David Flavell
About David Flavell
Executive Vice President, General Counsel and Corporate Secretary of PepsiCo; appointed to this role effective March 1, 2021 after joining PepsiCo in 2011. He oversees PepsiCo’s global legal affairs and corporate governance and previously served as Deputy General Counsel and Chief Compliance & Ethics Officer; earlier roles include General Counsel for Frito-Lay North America and PepsiCo’s AMEA/Latin America businesses, and prior in-house and law-firm positions at Danone, Fonterra, and Corrs Chambers Westgarth. He holds an honours degree in Law and a Bachelor of Economics from Monash University (Australia) . Company performance context during his tenure includes strong multi‑year EPS growth as a key compensation metric and rising GAAP net income as disclosed in PepsiCo’s pay‑versus‑performance table .
| Metric | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GAAP Net Income ($USD Millions) | 7,175 | 7,679 | 8,978 | 9,155 | 9,626 |
| Company-Selected Measure: Core Constant Currency EPS Growth (%) | 10% | 12% | 11% | 14% | 9% |
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| PepsiCo | EVP, General Counsel & Corporate Secretary | Appointed Mar 1, 2021 | Oversees global legal affairs and governance; Corporate Secretary for SEC filings and shareholder meetings |
| PepsiCo | Deputy General Counsel; Chief Compliance & Ethics Officer | Pre‑2021 | Led global Compliance & Ethics, data privacy/cybersecurity, global M&A; managed ~400 professionals globally |
| PepsiCo | General Counsel, Frito‑Lay North America; AMEA & Latin America | Pre‑2021 | Provided legal leadership across core NA snacks and international segments |
| Danone | General Counsel, Asia Pacific & Middle East | Pre‑2011 | Led regional legal function (Shanghai-based), cross‑border M&A and compliance |
| Fonterra Co‑operative Group | Senior in‑house legal roles | Pre‑2011 | Managed legal issues across developed/emerging markets |
| Corrs Chambers Westgarth | Corporate & antitrust partner | First 11 years of career | Advised on corporate and competition law; foundation for global M&A specialization |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| World Economic Forum | Profiled executive (biography page) | Ongoing | Global legal/compliance leadership visibility; cross‑regional experience highlighted |
Fixed Compensation
- Individual salary, target bonus, and grant-date values for Mr. Flavell are not disclosed in PepsiCo’s NEO tables; the 2024/2025 proxies list NEOs as CEO, CFO, and certain business unit leaders, and Mr. Flavell is not among the NEOs shown in the Summary Compensation Table .
- Compensation framework for executive officers emphasizes at‑risk pay with annual incentives and multi‑year long‑term incentives (see Performance Compensation) .
Performance Compensation
PepsiCo’s executive LTI design (applies to executive officers, including the General Counsel) blends performance stock units (PSUs) and a Long‑Term Cash (LTC) award with explicit metrics, weightings, and payout curves.
| Incentive Type | Metric | Weighting | Target/Payout Range | Vesting/Performance Period | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs (equity) | Core Constant Currency EPS Growth (3‑yr average of annual rates) | 50% | 0–200% of target | 3‑year performance; vests at 3 years subject to performance | Focuses on profitability, expense control, and sustained earnings quality |
| PSUs (equity) | Organic Revenue Performance (3‑yr average of annual rates) | 50% | 0–200% of target | 3‑year performance; vests at 3 years subject to performance | Emphasizes top‑line growth and return enhancement |
| Long‑Term Cash (LTC) | Relative TSR vs. proxy peer group (3‑yr) | 100% | 0–200% of target; above‑target requires positive 3‑yr TSR | 3‑year performance | Reinforces shareholder value creation via relative TSR |
Key vesting, holding, and plan terms:
- Standard vesting: annual LTI awards vest over three years; PSUs/LTC remain subject to performance; retirement eligibility allows pro‑rata vesting between ages 55–61 with 10+ years’ service, and full vesting at age 62+ with 10+ years (performance still applies) .
- Change‑in‑control: “double‑trigger” vesting—unvested equity and LTC vest at target if terminated without cause or for good reason within two years post‑CIC or if awards are not assumed by acquirer .
