Frederic de Wilde
CEO PMI International at PM
Executive
About Frederic de Wilde
Frederic de Wilde is President, South and South-East Asia, Commonwealth of Independent States, Middle East & Africa Region at Philip Morris International (PM). He has 32.41 years of service with PMI as of December 31, 2024 and is a Swiss payroll-based executive officer, with credited pension service including time at PMI’s Belgian affiliate . Company performance metrics tied to his long-term PSUs show strong alignment: for the 2022–2024 PSU cycle PMI delivered TSR at the 95th percentile vs. its peer group, a currency-neutral adjusted diluted EPS CAGR of 12.2% (max rating), and an aggregate Sustainability Index rating of 89%, resulting in a 170% overall PSU performance factor .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Philip Morris International | President, South & South-East Asia, CIS, Middle East & Africa | 2023–present | Led the region to significantly exceed performance targets; advanced IQOS penetration; introduced VEEV and ZYN in select markets; implemented new regional structure; progressed regulatory agenda and talent development |
Fixed Compensation
Multi-year summary compensation for Frederic de Wilde (USD):
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary | $890,375 | $1,103,535 | $1,138,937 |
| Stock Awards (grant date fair value) | $2,051,202 | $2,156,654 | $3,601,159 |
| Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation (cash bonus) | $1,375,027 | $1,969,931 | $2,245,983 |
| Change in Pension Value | — | $5,290,091 | $732,770 |
| All Other Compensation | $16,727 | $253,550 | $55,464 |
| Total Compensation | $4,333,331 | $10,773,761 | $7,774,313 |
2024 base salary levels set by the Compensation Committee:
| Metric | 2024 |
|---|---|
| Base Salary (Committee decision reference rate) | $1,145,813 |
Annual cash incentive targets and payouts (% of base salary):
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Cash Incentive Target (% of base) | 125% | 125% |
| Actual Cash Incentive Payout (% of base) | 165% | 203% |
All Other Compensation details indicate international assignment-related reimbursements (netting to a negative total in 2024 due to tax/social security equalization in UAE) and car expenses:
- All Other Compensation total for 2024: $55,464 (car expenses)
- International assignment reconciliation for 2024: actual total ($685,967) offsetting other benefits (UAE has no applicable taxes/social security)
Pension benefits (present value as of 12/31/2024):
| Plan Name | Credited Service (Years) | Present Value of Accumulated Benefits ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Pension Fund of Philip Morris in Switzerland | 33.00 | $12,783,691 |
| IC Pension Plan of Philip Morris in Switzerland | 19.92 | $1,756,835 |
| Supplemental Plan of Philip Morris in Switzerland | 16.00 | $3,198,657 |
Performance Compensation
Equity award structure and 2024 grants:
| Grant Date | Instrument | Target (#) | Max (#) | Grant-Date Fair Value ($) | Vest Terms |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2/8/2024 | PSUs | 24,490 | 48,980 | $2,147,626 | Vests 0–200% on 2/17/2027 based on pre-weighted TSR, EPS CAGR (currency neutral), and Sustainability Index |
| 2/8/2024 | RSUs | 16,330 | — | $1,453,533 | 100% vests on 2/17/2027; dividend equivalents payable during vesting |
Equity award targets as % of base salary (2024):
| Award Type | Target % of Base | Actual % of Base |
|---|---|---|
| PSUs (60% of total equity) | 165% | 198% |
| RSUs (40% of total equity) | 110% | 132% |
PSU performance metrics and outcomes:
| PSU Cycle | Metric | Weighting | Target/Scale | Actual | Rating/Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022–2024 | TSR vs Peer Group | 40% | 50th percentile = 100%; 80th+ = 200% | 95th percentile | 200% |
| 2022–2024 | Adjusted Diluted EPS CAGR (currency neutral) | 30% | <5.0% = 0%; 8.0% = 100%; ≥11% = 200% | 12.2% | 200% |
| 2022–2024 | Sustainability Index (Product 20%, Operational 10%) | 30% | KPI-weighted index (max 200%) | Product 76%→82%; Operational 115%→113%; combined 89% | 89% |
| 2022–2024 | Overall PSU Performance Factor | — | 0–200% | — | 170% (Committee rounded) |
