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Julia Brau Donnelly

Chief Financial Officer at PINTERESTPINTEREST
Executive

About Julia Brau Donnelly

Julia Brau Donnelly is Chief Financial Officer of Pinterest (PINS), serving since June 20, 2023; she is 42 years old and holds an MBA from Harvard Business School and a BA in Economics from Stanford University . Her 2024 performance-linked equity (PSUs) was tied 50/50 to revenue and adjusted EBITDA, both set above 2023 levels; actual 2024 results achieved $3,646 million revenue vs $3,568 million target (132% payout) and $1,001 million adjusted EBITDA vs $896 million target (150% payout), yielding a 141% overall PSU payout that vested March 1, 2025 . Base salary for NEOs, including Donnelly, was $600,000 in 2024 under a pay-for-performance framework emphasizing equity and performance awards, and moving to performance-based cash awards for 2025 short-term incentives . She joined under a 2023 offer letter with $13 million in RSUs vesting quarterly over 24 months, plus a $500,000 upfront bonus and a $500,000 additional discretionary bonus, alongside entry into the company’s standard severance and change-in-control agreement .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Wayfair Inc.VP, Global Head of Finance & AccountingSep 2019–Jun 2023Oversaw accounting, financial operations, tax, capital markets, investor relations, corporate development, strategic operations finance, strategic corporate finance, and procurement .
Wayfair Inc.Head of Corporate FinanceAug 2017–Sep 2019Led corporate finance function supporting strategic objectives and market-facing initiatives .
Wayfair Inc.Director, Strategic Finance & Investor RelationsMar 2016–Aug 2017Directed strategic finance and IR, supporting capital markets communications and planning .
Thomas H. Lee PartnersPrivate Equity InvestorPre-2016 (dates not specified)Investor in technology and media; board experience on Agencyport Software and iHeartMedia .

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Agencyport SoftwareBoard DirectorNot disclosedGovernance and oversight in enterprise software portfolio context .
iHeartMediaBoard DirectorNot disclosedGovernance and oversight in media portfolio context .

Fixed Compensation

Metric20232024
Base Salary ($)320,455 600,000
Bonus ($)1,000,000
All Other Compensation ($)211,420 1,009,395 (incl. $531,297 relocation reimbursement and $472,098 tax gross-up; $6,000 401(k))
Total ($)16,527,467 5,492,370
  • 2024 NEO base salaries were standardized at $600,000, consistent with committee review and pay philosophy .

Performance Compensation

2024 PSU Design and Outcomes

MetricWeightingThreshold (75% payout)Target (100% payout)Max (150% payout)ActualPayout
Revenue ($mm)50% 3,475 3,568 3,690 3,646 132%
Adjusted EBITDA ($mm)50% 840 896 947 1,001 150%
Overall PSU Payout141%
  • Target PSU opportunity was set as a percentage of base salary; Donnelly’s was 80% ($480,000 target value), with target 13,202 PSUs and actual earned 18,618 PSUs vesting March 1, 2025 .
  • Adjusted EBITDA definition for PSU measurement excludes payroll taxes on share-based compensation (beginning with the 2024 10-K), aligning incentive calculations with committee-approved methodology .

2024 Equity Grants (Long-term)

Grant TypeGrant DateShares/UnitsGrant Date Fair Value ($)Vesting
PSUs (2024)4/11/2024Target 13,202; earned 18,618449,132 (target value) One-year performance period (1/1/2024–12/31/2024), vested 3/1/2025 .
RSUs4/11/2024100,9363,433,843 Two equal installments in Sept and Dec 2025, subject to continued employment .
  • 2025 STI structure shifts to performance-based cash (replacing one-year PSUs), maintaining pay-for-performance alignment .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

As-of DateClass A Shares Owned% of Class AUnvested RSUs (Grant 7/13/2023)Unvested RSUs (Grant 4/11/2024)Unearned/Unvested PSUs
Record date (Mar 26, 2025)130,943 (market value $3,797,347 at $29.00) 100,936 (market value $2,927,144 at $29.00) — (2024 PSUs already vested on 3/1/2025)
  • Ownership table counts only vested and exercisable shares within 60 days; unvested RSUs/PSUs are excluded from beneficial ownership calculations .
  • Stock ownership guidelines require 3× base salary for executives, with a five-year compliance window; unvested awards and unexercised options do not count toward compliance .
  • Anti-hedging and pledging policies prohibit hedging and pledging of company stock (unless approved in advance), as well as margin purchases or short sales, reducing misalignment risk .

Vesting Schedules and Potential Selling Pressure

  • 2023 hire grant: $13 million RSUs vesting quarterly over 24 months from June 2023, implying continued quarterly vesting through mid-2025, creating foreseeable supply events tied to scheduled RSU deliveries .
  • 2024 RSU grant: 100,936 RSUs vest in September and December 2025, concentrating delivery into two dates, which may increase near-term liquidity/sale decisions around vesting .

Employment Terms

2023 Offer Letter (CFO Appointment)

TermDetail
Effective DateJune 20, 2023 .
Base Salary$600,000 .
EquityRSUs with aggregate $13 million grant value, vesting quarterly over 24 months (continued service required) .
Bonuses$500,000 one-time upfront bonus (earned pro-rata over first year); $500,000 additional discretionary bonus paid Sep 2023 (earned pro-rata over subsequent 12 months); repayment/forfeit provisions if departure within specified windows .
AgreementsStandard executive severance and change-in-control agreement; standard indemnification agreement .

Potential Termination Payments (as of 12/31/2024 at $29.00/share)

ScenarioLump Sum Severance ($)Accelerated Equity Value ($)Total ($)
Termination Without Cause600,485 (includes base salary and estimated health continuation over 12 months) 7,264,413 7,864,898
Double-Trigger (CIC + termination without cause/for good reason)600,485 7,264,413 7,864,898
  • Equity acceleration mechanics: in a no-cause termination, awards scheduled to vest over the next 12 months are valued at $29.00/share; under double-trigger, all unvested RSUs/PSUs/options as of year-end are accelerated and valued at $29.00/share less option strike where applicable .
  • Company policy explicitly avoids single-trigger vesting and tax gross-ups on change-in-control payments; a clawback policy applies to incentive compensation restatements or misconduct, and executives must meet stock ownership requirements .
  • 2024 “All Other Compensation” included relocation reimbursement ($531,297) and related tax gross-up ($472,098), a notable one-time perquisite .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Shift to one-year PSUs for 2024 and performance-based cash awards for 2025 enhances line-of-sight to annual financial execution while preserving long-term equity incentives via RSUs .
  • Base cash compensation remains modest versus equity grants, consistent with a philosophy emphasizing long-term value creation and competitive alignment with peer benchmarks .
  • Governance features include a fully independent compensation committee with an independent consultant (Compensia) and “double-trigger” CIC vesting, limiting windfalls and improving alignment .
  • 2024 say-on-pay support of 85.5% indicates shareholder endorsement of program design and pay outcomes .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Donnelly’s pay-for-performance exposure is meaningful, with 2024 PSUs paying 141% based on above-target revenue and adjusted EBITDA, indicating strong operational execution against challenging goals; future STI moves to cash-based performance in 2025, maintaining incentive alignment .
  • Retention and supply: Quarterly vesting from the $13 million 2023 hire grant through mid-2025 and two large 2025 RSU tranches (Sept/Dec) create predictable delivery windows that could translate to insider-selling supply if shares are sold upon vesting, though the ownership policy requires retention toward a 3× salary threshold .
  • Governance risk: Anti-hedging/pledging policies and double-trigger CIC vesting reduce governance red flags; no tax gross-ups on CIC payments, though a one-time relocation gross-up was paid in 2024 .
  • Severance economics: Modeled termination values suggest ~1× salary plus health benefits and material equity acceleration under both no-cause and double-trigger scenarios, implying moderate CIC expense and consistent retention incentives tied to continued service .
  • Peer benchmarking and shareholder support: A well-curated compensation peer group and strong say-on-pay approval (85.5%) reduce the likelihood of pay-related activism and support the sustainability of current incentive frameworks .