Robert Antokol
About Robert Antokol
Robert Antokol, 57, co-founded Playtika in 2010 and has served as CEO since inception; he became CEO of Playtika Holding Corp. in October 2019 and Chairperson of the Board in June 2020. He holds a Practical Engineering degree with an emphasis on Electricity from Ort Braude College. Under his leadership, Playtika executed major strategic transactions: sale to Caesars Interactive in 2011 and sale from CIE to a Giant-led consortium in 2016. Recent operating performance highlights include Q3 2025 revenue growth of 8.7% year over year and adjusted EBITDA growth of 10.3% YoY, driven by record Direct-to-Consumer revenue and portfolio performance in Bingo Blitz, June’s Journey, Solitaire Grand Harvest, and SuperPlay titles; 2024 Retention Plan Adjusted EBITDA achieved 97.2% of target, resulting in near-target annual bonus funding .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Playtika Ltd. / Playtika Holding Corp. | Co-founder; CEO; Chairperson of the Board | 2010–present (CEO since 2010; PLTK CEO since Oct 2019; Chair since Jun 2020) | Built games portfolio and scaled workforce from <50 to >3,000; oversaw 2011 sale to Caesars Interactive and 2016 sale to Giant-led consortium . |
External Roles
- None disclosed in company filings for Robert Antokol .
Fixed Compensation
| Year | Base Salary (USD) |
|---|---|
| 2022 | $366,818 |
| 2023 | $17,146 |
| 2024 | $19,547 |
| 2025 | $1,980,000 (reset post-Retention Plan) |
Performance Compensation
Annual Bonus Plan (2024)
| Element | Metric/Terms | Target | Actual | Payout/Outcome | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CEO Annual Bonus | 100% tied to Retention Plan Adjusted EBITDA | $875.0M target; threshold 90%; max 110% | $850.6M (97.2% of target) | ~86% of target; CEO payout $3,011,654 (Feb 2025) | Cash payout following year-end |
| 2025 Targets | Post-plan recalibration | Target bonus $1,980,000 (threshold $990,000; max $3,960,000) | N/A | N/A | N/A |
Notes: Retention Plan Adjusted EBITDA defined per credit agreement adjustments; bonus pool determined formulaically .
Long-Term Equity (granted Dec 2024)
| Award Type | Metric | Grant Size (# PSUs/RSUs) | Annual Performance Periods | Achievement Structure | Vesting Schedule |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs – Revenue Growth | Annual revenue growth | 1,195,098 | FY2025–FY2027 | Threshold 1% = 50%; Target ≥2% = 100% | Up to 33.3% per year based on performance |
| PSUs – Adjusted EBITDA | Adjusted EBITDA | 1,195,098 | FY2025–FY2027 | Target-only hurdle; if below target, no vest | Up to 33.3% per year based on performance |
| PSUs – TSR | 1-year TSR | 2,390,196 | FY2025–FY2027 | Threshold 10% = 50%; Target ≥15% = 100% | Up to 33.3% per year based on performance |
| RSUs (time-based) | Service | 2,390,196 | N/A | N/A | Quarterly over ~3 years to Dec 15, 2027 |
Change-in-control / Qualifying Termination: PSUs convert to time-based vesting post-CIC; full acceleration upon Qualifying Termination after CIC; pro-rata vest in-year on Qualifying Termination pre-CIC (details per 2020 Plan) .
Legacy PSUs (granted Feb 2022)
| Award | Metric | 2024 Outcome | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 PSUs | Annual revenue growth (4 tranches over 2022–2025) | 2024 revenue growth <1% → 0% achievement; for Israeli executives, minimum 25 PSUs vested per award terms | Antokol: 25 PSUs vested for 2024 under minimum provision |
2024 Summary Compensation
| Component (2024) | Amount (USD) |
|---|---|
| Salary | $19,547 |
| Bonus (Retention Units) | $13,652,913 |
| Stock Awards (grant-date fair value) | $38,179,397 |
| Non-Equity Incentive (Appreciation Units + annual bonus) | $30,675,945 (incl. annual bonus $3,011,654) |
| All Other Compensation | $1,613,772 (security $1,129,404; aircraft $461,000; tax gross-up $5,295; Israeli benefits detail) |
| Total | $84,141,574 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership | 16,506,565 shares; 4.4% of outstanding (as of Apr 17, 2025) |
| Voting Arrangement | Includes 8,054,100 shares transferred to ex-spouse with Antokol retaining sole voting power while an officer |
| Outstanding Unvested Equity (12/31/2024) | RSUs: 2,390,196; PSUs eligibility (TSR): 2,390,196; PSUs (Revenue): 1,195,098; PSUs (Adj. EBITDA): 1,195,098; 2022 PSUs pending 2025: 202,703 |
| Ownership Guidelines | CEO: 6x base salary; all executive officers in compliance as of proxy date |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for directors and officers (short sales, derivatives, margin/pledging) |
| Equity Plan Stockholders Agreement | Employee Stockholders (incl. Antokol) granted irrevocable proxy to Giant to vote their shares until Giant’s group falls below 40% voting power; piggyback registration rights through Jan 14, 2026 |
Employment Terms
| Term | Key Provisions |
|---|---|
| Agreement | Employment agreement dated Dec 2011 (amended); governed by Israeli law |
| Term/Notice | Indefinite; either party may terminate with 6 months’ notice; immediate termination for cause |
| Severance | Lump-sum equal to six months’ base salary on termination without cause or resignation for good reason (based on prevailing salary at time) ; quantified at $9,774 at 12/31/2024 (reflective of 2024 base) |
| Section 14 Severance/Pension | Monthly contributions per Israeli law; Antokol agreed to waive claims beyond contributions; April 22, 2025 Amendment sets Determined Salary for pension/severance contributions at NIS 30,000, with waiver of severance beyond contributions |
| Non-Compete/Non-Solicit | 12 months post-termination |
| Good Reason/Cause | Detailed definitions including compensation reduction, relocation >60km, non-payment, duty diminution, material breach (good reason); willful failure, fraud/theft, felony, gaming license issues, securities violations, adverse activity (cause) |
| Clawback | Compliant with SEC/Nasdaq Dodd-Frank clawback for erroneously paid incentive compensation since Oct 2, 2023 |
| Perquisites | Company security; mandatory private aircraft use policy (with exceptions in 2024); Israeli benefits; occasional tax gross-ups on taxable benefits |
| CIC Equity Treatment | PSUs convert to time-based vesting with acceleration upon Qualifying Termination post-CIC; RSU acceleration terms apply to pre-2023 RSUs (general provisions) |
Potential Payments (illustrative at 12/31/2024): PSU acceleration of $34,582,853 upon CIC with Qualifying Termination; minimal cash severance reflects temporarily reduced 2024 base salary; RSU acceleration not applicable for 2024 grants per table .
