Sundar Raman
About Sundar Raman
Sundar G. Raman is Chief Executive Officer of Procter & Gamble’s Fabric & Home Care sector (since 2021), P&G’s largest division comprising Tide, Ariel, Downy, Gain, Febreze, Swiffer, and roughly one-third of company sales and earnings . He joined P&G in June 1998 and holds a B.Tech. in Electrical & Electronics Engineering (IIT Madras, 1996) and a Post-Graduate Diploma in Management (IIM Calcutta, 1998), with executive education at Harvard Business School (2015) . His pay-for-performance is tied to company metrics including organic sales growth, Core EPS growth, free cash flow productivity, and relative TSR; recent company outcomes were +4% organic sales, +12% Core EPS, 105% adjusted FCF productivity in FY 2023-24 and +2%, +4%, 87% respectively in FY 2024-25 . P&G’s three-year PSP paid 160% for the 2021–2024 cycle and 148% for 2022–2025, reflecting strong relative TSR and operating performance .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Procter & Gamble | CEO, Fabric & Home Care | 2021–present | Leads largest P&G sector; focus on superiority, synchronized E2E supply chain, brand-building, innovation; sustained growth and record profits in NA Fabric Care with launches like Tide Pods and Downy Unstopables . |
| Procter & Gamble | President – Home Care and P&G Professional (Global) | 2020 | Led a $7B+ Home Care portfolio; expanded Professional cleaning across 39 countries . |
| Procter & Gamble | President – Fabric Care NA & P&G Professional (Global) | 2019 | Drove category growth and media/transformation initiatives; built service expansion strategy in laundry . |
| Procter & Gamble | VP – Fabric Care NA | 2015 | Led innovation and marketing; strengthened brand superiority . |
| Procter & Gamble | Brand Director/Associate Director – Fabric Care NA | 2008–2015 | Led innovation and brand-building; accelerated category growth . |
| Procter & Gamble | Brand roles in Beauty; Consumer & Market Knowledge | 1998–2008 | Built analytics and marketing foundations; multiple roles in US and India . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| American Cleaning Institute | Chairman of the Board | 2017–present | Industry leadership across cleaning product standards and sustainability . |
| National Underground Railroad Freedom Center (Cincinnati) | Board Member | 2016–present | Citizenship, equality & inclusion advocacy . |
| Agile Pursuits Franchising, Inc. | Board/Vice President, Marketing | 2015–present | Laundry services platform oversight . |
Fixed Compensation
| Component (FY 2024-25) | Amount (USD) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | $912,500 | Salary converted/paid in CHF; shown USD . |
| Retirement Plan Contributions | $70,101 | PST contributions in USD . |
| Flexible Compensation Credits | $3,450 | Benefit credits for coverage . |
| Expatriate, Relocation & Tax Equalization | $993,017 | Switzerland assignment costs incl. housing $140,046; COLA $139,087; travel $7,011; relocation $8,962; tax prep $16,910; tax equalization $681,001 . |
| Executive Benefits | $15,612 | Financial counseling, annual physical, secure parking; aircraft use not indicated for him . |
| All Other Compensation Total | $1,082,180 | Sum of items above . |
Performance Compensation
| Program | Metric/Detail | Target | Actual/Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| STAR (Annual Bonus, FY 2024-25) | STAR Target (115% of salary) | $1,069,500 | Award $737,153 (69% of target) | Cash (he elected cash) . |
| STAR (FY 2024-25) | Business Unit Factor (70% weight) | — | 85% | Annual. |
| STAR (FY 2024-25) | Total Company Factor (30% weight) | — | 32% | Annual; ESG factor not applied (100% neutral) . |
| LTIP (Grant 10/01/2024) | Stock Options | 57,601 options; GDFV $2,095,524 | — | Cliff vest at 3 years; expire 09/29/2034; strike $173.04 . |
| LTIP (Grant 10/01/2024) | RSUs | None (0 granted) | — | N/A. |
| PSP (Grant 10/01/2024) | PSUs | 12,110 PSUs; GDFV $2,156,549 | Payout in Aug 2027 based on 3-year goals | Forfeitable until 06/30/2027; delivery Aug 2027 . |
| PSP (Goals FY 2024–2027) | Org. Sales Growth Percentile (30%) | 50th = 100% | 80th=200%; 30th=33% | 3-year performance. |
| PSP (Goals FY 2024–2027) | Const. Curr. Core BTO Profit Growth (20%) | 6.3%=100% | 11.3% = 200%; 1.3% = 0% | 3-year performance. |
| PSP (Goals FY 2024–2027) | Core EPS Growth (30%) | 6.7%=100% | 11.7% = 200%; 1.7% = 0% | 3-year performance. |
