John P. Albright
About John P. Albright
John P. Albright, 59, is President and Chief Executive Officer of Alpine Income Property Trust (PINE) and a director since the company’s formation in August 2019; he is also President, CEO, and a director of CTO Realty Growth, Inc. (CTO), the parent of PINE’s external manager and a 15.0% owner of PINE as of March 20, 2025 . PINE maintains an independent Chairman structure (Andrew C. Richardson), with Albright serving as CEO/director but not Chairman, which mitigates CEO/Chair concentration risk; the Board meets in regular executive sessions without management . PINE is externally managed; executive officers (including Albright) receive no cash compensation from PINE—fees are paid to the external Manager with potential incentive tied to total shareholder return (TSR), not to individual executives; no incentive fee was earned for 2024 . Education details and firm-level TSR/operating growth attribution for Albright are not disclosed in PINE’s proxy .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact/Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alpine Income Property Trust (PINE) | President & Chief Executive Officer; Director | Since Aug 2019 | Leads externally managed REIT; Board cites his experience in investment, lending, development of commercial properties and real estate investment banking as valuable to PINE . |
| CTO Realty Growth, Inc. (CTO) | President & Chief Executive Officer | Since 2011 | Parent of PINE’s external manager; significant holder of PINE equity; governance and alignment implications noted below . |
| CTO Realty Growth, Inc. (CTO) | Director | Since 2012 | Cross-board role underscores affiliation between CTO and PINE . |
| Archon Capital (Goldman Sachs) | Co-Head & Managing Director | Prior to CTO | Real estate investment banking/operations background cited as relevant expertise for PINE’s strategy . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| CTO Realty Growth, Inc. (NYSE: CTO) | Director; President & CEO | Director since 2012; CEO since 2011 | CTO is parent of PINE’s external manager and owned ~15.0% of PINE as of 3/20/2025 (including OP units) . |
Fixed Compensation
PINE is externally managed; Albright receives no cash compensation from PINE for executive or director service. PINE pays the Manager a base fee of 0.375% per quarter of “total equity” (1.5% annualized). 2024 base fees totaled ~$4.2 million; no incentive fee accrued for 2024 .
| Component | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| PINE base management fees to Manager ($) | ~$4.3 million | ~$4.2 million |
| Executive/director cash compensation paid by PINE to Albright | $0 (externally managed) | $0 (externally managed) |
Additional context:
- Director pay framework (non-employee directors): In 2024, $60,000 annual retainer; Chairman +$18,000; effective Jan 1, 2025, retainer reduced to $50,000, Chairman increased to $30,000, and added $70,000 annual equity grant. Officers or employees of the Manager or CTO (including Albright) receive no director compensation from PINE .
Performance Compensation
PINE’s incentive economics reside at the Manager level, not the individual executive level.
| Incentive | Metric | Target/Hurdle | Period | Actual/Payout | Vesting/Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Manager incentive fee | Company TSR vs hurdle | TSR must exceed 8% cumulative annual hurdle; subject to high-water mark price | FY 2024 | No incentive fee earned to date; none in 2024 | Paid to Manager; not to individual executives; no individual PSU/option metrics disclosed at PINE . |
- Equity plans exist (Individual Equity Incentive Plan and Manager Incentive Plan), but the Compensation Committee did not grant any awards to the Manager or its employees in 2024; the 2025 equity program had not been formally adopted at the time of the proxy .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| As-of Date | Direct/Restricted Shares | Ownership % of Outstanding | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mar 20, 2025 (proxy record date) | 7,944 direct shares; 0 restricted | <1% (“*”) | Table shows “Other Shares Beneficially Owned” of 7,944; less than 1% of 14,476,237 shares . |
| Aug 6, 2025 (post-trade) | 11,444 direct shares | n/a | Form 4 shows open-market purchase of 3,500 shares at $14.2007 (weighted average $14.17–$14.21), bringing direct beneficial ownership to 11,444 shares; the filing disclaims beneficial ownership of any PINE equity held by CTO or affiliates . |
Alignment safeguards and policies:
- Anti-hedging and anti-pledging policies prohibit directors, officers, employees of PINE, the Manager, or CTO from hedging or pledging PINE securities; also prohibit margin purchases/borrowing against PINE securities .
- Director ownership guidelines: each non-employee director must hold at least 5x the value of their annual equity compensation (min 5,000 shares); new directors have phased timelines. These guidelines apply to non-employee directors; Albright, as an officer, receives no director compensation from PINE .
