd‑Frank clawback (3‑year lookback post restatement), broader executive incentive recoupment policy, and severance policy recoupment in defined circumstances; no clawback actions in 2024 .
- Say‑on‑pay support: 2024 vote approvals of >95% and 99% at PG&E Corp and Utility respectively; 2025 outreach found no investor concerns on programs .
Retirement and deferred compensation:
- Pension: Present value $67,141; credited service 3.66 years (Retirement Plan) .
- Supplemental/Deferred: 2024 registrant contributions to DC‑ESRP $120,205; aggregate DC‑ESRP balance $370,511; SRSP aggregate balance $47,636 .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment is strong: 74%+ of NEO pay at risk; STIP/PSU metrics emphasize wildfire safety, customer reliability, financial stability, and TSR; 2024 STIP paid at 103.6% with mixed safety outcomes (ignitions and serious injuries below threshold, but EPS and SAIDI exceeded targets) .
- Near-term vesting may create mechanical supply from PSU settlements (175,012 earned PSUs vesting 3/1/2025; further scheduled PSU vestings in 2026 and 2027), but anti‑hedging/pledging and ownership retention requirements mitigate selling pressure until guideline compliance is met .
- Severance and CIC economics: One‑times base+target STIP for TWC and two‑times for CIC (double trigger) indicate moderate protection with shareholder-friendly features (parachute approval threshold, clawbacks), reducing governance risk signals .
- Track record: Industry‑leading three‑year TSR and EPS growth support incentive payouts; continued focus on wildfire safety and affordability tied directly to incentive design provides measurable execution benchmarks for monitoring risk and pay outcomes .