Vesting and realized value:
| Event | Date | Shares | Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stock vested during 2024 | 2024 | 32,714 | $2,943,279 |
| 2022 RSUs vested | 2/19/2025 | 7,170 | — |
| 2022 PSUs vested (at 170%) | 2/19/2025 | 18,292 | Dividend equivalents $283,161 |
Future vesting schedule:
| Grant Date | Grant Type | Vesting Schedule |
|---|---|---|
| 2/8/2024 | PSUs | Vests 0–200% on 2/17/2027 upon certified performance |
| 2/8/2024 | RSUs | 100% vests on 2/17/2027 |
| 2/9/2023 | PSUs | Vests 0–200% on 2/18/2026 upon certified performance |
| 2/9/2023 | RSUs | 100% vests on 2/18/2026 |
| 2/10/2022 | PSUs | Vested at 170% on 2/19/2025 |
| 2/10/2022 | RSUs | 100% vested on 2/19/2025 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial ownership and outstanding equity:
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (as of 3/14/2025) | 85,064 shares; each NEO’s ownership is <1% of shares outstanding (1,556,488,205) |
| Outstanding RSUs (Unvested) | 16,330 (2024 grant), 7,170 (2022 grant as of 12/31/2024) with market values $1,965,316 and $862,910 respectively |
| Outstanding PSUs (Unearned) | 48,980 (2024 grant), 23,620 (2023 grant), 18,292 (2022 earned) with market/payout values $5,894,743; $2,842,667; $2,201,442 respectively (based on $120.35 close) |
| New 2025 awards | 12,170 RSUs; 18,260 PSUs (vesting 2/16/2028, split 40/60 RSU/PSU) |
Ownership policies and alignment:
- Stock ownership requirements: Salary grade multiples (Grade 26 requires 5x salary); all NEOs were in compliance as of Dec 31, 2024 .
- Anti-hedging and anti-pledging: Executives prohibited from hedging or pledging PMI shares; short sales prohibited .
- Post-termination share holding: If any equity award vests on an accelerated basis (other than death/disability), shares must be held for at least one year post-termination .
- PMI uses RSUs/PSUs instead of options to improve cost-value alignment and limit overhang/run rate .
Employment Terms
Contracts, severance, and change-in-control:
| Topic | Frederic de Wilde |
|---|---|
| Employment contract terms | No special employment contract; NEO agreements do not include change-in-control provisions (except CFO’s severance terms) |
| Change-in-control definition | As per PMI’s 2017/2022 Performance Incentive Plans (20%+ acquisition, board changes, major reorganizations, liquidation/sale) |
| CIC estimated payouts (12/31/2024 scenario) | Unvested PSUs: $5,663,671; Unvested RSUs: $3,775,380; Completed 2024 annual incentive cycle: $1,382,143; Total: $10,821,194 |
| Clawback policy | Board-approved policy for recovery of erroneously awarded incentive compensation consistent with SEC/NYSE rules (in addition to existing recoupment policy) |
| Perquisites | Company vehicle; international assignment program support (2023 housing/home leave/relocation; 2024 UAE equalization netted negative) |
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: High equity mix with PSUs weighted to TSR (40%), currency-neutral EPS CAGR (30%), and Sustainability Index (30%) creates direct linkage to value creation; 2022–2024 PSU cycle vested at 170%, reflecting superior TSR and EPS growth execution .
- Retention and selling pressure: Clustered vesting dates (2026 and 2027) and sizable unearned PSUs/RSUs (e.g., 48,980 PSUs and 16,330 RSUs from 2024 grant) can create calendar-driven supply dynamics around February vestings; observed 2024 vesting of 32,714 shares ($2.94M realized) and 2025 vesting of 18,292 PSUs + 7,170 RSUs indicate potential periodic liquidity events .
- Alignment and risk controls: Strict anti-hedging/anti-pledging and rigorous ownership multiples (compliance confirmed) reduce misalignment risk; post-termination holding further aligns behavior. Lack of individualized CIC/severance terms (beyond plan treatment) limits windfall risk, with CIC values driven by equity acceleration assumptions .
- Execution track record: Committee cited de Wilde’s role in advancing IQOS, launching VEEV and ZYN in select markets, exceeding regional targets, and progressing PMI’s regulatory agenda—signals strong operational execution tied to incentive outcomes .