Chip Ohlsson

About Chip Ohlsson

Chip Ohlsson is Planet Fitness’ Chief Development Officer (CDO), appointed effective January 20, 2025, reporting to CEO Colleen Keating and responsible for accelerating domestic and international club openings and strengthening the franchise network . He brings three decades of hospitality development experience, most recently as EVP & Chief Development Officer at Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, where he led development for 24 brands across North America, delivered 16 consecutive quarters of growth, restructured sales teams, and deepened relationships with key ownership groups; earlier, he launched aloft and Element and revitalized Four Points at Starwood, and began his career at Cendant; he also previously operated as a multi-unit franchisee, giving him direct P&L perspective . Ohlsson holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Communications from William Paterson College . Context: Planet Fitness ended 2024 with 19.7M members (+~1.0M YoY), 2,722 clubs (+150), revenue up 10.3% to ~$1.2B, Adjusted EBITDA up 12% to $487.7M, system‑wide same‑club sales +5.0%—a platform on which Ohlsson is tasked to accelerate openings as unit economics improve .

Past Roles

External Roles

• Not disclosed in company filings or press materials reviewed (no public board roles identified for Ohlsson) .

Fixed Compensation

• Ohlsson’s specific base salary, target bonus, and any sign‑on awards have not been disclosed in PLNT’s public filings to date. The company’s 2025 proxy (covering FY2024) lists named executive officers (NEOs) for 2024 but does not include Ohlsson (he joined in 2025), and no 8‑K detailing his compensatory arrangements has been filed as of the documents reviewed .

Performance Compensation

Planet Fitness’ executive incentive design (context for C‑suite roles, as disclosed for 2024 NEOs):

• Annual cash bonus metrics and weights (CSC leaders): equally weighted Adjusted EBITDA, system‑wide same‑club EFT dollars, and total franchise club placements; payout curve 25% at threshold (85% of target) to 200% at max . Corporate club leaders used segment metrics: corporate club Adjusted EBITDA, corporate club same‑club EFT dollars, and new club revenue . In 2024, CEO/NEO payouts reflected 66.03% of target for CSC metrics and 93.41% for the corporate clubs leader, evidencing a pay‑for‑performance link .
• Long‑term incentives (LTI): 50% RSUs (3‑year ratable vest); 50% PSUs (3‑year performance period, cliff vest at year 3) tied to adjusted net income per share, diluted; earn‑out 0–200% of target .

Note: Ohlsson’s 2025 incentives have not been disclosed; table reflects company plan design used for 2024 executives .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

• Stock ownership guidelines: CEO 5x base salary; other senior executive officers 3x base salary; until met, executives must retain 100% of net shares from vesting/exercise .
• Clawbacks: Company maintains an executive recoupment policy and a 2023 SEC/NYSE‑compliant clawback requiring recovery of incentive comp after an accounting restatement (look‑back: three fiscal years) .
• Anti‑hedging/shorting/pledging: Insider Trading Policy prohibits hedging, short sales, and pledging of company stock; imposes pre‑clearance, blackout trading windows, and encourages Rule 10b5‑1 plans for automated trading .
• Pledging/hedging red flags: Policy prohibitions reduce alignment risk from collateralized or hedged positions .
• Beneficial ownership: No Ohlsson‑specific ownership or Form 4 transactions identified in reviewed filings; not disclosed in the 2025 proxy’s beneficial ownership table (record date March 10, 2025) .

