Jacob Tetlow
About Jacob Tetlow
Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of APS since October 23, 2024; previously Executive Vice President (promoted May 2021), overseeing non‑nuclear generation and power delivery plus IT, resource management, safety, security, sustainability, supply chain, and customer‑to‑grid solutions . External leadership includes the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Research Advisory Committee, Board of Directors for the Association of Edison Illuminating Companies, and serving as Board Chair for The Nature Conservancy Arizona Chapter . During his tenure, PNW delivered year‑end diluted EPS of $5.24 and a 2024 TSR of 23.25%, outperforming the EEI Index (19.10%) amid constructive rate outcomes and strong load growth .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| APS | Executive Vice President, Operations | 2021–2024 | Led non-nuclear generation and power delivery operations; set enterprise operational metrics and contributed to earnings and reliability outcomes |
| APS | Executive Vice President & Chief Operating Officer | Oct 2024–present | Expanded remit across IT, resource management, safety, security, sustainability, supply chain, facilities, transportation, and environmental services; core role in execution of largest transmission/generation expansion in APS history |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| EPRI | Research Advisory Committee Member | Ongoing | Guides industry R&D priorities and technology adoption to support grid reliability and decarbonization |
| Association of Edison Illuminating Companies | Board Director | Ongoing | Advances utility operating best practices and safety/risk management standards |
| The Nature Conservancy – Arizona Chapter | Board Chair | Ongoing | Oversees conservation initiatives relevant to APS’s water stewardship and environmental commitments |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 485,000 | 525,000 | 586,776 |
| Annual Cash Incentive ($) | 540,242 | 566,799 | 878,981 |
| Stock Awards – Grant Date FV ($) | 633,827 | 1,261,291 | 2,337,019 |
| Change in Pension & NQDC ($) | (99,050) | 490,390 | 108,829 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 27,308 | 26,240 | 27,415 |
- 2024 base salary rate increased from $560,000 to $700,000 effective October 23, 2024 upon promotion to EVP & COO .
- 2024 target annual incentive: 75% of base salary; threshold 18.75%; max 150%; actual payout 149.8% of salary ($878,981) .
- 2024 perquisites included car allowance, executive physical, and financial planning ($17,065) and 401(k) contribution ($10,350) .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Structure and Results (2024)
| Component | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| APS Earnings | 50% | $570M APS incentive earnings | $641.9M APS incentive earnings | 200% |
| Corporate Resources (avg) | 15% | 100% | 145% | 145% |
| Information Technology | 10% | 95% Mission/Business Critical SLAs | 100% (200% payout) | 200% |
| Resource Management | 5% | Various shared metrics | Included in Corporate Resources | Included |
| Generation (non‑nuclear) | 17.5% | 100% | 110% | 110% |
| Transmission & Distribution | 17.5% | 100% | 152% | 152% |
| Total | 100% | — | — | 135% (business unit), earnings at 200% |
- Business unit metrics averaged 145% of target across APS; Tetlow’s mix included Corporate Resources, IT, Resource Management, Generation, and T&D .
- PNW/APS earnings results were 200% of target driven by constructive rate case, favorable weather, and strong customer growth .
Long-Term Incentives (2024 Design)
| Vehicle | % of Target Equity | Measurement Period | Performance Link |
|---|---|---|---|
| Performance Shares (PS) | 70% | 3 years | Relative TSR 40%; EPS Performance 40%; Clean MWs Installed 20% |
| RSUs | 30% | 4-year ratable vest | Stock price; retention emphasis |
2024 Grants – Share Counts and Grant-Date Values (Tetlow)
| Grant Type | Grant Date | Target (#) | Max (#) | Grant-Date FV ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PS – TSR | Feb 20, 2024 | 5,269 | 10,538 | 400,918 |
| PS – EPS | Feb 20, 2024 | 5,269 | 10,538 | 364,088 |
| PS – Clean MWs | Feb 20, 2024 | 2,634 | 5,268 | 182,009 |
| RSUs (annual) | Feb 20, 2024 | 5,644 (granted) | — | 390,000 |
| RSUs (promotional, cliff) | Oct 23, 2024 | 11,197 (granted) | — | 1,000,004 |
Allocation of 2024 equity value: RSUs $1,390,004; Performance Shares $947,015 .