Board Governance
- Structure: CEO also serves as Chairperson; Board reviews leadership structure periodically; lead independent director is Bing Yuan (since Nov 2022) .
- Independence and Committees: Independent directors include Beilinson, Du, Gross, Yuan; Audit (Beilinson chair; Gross; Yuan), Compensation (Du; Yuan), Nominating & Corporate Governance (Yuan chair; Beilinson) .
- Meetings: Board met seven times in 2024; all directors attended ≥75% of meetings/committees; directors did not attend 2024 annual meeting (virtual) .
- Controlled Company: Playtika is a Nasdaq “controlled company” (PHUKII >50% voting power) but does not use governance exemptions .
- Anti-hedging/pledging: Prohibited for insiders .
- Director Compensation: Antokol receives no additional pay for board service; non-employee directors receive cash retainers and fully vested RSUs (31,776 in 2024 for eligible directors) .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix shift: Expiration of 2021–2024 Retention Plan on Dec 31, 2024; Compensation Committee rebalanced toward market-aligned base salaries (CEO base increased to $1.98M for 2025) and new PSUs/RSUs emphasizing revenue growth, adjusted EBITDA, and TSR .
- Incentive rigor: 2024 annual bonus solely tied to Retention Plan Adjusted EBITDA with formulaic thresholds; PSUs include clear thresholds/targets; 2022 PSUs saw forfeiture for 2024 performance (<1% revenue growth), with only minimum vesting for Israeli executives—a negative signal on growth metric rigor .
- Peer benchmarking: Committee aimed 2025 target total cash around 75th percentile; total direct compensation between 50th–75th percentile of peer group .
- Governance controls: Adoption of clawback policy consistent with Dodd-Frank and strong anti-hedging/pledging; equity grant practices avoid options repricing; no stock options granted in 2024 .
Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 2024 say-on-pay approval: ~85% support, reflecting improved alignment after stakeholder outreach; program retained Pearl Meyer as independent consultant; design changes implemented post-Retention Plan .
- Compensation peer group (selected in 2022; updated for changes): AppLovin, DraftKings, Electronic Arts, Light & Wonder, Match Group, Pinterest, Roku, Take-Two, AMC Networks, IAC, CyberArk, Xperi, Ziff Davis; removed Activision post-transaction .
- Target percentile: 2025 cash and total direct compensation targets guided to 75th and 50th–75th percentile ranges respectively .
Equity Vesting & Insider Selling Pressure
- RSU vesting occurs quarterly over three years (beginning Mar 15, 2025), creating regular release dates; PSUs vest annually based on revenue growth, adjusted EBITDA, and TSR performance—no vest if metrics miss targets (for EBITDA/TRS thresholds) .
- Hedging/pledging is prohibited, reducing forced-selling/pledge risk; company maintains trading policies for insiders .
Related Party Transactions and Alignment Considerations
- Irrevocable proxy: Employee Stockholders (including Antokol) granted Giant an irrevocable proxy to vote their shares until Giant’s group falls below 40% voting power; piggyback registration rights through Jan 14, 2026 .
- Family employment: CEO’s brother-in-law employed at Playtika Ltd.; 2024 total cash compensation $308,701; described as consistent with peers under related party policy .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- CEO pay ratio: 1,009:1 for 2024, driven by large Retention Plan payouts and new equity awards, a potential investor sensitivity point .
- Dual role: CEO and Chairperson combined; mitigated by a lead independent director and independent committees .
- Controlled company: Majority owner PHUKII; company elects not to use Nasdaq controlled-company governance exemptions .
- Air travel/security perqs and tax gross-ups: Material personal security and aircraft costs; occasional gross-ups (small amounts) .
- Performance risk: 2022 PSUs 2024 tranche forfeited due to low revenue growth (<1%) .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment has tightened post-2024 with clear PSU metrics and recalibrated cash comp; however, the 2024 total compensation optics and CEO pay ratio may attract governance scrutiny .
- Quarterly RSU vesting and annual PSU determinations create predictable windows for potential selling pressure, though hedging/pledging bans reduce alignment risks .
- Governance structure reflects a controlled company with CEO as Chair; strong committee independence and a lead independent director partially mitigate dual-role concerns, but the irrevocable proxy to Giant over employee shares is a notable governance constraint .
- Operational execution under Antokol shows momentum in DTC revenue and adjusted EBITDA growth in 2025; bonus outcomes tied to Retention Plan Adjusted EBITDA were near target in 2024, supporting incentive credibility into the new PSU framework .