- Share retention: executives must hold at least 50% of net shares from PSU vesting; option sale proceeds above 20% annual cap must be held in stock for one year (executives who meet ownership guidelines are exempt) .
- Option usage: PepsiCo grants options to employees generally, but executive officers do not receive stock options; no option grants to NEOs in 2024 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Topic | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership | As of Feb 27, 2025, current directors and executive officers as a group beneficially owned less than 1% of outstanding shares; Mr. Flavell is not individually listed in the table of named individuals . |
| Stock ownership guidelines | Executives must own a multiple of salary; unexercised options and unvested PSUs/RSUs do not count; five‑year compliance window; all executive officers have met or are on track to meet requirements . |
| Retention/holding | Required to hold 50% of net shares from PSU payouts; option exercise proceeds above 20% cap retained in stock for at least one year (exempt if meeting guidelines) . |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited from hedging, short sales, margin accounts, or pledging PepsiCo securities; strict trading windows with pre‑clearance . |
| Option exposure | Executive officers do not receive stock options under current practice; reduces option‑driven selling pressure; no option grants to NEOs in 2024 . |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Summary |
|---|---|
| Employment agreement | None; PepsiCo states NEOs (and executive officers) do not have employment contracts; terminations addressed case‑by‑case . |
| Cash severance policy | Shareholder ratification required for any new executive agreement exceeding 2.99x base salary + target bonus (or 3‑yr average actual bonus if greater) in “cash severance benefits” . |
| Change‑in‑control (CIC) | Double‑trigger vesting for unvested equity and LTC (target performance) upon qualifying termination within 2 years post‑CIC or if awards not assumed . |
| Clawback | Robust clawbacks for detrimental behavior (violations of non‑compete/non‑solicit/non‑disclosure or misconduct) and a Dodd‑Frank‑compliant Compensation Recovery Policy effective Oct 2, 2023 requiring recovery of erroneously awarded incentive pay over the three years prior to any restatement, regardless of misconduct . |
| Trading windows | Executives may only trade during approved windows after mandatory clearance . |
Performance, Track Record, and Execution Risk
- Governance and disclosure leadership: As Corporate Secretary, Mr. Flavell signs SEC filings and oversees proxy processes, reinforcing governance rigor and disclosure controls .
- Pay‑for‑performance linkage in programs he administers: PSU metrics delivered maximum payouts for the 2022 PSU cycle due to 3‑year EPS growth (11.2%) and organic revenue performance (8.6%) above max targets—illustrating alignment between long‑term incentives and operating performance .
- Company performance backdrop: Net income expanded from $7.2B (2020) to $9.6B (2024), while Core Constant Currency EPS Growth ranged 9–14% annually over 2020–2024 .
Additional Signals on Vesting and Selling Pressure
- PSU-centric equity with mandatory post‑vest holding curbs near‑term selling; executive officers currently do not receive options, further limiting option‑related liquidity events .
- Retirement provisions create predictable vesting overhangs (pro‑rata at 55–61 with 10+ years; full at 62+), but performance gates remain in place until certification .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Strong—multi‑year PSU metrics (EPS growth and organic revenue) and LTC relative TSR directly tie realized pay to growth and shareholder returns; strict hedging/pledging bans and ownership/holding requirements further align incentives .
- Retention risk: Moderate‑low—no guaranteed severance or employment contract, but meaningful at‑risk LTI with retirement‑eligibility features encourages tenure; severance policy caps extreme cash packages (>2.99x) without shareholder ratification, limiting moral hazard while preserving flexibility .
- Trading/selling pressure: Low—absence of new option grants to executive officers and mandatory holding of PSU net shares mitigate forced selling dynamics around vest dates .
- Governance quality: High—double‑trigger CIC, robust clawbacks (including no‑fault restatement recovery), limited trading windows and pre‑clearance, and responsible equity grant practices support risk mitigation and long‑term orientation .
Sources and Role Confirmation
- Appointment and responsibilities: PepsiCo press release (Jan 28, 2021); PepsiCo leadership profile; World Economic Forum bio .
- Corporate Secretary role in filings/meetings: 8‑K signatures and proxy notices .
- Compensation framework, metrics, vesting, ownership, hedging/pledging, severance/CIC/clawback: PepsiCo DEF 14A (2025, 2024, 2023, 2022, 2021) .
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