Vesting schedules:
- PS: 3‑year performance period; payout based on relative TSR, EPS, and Clean MWs metrics .
- RSUs: annual grant vests ratably over 4 years; promotional RSUs cliff vest October 31, 2029 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership | 2,527 shares as of March 14, 2025; less than 1% of outstanding |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | EVP/SVP requirement: 2× base salary; 5‑year phase‑in; +3 years if promotion or >20% salary increase; all NEOs in compliance |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for Directors and officers; anti‑pledging policy in effect |
| Clawback | NYSE‑compliant policy; recovers excess incentive pay over prior 3 fiscal years upon required restatement |
Outstanding equity detail (Dec 31, 2024):
| Category | Units (#) | Market Value ($) |
|---|---|---|
| RSUs (2024 annual) | 5,644 | 478,442 |
| RSUs (2024 promotional, cliff) | 11,197 | 949,170 |
| RSUs (2023 remnant) | 3,720 | 315,344 |
| RSUs (2022 remnant) | 1,308 | 110,879 |
| Performance Shares (2024 TSR at max) | 10,538 | 893,306 |
| Performance Shares (2024 EPS at max) | 10,538 | 893,306 |
| Performance Shares (2024 Clean MWs at threshold) | 1,317 | 111,642 |
| Performance Shares (2022 TSR at max) | 9,254 | 784,462 |
| Performance Shares (2022 EPS at max) | 9,254 | 784,462 |
| Performance Shares (2022 Clean MWs at threshold) | 1,157 | 98,079 |
| RSUs (older) | 615 | 52,134 |
| RSUs (older) | 190 | 16,107 |
Note: Market values use $84.77 closing price at 12/31/2024 and include applicable dividend equivalents where noted .
Employment Terms
Change-of-Control Economics
- Structure: Double‑trigger agreements (2.99× salary + average annual bonus over prior four years), continued medical/dental/life benefits, outplacement; “best net benefit” provision to avoid excise tax gross‑ups in updated agreements (no gross‑ups in new/materially amended NEO agreements since 2009, exception removed in 2018) .
- Award treatment: PS/RSU accelerate at target upon change of control unless Board overrides by assuring equivalent awards without material impairment .
Termination scenario values (as of Dec 31, 2024):
| Scenario | PS ($) | RSUs ($) | Severance ($) | Benefits & Outplacement ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Qualifying CoC termination | 2,797,834 | 1,988,563 | 3,227,116 | 58,720 | 8,072,233 |
| Death/Disability | 2,383,817 | 1,919,193 | 0 | 58,720 | 4,303,010 |
| All other termination | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Other terms:
- No formal employment agreement; company uses offer letters for executives .
- Deferred Compensation Plan (DCP) discretionary credits: $100k (7/1/2019), $50k (1/1/2020), and $100k on 1/1/2021–2023 vested upon May 2021 promotion; payable after separation; additional credits of $500k on 11/1/2027 (vest 10/31/2028) and $500k on 11/1/2028 (vest 10/31/2029); accelerate upon APS termination without cause, death, or disability prior to 10/31/2029 .
Compliance/Trading:
- Section 16: one Form 4 filed one day late on Feb 22, 2024 due to third‑party outage; company indicates overall compliance otherwise .
Investment Implications
- High pay‑at‑risk mix with measurable operational/financial metrics (Earnings, TSR, EPS, Clean MWs) aligns incentives with shareholder returns and APS decarbonization goals; 2024 business unit metrics averaged 145% and earnings paid at 200%, driving strong cash incentive outcomes .
- Retention signals are strong: promotional RSUs with 2029 cliff vest and sizable DCP credits vesting in 2028/2029 create meaningful deferral and reduce near‑term insider selling pressure .
- Governance mitigants: anti‑hedging/pledging, clawback, ownership guidelines (EVP 2× salary, with phase‑in extensions on promotion/large raise) support alignment and reduce risk of leveraged sales or misreporting .
- Change‑of‑control double‑trigger with potential equity acceleration could be a valuation consideration in strategic scenarios; lack of gross‑ups in updated agreements is shareholder‑friendly, but 2.99× cash severance remains material .