Employment Terms

• Eligibility: Executives at SVP+ are eligible under the Executive Severance & Change in Control Policy (amended Nov 5, 2024). While Ohlsson’s individual letter is not filed, the policy governs executive severance economics company‑wide .
• Termination (no change‑in‑control):
  • Base salary continuation: 100% of base salary for SVP+ (CEO: 200%; President: 150%), paid as salary continuation; pro‑rated annual bonus for year of termination; lump‑sum of 12 months’ employer portion of medical/dental/vision premiums .
  • Equity: time‑based awards continue to vest for 12 months post‑termination; performance‑based awards are forfeited unless performance period already ended, in which case any earned shares vest per award terms within 12 months .
• Double‑trigger Change‑in‑Control (within 24 months):
  • Cash: 150% of base salary (CEO: 300%; President: 200%); 100% of target annual bonus for CIC year; 12 months’ employer portion of medical/dental/vision premiums .
  • Equity: all unvested time‑based vest immediately; performance‑based vest at target (if period ended, pay per award terms) .
• Restrictive covenants: Non‑compete and non‑solicit apply during employment and for the “Severance Period” after separation (Severance Period scales with multiple—e.g., 12 months for 100% base; 18 months for 150%; 24 months for 200%; 36 months for 300%) .
• 280G gross‑ups: None—policy includes “best net” cutback to avoid excise tax, consistent with governance statement of no excise tax gross‑ups .
• At‑will; confidentiality/non‑compete agreements: Company requires confidentiality and non‑competition agreements as a condition of executive employment (illustrated in contemporaneous officer offer letters) .

Performance & Track Record

Planet Fitness operating baseline entering Ohlsson’s tenure:

Management enacted a New Growth Model (capex reductions, fee eliminations, extended investment timelines) and raised the Classic Card price from $10 to $15 after testing; leadership cited improving club IRRs as “moving closer to pre‑pandemic levels,” with 2025 focus on four imperatives, including accelerating openings—areas Ohlsson now leads as CDO . Company “pay versus performance” indicates Adjusted EBITDA, adjusted diluted EPS, and system‑wide same‑club sales as top performance measures tying realized pay to outcomes .

Compensation Committee & Say‑on‑Pay Context

• Peer group reviewed annually; 2025 peer set includes franchisors and consumer brands (e.g., Domino’s, Wingstop, Wyndham, Texas Roadhouse, Dutch Bros, Five Below, Valvoline) used to benchmark base, bonus targets, and LTI value/mix .
• 2024 Say‑on‑Pay: ~94% approval, supporting the program’s structure and outcomes .

Investment Implications

• Growth lever: Ohlsson’s track record scaling multi‑brand franchise systems (24 brands at Wyndham; 16 straight growth quarters) plus operator experience should directly support PLNT’s “accelerate club openings” imperative—key to long‑term AUV and royalty growth .
• Alignment/retention: Company‑wide policies (3x salary ownership guideline for senior execs, anti‑hedging/pledging, SEC‑compliant clawback) foster alignment and curb misaligned risk; double‑trigger CIC with immediate equity vesting and non‑CIC continued vesting enhance retention, especially given 3‑year PSU cliffs .
• Unknowns: Specific cash/equity terms for Ohlsson are not yet disclosed; lack of Form 4 data limits visibility into initial equity stake or potential selling pressure. Watch for subsequent 8‑K/DEF 14A disclosures covering his offer letter, initial grants, and any 10b5‑1 plan adoption .
• Pay‑for‑performance: With annual incentives tied to Adjusted EBITDA, system‑wide EFT and club placements, and PSUs tied to adjusted diluted EPS, Ohlsson’s mandate (accelerating openings while supporting franchisee economics) is well‑aligned with PLNT’s value drivers .

Overall: Ohlsson’s development pedigree and franchisee empathy are well‑suited to PLNT’s next leg of unit growth; governance structures reduce hedging/pledging and gross‑up risks, while LTI design and non‑compete terms support retention. Near‑term diligence should focus on disclosure of his compensation package, initial equity grants/vesting cadence, and early pipeline conversion under the New Growth Model .

Sources

• Appointment/role and background:
• Company performance and strategy context:
• Incentive metrics and outcomes; LTI design:
• Governance: ownership guidelines, clawback, insider trading/anti‑pledging:
• Severance & CIC policy (eligibility, multiples, equity treatment, non‑compete):
• Peer group & Say‑on‑Pay:
• “No excise tax gross‑ups” governance highlight: