Robert A. Plante
About Robert A. Plante
Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Peapack-Gladstone Financial Corporation; joined in 2017. Prior roles include COO at Israel Discount Bank New York, CIO at CIT Group, and senior leadership posts at GE Capital Global Consumer Finance and Geary Corporation; B.S. in Business Administration (Finance), University of Vermont . Company performance in 2024 featured: core deposit growth of $1.2B (+30%) with top-tier peer rankings, liquidity ratio up to 17.1% (from 12.1%), loan-to-deposit ratio improved to 90% (from 103%), and PWMAUM/administration up to $11.9B (~+10%); one-year TSR ranked 82nd percentile vs NJ peer group and near 50th percentile vs a broader peer set . Say-on-pay support was 87% in 2024 following program changes to reduce equity dilution (shift to cash-settled phantom units and partial mix reallocation) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Israel Discount Bank New York | Chief Operating Officer | Not disclosed | Not disclosed |
| CIT Group | Chief Information Officer | Not disclosed | Not disclosed |
| GE Capital Global Consumer Finance | Senior leadership positions | Not disclosed | Not disclosed |
| Geary Corporation (IT consulting) | Senior leadership positions | Not disclosed | Not disclosed |
External Roles
Not disclosed.
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base salary ($) | $365,000 | $379,600 | $390,988 |
| STI (cash) paid for performance year ($) | $164,250 | $92,528 | $188,163 |
| All other compensation ($) | $19,800 | $19,800 | $20,700 |
STI design (as % of salary):
- 2023 target schedule (Plante): Threshold 22.5% / Target 30% / Maximum 45%
- 2024/2025 plan update (paid/granted Mar 2025): Threshold 32.5% / Target 45% / Maximum 70%
Performance Compensation
STI framework and 2024 payout basis
| Component | Weighting | Target basis | 2024 as reported vs budget | 2024 as adjusted vs budget | Committee determination |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-tax income before provision for credit losses | 40% | Company budget | -24% | -5% | Included in 102% blended result (Target) |
| Diluted EPS | 60% | Company budget | -19% | +7% | Included in 102% blended result (Target) |
| Overall Company performance | — | 80% Threshold / 100% Target / 110% Max | — | — | Target |
| Individual/strategic (Plante) | Up to 25% weight | CEO-rated | — | — | Incorporated in payout |
Plante’s 2024 STI cash paid: $188,163 (48.13% of salary) reflecting Company at Target and individual component applied per plan .
LTI structure and metrics
- Vesting mix: 60% performance-based (3-year cliff) and 40% time-based (2024 grants 3-year ratable; 2020–2023 grants 5-year ratable) .
- Performance metrics/weights:
- 2024 grants (phantom units): EPS Growth 30%, TSR 30%, Core Deposit Growth 20%, two Credit Quality metrics 20% (relative to peers) .
- 2023 grants (RSUs): EPS Growth 40%, TSR 40%, two Credit Quality metrics 20% (relative to peers) .
- Payout scale (performance tranche): ~55% at 25th percentile, 100% at 50th, ~165% at 75th (relative performance) .
LTI grants to Plante
| Metric | 2023 grant (RSUs) | 2024 grant (cash-settled phantom units) |
|---|---|---|
| Total grant value ($) | $419,725 | $194,517 |
| Total units (target) | 13,557 | 8,132 |
| Time-based units | 5,423 (5-yr vest) | 3,253 (3-yr ratable) |
| Performance-based units (target) | 8,134 (3-yr cliff) | 4,879 (3-yr cliff) |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial ownership and policy alignment
| As of record date | Shares beneficially owned | Included RSUs | ESPP shares | % of class | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mar 6, 2024 | 58,423 | 9,893 | 2,929 | <0.5% (“*”) | NEOs subject to 1x salary ownership; all NEOs in compliance |
| Mar 5, 2025 | 60,276 | 8,970 | 3,410 | <0.5% (“*”) | Anti-hedging and anti-pledging policies in place |
- Options: none outstanding for NEOs as of 12/31/2024; no stock options granted to executive officers in 2024 .
- Dilution control: 2024 switch to cash-settled phantom units for LTI to address dilution concerns .