| PSP (Goals FY 2024–2027) | Adjusted FCF Productivity (20%) | 90%=100% | 115%=200%; 65%=0% | 3-year performance. |
| PSP (FY 2022–2025 realized) | Final PSP Payout | — | 148% of target; driven by top quartile TSR (125% multiplier), strong profit growth and FCF | Settled Aug 2025 . |
| PSP (FY 2022–2025 realized) | Sundar Raman PSUs delivered | Target+dividends — | 21,371 PSUs delivered; market value $3,404,828 @ $159.32 | Delivered in shares or retirement-deferred RSUs . |
Company metrics shaping annual incentives:
| Metric | FY 2023-24 | FY 2024-25 |
|---|---|---|
| Organic Sales Growth | +4% | +2% |
| Core EPS Growth | +12% | +4% |
| Adjusted FCF Productivity | 105% | 87% |
PSP cycle payouts:
| PSP Cycle | Weighted Perf. Factors | TSR Modifier | Final Payout |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021–2024 | 128% | 125% | 160% |
| 2022–2025 | 118% | 125% | 148% |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (Common) | Direct 37,974; Right to acquire 238,677; Total 276,651; RSUs 3,594 . |
| Ownership % of Shares Outstanding | Less than 0.036% for any one NEO . |
| Outstanding Equity (FY-end) | Unexercisable options: 58,396 (10/03/2022), 52,792 (10/02/2023), 57,601 (10/01/2024); Unvested PSUs: 12,983 (2023 grant), 12,338 (2024 grant) . |
| Ownership Guidelines | NEOs must hold 4× salary; all NEOs exceeded requirements as of 06/30/2025 . |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for officers; insider trading policy bans hedging, short sales, collars, pledging . |
| Holding Requirements | If below guideline, NEOs must hold net shares from option exercises/RSU/PSU settlements (1 year for non-CEO) . |
| Insider Transactions | 9,554 shares sold at $158.1589 on 08/21/2025 to cover taxes on a stock award; post-sale direct holdings 41,886 and 8,366 indirect (retirement trust) . |
Employment Terms
- No individual employment contracts or special executive severance (no golden parachutes). Standard separation allowance up to one year’s salary (based on service) if encouraged to separate; outstanding equity generally retained per plan terms and pro-rated if separation occurs before first anniversary of grant .
- Change-of-control: Double-trigger; awards accelerate only if not assumed, or upon qualifying termination/resignation for good reason after a change-in-control (PSP pays at actual or target if actual not determinable) .
- Clawbacks: Dodd-Frank Recoupment Policy for Section 16 officers; additional senior executive recoupment; plan-level recovery of proceeds for conduct damaging reputation/goodwill .
- Non-compete/solicit provisions: Award agreements may include restrictions against competitive employment or solicitation; confidentiality and reputational clauses .
- Deferred Compensation: Eligible to defer salary/STAR; RSU-based PST Restoration contributions vest after three years; retirement-related RSU delivery deferrals available .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and pay-for-performance: A large share of compensation is at-risk via PSP and LTIP, with PSP goals explicitly targeting top-tier organic growth, profit, EPS, FCF, and relative TSR; realized PSP payouts (148% for 2022–2025) confirm linkage between value creation and rewards . Share ownership guidelines and anti-hedging/pledging policies further strengthen alignment .
- Retention risk: Significant unvested PSUs (12,338) and unexercisable options across multiple vintages create strong retention hooks; Switzerland expatriate benefits and tax equalization indicate ongoing international assignment support; no guaranteed severance contracts reduces entrenchment risk .
- Trading signals: The August 2025 Form 4 sale was tax-related, not discretionary selling pressure—neutral signal; watch subsequent option grants/retention equity and any large open-market sales for sentiment shifts .
- Performance momentum: FY 2024-25 delivered under target company factors (organic sales/Core EPS), compressing annual bonus outcomes despite solid business unit performance (85%); longer-term PSP structures and top-quartile TSR support continued incentive payouts if multi-year goals are met .
- Governance quality: Strong clawbacks, double-trigger CIC, and lack of golden parachutes, combined with high say-on-pay support (90.65% in 2024), indicate investor-friendly compensation governance .