Insider transaction signal (trading pressure):
- No PINE equity awards were granted in 2024 by the Compensation Committee, reducing near-term vesting-related selling pressure at PINE; the August 2025 open-market PINE purchase by Albright is a positive signal for alignment/confidence .
Employment Terms
| Term | Disclosure |
|---|---|
| Employment start at PINE | President & CEO since formation (August 2019) . |
| Contract term/renewal | As an externally managed REIT, PINE’s Management Agreement (with Manager, a CTO subsidiary) governs economics; current term expires Jan 31, 2026 and automatically renews for successive one-year periods; amended July 18, 2024 . |
| Severance/COC | No individual employment, severance, change-of-control, or golden parachute terms for Albright at PINE are disclosed; executives are paid by CTO/Manager, not by PINE . |
| Clawback | Compensation Committee administers the Company’s clawback policy . |
| Indemnification/D&O | Standard indemnification agreements; charter limits director/officer liability to the extent permitted by Maryland law; D&O insurance maintained . |
Board Governance (including board service history, committees, and dual-role implications)
- Board service: Albright has been a PINE director since 2019; he serves on no Board committees . He is also a director of CTO (since 2012) .
- Independence and leadership: PINE requires an independent Chairman; Andrew C. Richardson serves as independent Chairman. This structure separates CEO and Chairman roles and supports independent oversight despite Albright’s CEO/director dual role .
- Committees: Audit (Richardson Chair; Elias Wein; Wadleigh), Compensation (Elias Wein Chair; Wadleigh; Good), Governance (Good Chair; Elias Wein)—all composed exclusively of independent directors .
- Meetings/attendance: In 2024, the Board held six regular and five additional meetings; all then-current directors attended >75% of Board/committee meetings; executive sessions occur at least quarterly without management .
- Director compensation: Officers/employees of the Manager or CTO (including Albright) receive no compensation for Board service at PINE .
Dual-role implications and external manager affiliation:
- CTO is the parent of PINE’s Manager and owned ~15.0% of PINE’s outstanding equity (including OP units) as of March 20, 2025, creating alignment but also potential related-party risks that are addressed via independent Board oversight, committee structures, and related-party policies .
- Related-party frameworks include an Exclusivity and ROFO Agreement (CTO must offer single-tenant net-lease opportunities to PINE first, subject to exceptions), a Revenue Sharing Agreement tied to a portfolio loan’s asset management economics, and a Management Agreement setting base and incentive fees .
Related-Party Transactions and Alignment Controls
- Management Agreement: Base management fee 0.375% per quarter of “total equity” (1.5% annualized); potential incentive fee if TSR exceeds 8% annual hurdle with high-water mark; 2024 base fees ~$4.2 million; no incentive fees earned; Manager reimbursed for certain expenses (2024: ~$144,189) .
- Exclusivity & ROFO with CTO: CTO grants PINE a right of first offer on applicable single-tenant net-leased properties for so long as the Management Agreement is in effect, with defined exceptions .
- Revenue Sharing Agreement: PINE shares in certain fees from CTO’s asset management of a loan-collateral portfolio; PINE recognized ~$0.5 million revenue in 2024 .
- Tax Protection Agreement: Built-in gain protections tied to contributed properties and their replacements under specified tax-deferred transactions; potential indemnities through 10 years from IPO .
- Anti-hedging/anti-pledging; independent committees; related-party review policy via Audit Committee .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance linkage exists at the Manager level (TSR-based incentive with 8% hurdle and high-water mark) and no PINE-paid executive cash comp, which aligns the platform with shareholder outcomes while also introducing fee-based overhead; 2024 results show no incentive fee accrued, which contains pay leakage in a weak TSR year .
- Governance mitigants (independent Chair; fully independent committees; anti-hedging/pledging; related-party review policy; director ownership guidelines) offset dual-role and external manager conflicts, though CTO’s 15% stake and management control continue to warrant monitoring during capital allocation and related-party opportunity flow (Exclusivity/ROFO mechanics) .
- Insider activity: Albright’s open-market PINE purchase in August 2025 (3,500 shares; $14.2007) lifts direct holdings to 11,444 shares and is a positive confidence signal; with no PINE equity awards granted in 2024, near-term vesting-related selling pressure should be limited .
- Data gaps: Individual executive pay levels, targets, and severance/COC economics are set by CTO and not disclosed at PINE; analysts should review CTO’s proxy for a full picture of Albright’s personal incentive metrics and contract protections .