Outstanding unvested awards (12/31/2024)
| Grant date | Type | Units unvested | Market value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3/20/2020 | Phantom (time-based, 5-yr) | 2,029 | $65,029 |
| 3/20/2021 | Phantom (time-based, 5-yr) | 1,717 | $55,030 |
| 3/20/2022 | RSU (time-based, 5-yr) | 3,423 | $109,707 |
| 3/20/2022 | RSU (performance, 3-yr cliff) | 5,703 | $182,781 |
| 3/20/2023 | RSU (time-based, 5-yr) | 4,339 | $139,065 |
| 3/20/2023 | RSU (performance, 3-yr cliff) | 8,134 | $260,695 |
| 3/20/2024 | Phantom (time-based, 3-yr) | 3,253 | $104,259 |
| 3/20/2024 | Phantom (performance, 3-yr cliff) | 4,879 | $156,372 |
Notes: Footnotes specify vesting schedules and double-trigger CIC treatment for performance awards .
Employment Terms
- Employment agreement: Not disclosed for Plante; he is covered by a change-in-control (CIC) agreement only .
- CIC agreement economics (double-trigger; term auto-renews annually to keep 2 years outstanding): upon involuntary termination without cause or resignation for good reason within 2 years post-CIC, lump-sum cash equals 2x base salary plus 2x the greater of (a) average annual cash bonus (not less than target) for the prior 3 years or (b) prior year bonus; 18 months COBRA reimbursement .
- Estimated CIC severance values (if terminated at 12/31/2024): cash severance $1,062,661; equity acceleration $812,307; phantom acceleration $260,631; COBRA $50,743; total $2,186,342 .
- Clawbacks: EPP and equity awards subject to clawback (SOX 304 and Dodd-Frank/Company policies), with double-trigger CIC for equity vesting; no excise tax gross-ups .
Multi‑Year Compensation Summary (NEO SCT lines)
| Year | Salary ($) | Stock awards ($) | Non‑equity incentive ($) | All other comp ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | $365,000 | $419,741 | $164,250 | $19,800 | $968,791 |
| 2023 | $379,600 | $419,725 | $92,528 | $19,800 | $911,653 |
| 2024 | $390,988 | $194,517 | $188,163 | $20,700 | $794,368 |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix and trend: 2024 stock award value for Plante decreased vs 2023 as PGC shifted a portion of LTI to STI cash and adopted cash-settled phantom units to reduce shareholder dilution; overall STI rose with Company at Target and higher individual weighting ceiling (25%) .
- Risk controls: No options granted in 2024; anti-hedging/anti-pledging policy; heavy use of performance-based equity (60%) with relative metrics; double-trigger CIC for equity; no 280G gross-ups .
- Pay and targets: 2024 STI schedule for Plante increased (Target 45% vs 30% in 2023), aligning with strategic initiatives (NY expansion) while LTI still emphasizes multi-year performance vs peers .
SAY‑ON‑PAY & Shareholder Feedback
- Say‑on‑pay support: 85% in 2023 and 87% in 2024 .
- Program response: Adoption of Phantom Stock Plan (cash-settled) and partial reallocation from LTI to STI for 2024 awards to address dilution and burn-rate concerns; governance guardrails (1‑yr minimum vesting, no repricing, director award limits) affirmed under 2025 LTIP proposal .
Compensation Committee & Peer Group
- Committee/consultant: Compensation Committee retained Aon (independent) for peer benchmarking and program advice; independence affirmed .
- Peer group approach: 20-bank group, east coast commercial banks with specified financial screens; Committee does not target specific percentile for pay; applies judgment using market data and performance context .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and dilution: Shift to cash-settled phantom LTI reduces share issuance, limiting dilution while maintaining performance linkage; anti-hedging/pledging policies enhance alignment .
- Vesting supply overhang: Time-based pieces from 2020–2023 (5-year) and 2024 (3-year) plus upcoming 3-year performance cliffs create periodic vesting events that can add selling pressure if net shares are sold upon vest; however, NEOs must retain net shares until ownership guidelines are met (Plante already compliant) .
- Retention dynamics: Plante lacks a standard employment agreement (no non‑CIC severance), but has meaningful unvested equity/phantom and a double‑trigger CIC agreement; this mix may balance retention with shareholder protections and limit windfalls absent a CIC .
- Pay-for-performance: Plante’s 2024 STI at ~48% of salary followed Company Target achievement (adjusted) and individual performance; LTI is majority performance-based on relative EPS growth, TSR, core deposits, and credit quality—metrics that directly tie management incentives to value creation amid a rate-sensitive banking environment .
Monitoring suggestions: Track Form 4s for any incremental selling around vest dates; watch LTI performance track vs peer metrics (EPS growth, TSR, core deposits, credit quality) as the 2024 performance-vested tranche approaches its 3-year cliff .