Jaime Vasquez
PureCycle TechnologiesAbout Jaime Vasquez
Jaime Vasquez, 62, is Chief Financial Officer of PureCycle Technologies (PCT) since February 19, 2024. He holds an MBA from the University of North Carolina—Bryan School of Business and a BA from Rutgers University . 2024 short‑term incentives were tied to Ironton facility EBITDA; actual performance was below threshold, resulting in zero STI payout for NEOs, signaling pay‑for‑performance alignment amid ramp challenges . Company pay-versus-performance shows cumulative TSR declined to $14 (on a $100 base) through FY2023 and Adjusted EBITDA was negative, underscoring execution risk during scale-up .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| C&D Technologies | Chief Financial Officer | Sep 2020 – Nov 2022 | Battery manufacturer for golf cart, industrial, data center markets |
| AK Steel (public) | Chief Financial Officer | 2015 – 2019 | CFO of previously public steelmaking company |
| AK Steel | Director of Finance | 2014 – 2015 | Corporate finance leadership |
| Carpenter Technology Corporation (public) | Division CFO; various finance roles | 2001 – 2014 | Specialty metals manufacturer; finance leadership including division CFO |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| None disclosed | — | — | No current public company board roles disclosed in PCT proxy/8‑K materials |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2024 Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | $510,000 | Set at appointment as CFO (effective Feb 19, 2024) |
| Target Bonus (STI) | 70% of base ($357,000) | 2024 STI target not pro‑rated |
| Actual STI Paid | $0 | 2024 NEO cash incentives not paid due to below‑threshold Ironton EBITDA |
| All Other Compensation | $28,885 | Includes relocation reimbursement and executive physicals |
Performance Compensation
Short-Term Incentive (STI) – 2024 Design and Outcome
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold (50%) | Target (100%) | Maximum (200%) | Actual | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ironton EBITDA (excl. corp alloc.) | 70% (Company metric) | 3 cumulative months breakeven | 6 months cumulative > $15M | 6 months cumulative > $30M | Below threshold (negative) | 0% |
| Individual Performance | 30% | Discretionary (no pre-set goals) | Discretionary | Discretionary | Evaluated; NEOs received no cash incentive given Company performance | 0% cash paid |
Long-Term Incentive (LTI) – 2024 Grants (Grant date: Feb 21, 2024)
| Award Type | Quantity | Terms | Grant-Date Fair Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs | 71,629 | Time-based; vest 25% per year over 4 years on each anniversary of grant date | $410,434 |
| PSUs (target) | 35,814 (Threshold 17,907; Max 71,628) | Three-year operational metrics; payout 50%–200% of target based on performance; vest upon committee certification | $205,214 (at target) |
| Stock Options | 35,027 | Non-qualified; strike $5.73; cliff vest on 2/21/2027; expire 2/21/2034 | $159,373 |
2024 Summary Compensation for Vasquez reflects Stock Awards $615,648 (RSUs+PSUs) and Option Awards $159,373 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Amount | Details |
|---|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (3/21/2025) | 98,529 shares | <1% of outstanding; included in NEO/Director table |
| Unvested RSUs (12/31/2024) | 71,629 | Market value $734,197 |
| Unvested PSUs (12/31/2024) | 17,907 | Market/payout value $183,547 (unearned) |
| Stock Options (12/31/2024) | 35,027 unexercisable; 0 exercisable | Strike $5.73; expire 2/21/2034 |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited | Insider Trading Policy bans hedging and pledging/margin |
| Pledged Shares | None | “To our knowledge, no shares … have been pledged” |
| Ownership Guidelines | 3x salary (CFO) | On-track to meet within 5 years |
2025 aggregate ownership table based on 179,412,172 shares outstanding .
Employment Terms
| Term | Details |
|---|---|
| Start Date | Appointed CFO on Feb 19, 2024 |
| Offer Letter | Base salary $510,000; 2024 STI at 70% of base; 2024 LTI target 125% of base; relocation reimbursement up to $26,000; participation in Severance Plan; restrictive covenants |
| Severance (no CIC) | 1x base salary paid in installments; up to 12 months COBRA reimbursement (excess over employee rate) |
| Severance (within 12 months after CIC) | Lump sum 1.5x base + 1.5x STI target; COBRA reimbursement; outplacement; equity vests in full at target for performance awards (double trigger) |
| Equity Vesting on CIC | If no replacement award, RSUs/PSUs/options vest in full; with replacement award and termination within 12 months (double trigger), vest in full; PSUs deemed at target if not yet scored |
| Clawbacks | “No-fault” clawback compliant with Nasdaq Rule 5608; separate policy for willful contribution to restatement |
| Hedging/Pledging Policy | Prohibits short sales, derivatives, hedging, and pledging/margin accounts for insiders and household members |
| Tax Gross-Ups | None for NEOs |
| Incentive Caps | STI and LTI individually capped at 200% of target |
| Non-Compete/Non-Solicit | Participation in Severance Plan contingent on signing customary non‑competition, non‑solicitation, confidentiality; durations not disclosed |
Compensation Structure Context
- 2024 pay mix: Fixed salary plus at‑risk STI/LTI, with LTI comprising RSUs, PSUs, and options; PSUs tied to three-year operational metrics and options cliff vest after three years .
- 2024 STI metric migrated to Ironton EBITDA to sharpen alignment with commercialization milestones; payout was 0% as performance was below threshold .
- Independent compensation consultant FW Cook engaged; peer group includes Li‑Cycle, Origin Materials, Trex, etc., to benchmark competitiveness and retention .
Performance & Execution Signals
- Liquidity and capital markets: Q2 2025 call reported cash of ~$298M (unrestricted ~$284M), bond sales for ~$10.5M proceeds, and plans to sell ~$87M remaining revenue bonds to support growth .
- STI outcome indicates rigorous thresholds and payout discipline as commercialization timelines extended .
- Prior three‑year PSU cycle (2021–2023) for NEOs forfeited due to operational underperformance, reflecting tough long‑term hurdles; underscores execution sensitivity of equity payouts (companywide context) .
Say‑On‑Pay & Governance
- Say-on-pay: At the 2023 annual meeting, >95% approval of NEO compensation; frequency vote supported annual say‑on‑pay .
- Compensation Committee: Independent; uses external consultant; oversees risk and stock ownership policy .
- Director/NEO stock ownership guidelines and anti-hedging/pledging policies strengthen alignment .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Zero 2024 STI payout and PSU dependence on operational goals emphasize pay‑for‑performance and reduce windfall risk; anti‑hedging/pledging and clawbacks further harden governance .
- Retention: Severance (1.0x base; 1.5x base+bonus on CIC) and multi‑year LTI mix (RSUs/PSUs/options) provide retention hooks; ownership guideline (3x salary) increases skin‑in‑the‑game over time .
- Trading Signals: RSU tranches (~25% of 71,629 annually) vest on each anniversary of 2/21/2024; option cliff on 2/21/2027 may concentrate potential insider liquidity windows; no pledging mitigates forced selling risk .
- Execution Risk: PSU outcomes hinge on delivering operational/expansion milestones; historical underperformance on long‑term metrics and negative Adjusted EBITDA/TSR trends highlight sensitivity to ramp progress, though liquidity measures in 2025 bolster runway .