Daniel Schumacher
About Daniel Schumacher
Daniel Schumacher, age 50, has served as Chief Financial Officer and principal financial and accounting officer since June 2022, after serving as Interim CFO beginning December 2021; prior roles include VP of Investor Relations & FP&A (2017–2021), Finance Director at Stratasys (2015–2017), and finance leadership at Rockwell Automation (2001–2015) . Company performance under the 2022 PSU cycle recorded cumulative TSR of -19.8% versus 54.4% relative percentile, capped at 100% payout due to negative TSR, with earned PSUs vesting in February 2025 . Annual incentive outcomes reflect discipline: CFO payout was 41% of target in 2022 , 56% in 2023 , and 0% in 2024 amid revenue and AOI shortfalls .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proto Labs (PRLB) | Interim Chief Financial Officer | Dec 2021 – Jun 2022 | Led transition of finance leadership; supported external reporting and controls . |
| Proto Labs (PRLB) | VP, Investor Relations & FP&A | Apr 2017 – Dec 2021 | Led investor communications, forecasting, planning, and business intelligence . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stratasys, Inc. | Finance Director, Americas Finance & Operations | 2015 – 2017 | Finance leadership in 3D printing OEM operations . |
| Rockwell Automation | Finance leadership roles | 2001 – 2015 | Increasing responsibility across industrial automation finance . |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 360,000 | 360,000 | 370,800 |
| Target Bonus ($ or %) | 234,000 target under CFO Agreement | 65% of salary | 65% of salary |
| Actual Annual Incentive ($) | 112,532 (incl. $50,000 interim CFO incentive) | 130,285 | 0 |
Performance Compensation
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual Performance | Final Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Consolidated Revenue | 75% (CFO uses consolidated) | $502.3M | $551.5M | $617.0M | $497.6M (FX-adjusted) | 0.0% |
| United States Revenue | Not applicable for CFO | $396.1M | $433.3M | $483.6M | $396.2M | 30.4% |
| EMEA Revenue | Not applicable for CFO | $106.2M | $128.2M | $160.1M | $101.4M | 0.0% |
| Consolidated AOI Margin | 25% | 11.5% | 12.0% | 15.8% | 10.4% | 0.0% |
Notes:
- 2024 plan metrics: 75% revenue, 25% adjusted operating income (AOI), with CFO allocation 100% consolidated for both factors; max payout capped at 200% .
- 2023 plan design mirrored 2024 with revenue growth and AOI; CFO achieved 56% of target bonus in 2023 .
Equity Awards and Vesting
| Grant Year | Instrument | Grant Details | Vesting Terms |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | RSUs | 8,387 units; ASC 718 FV $328,016 | 25% annually over 4 years starting Feb 13, 2023; death/disability/change-in-control double-trigger acceleration . |
| 2022 | Options | 8,605 options @ $39.11; FV $165,438 | 25% annually over 4 years starting Feb 13, 2023; 10-year term; double-trigger accel . |
| 2022 | PSUs | Target 3,077; FV $179,475; 3-year TSR vs Russell 2000 Growth, 0–200% payout, cap at 100% if TSR negative . | |
| 2024 | RSUs | 5,221 units; targeted value contribution to $700,000 package; RSU FV $175,008 | 25% annually over 4 years starting Feb 13, 2025; double-trigger accel . |
| 2024 | Options | 9,616 options @ $33.52; FV $175,015 | 25% annually over 4 years starting Feb 13, 2025; 10-year term . |
| 2024 | PSUs | Target 10,442; target FV $503,278; max $1,006,556; 2024–2026 TSR vs Russell 2000 Growth, 0–200% scale . |
Stock vested and value realized:
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Shares vested (#) | 4,254 | 2,900 | 7,115 (includes RSUs and earned 2022 PSUs) |
| Value realized on vesting ($) | 134,844 | 96,720 | 271,847 |
| Options exercised (#) | — | — | — |
PSU outcome (2012–2024 cycle):
| PSU Cycle | Performance Period | Relative TSR Percentile | Cumulative TSR | Payout | Earned Units | Vest Date |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 PSUs | Jan 1, 2022 – Dec 31, 2024 | 54.4% | -19.8% | 100% (cap applied) | 3,077 | Feb 13, 2025 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Date | Shares Beneficially Owned | % of Outstanding | Shares Outstanding Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mar 28, 2024 | 21,853 | <1% | 25,560,238 |
| Mar 25, 2025 | 34,823 | <1% | 23,770,640 |
Unvested awards at 2024 year-end:
| Category | Count | Market/Payout Value ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Unvested RSUs | 13,732 | 536,784 |
| Unearned PSUs (2023 grant) | 10,343 | 404,308 |
| Unearned PSUs (2024 grant) | 10,442 | 408,178 |
| Options (Unexercisable) Summary | 484 (2021 @ $95.40); 4,303 (2022 @ $39.11); 7,362 (2023 @ $33.84); 9,616 (2024 @ $33.52) |
Alignment policies:
- No hedging/pledging permitted; executives must hold 100% of after-tax shares from option exercises or RSU/PSU vesting until ownership requirements are met .
- Clawback policy adopted in 2014 and expanded in 2019 allowing recoupment of incentive compensation under specified circumstances .
Employment Terms
Offer/Employment Agreements:
- Interim CFO Agreement (Dec 1, 2021): Annualized base salary $296,153; pro-rated target bonus $110,000 for FY2022; RSUs valued at $150,000 vesting in full after one year; no severance .
- CFO Agreement (Jun 3, 2022): Base salary $360,000; eligible for FY2022 target cash incentive $234,000; equity grant of RSUs $300,000, options $150,000, PSUs $150,000; separate severance agreement summarized below .
Severance and Change-in-Control (CIC) economics (form agreement for NEOs):
- Not during transition period (qualifying termination): 12 months base salary paid in installments; pro rata annual bonus; 12 months COBRA employer share; pro rata vesting of awards scheduled to vest on next anniversary .
- During transition period (qualifying termination): Above plus target annual bonus; full acceleration of all unvested equity awards .
- Within 90 days prior to CIC and in anticipation: Above base severance plus target annual bonus and payment equal to value of forfeited unvested equity awards .
- 280G cut-down: Best-net approach—either full benefits or reduced to avoid excise tax, whichever yields greatest after-tax amount .
Illustrative potential payments at 12/31/2024 (CFO):
| Scenario | Base Salary ($) | Incentive ($) | COBRA ($) | Accelerated Options ($) | Accelerated RSUs ($) | Accelerated PSUs ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Not during transition / Not CIC | 370,800 | 241,020 | — | 26,274 | 200,639 | — |
| CIC or during transition | 370,800 | 241,020 | — | 92,212 | 536,784 | 405,598 |
| Anticipation of CIC | 370,800 | 241,020 | — | 92,212 | 536,784 | — |
| Death | — | — | — | 92,212 | 536,784 | 405,598 |
| Disability | — | — | — | 92,212 | 536,784 | — |
Vesting mechanics across awards:
- Options: 25% annual vesting over 4 years; 10-year term; double-trigger acceleration upon CIC with termination or failure to assume awards .
- RSUs: 25% annual vesting over 4 years; double-trigger acceleration .
- PSUs: 3-year performance period, payout 0–200% by relative TSR; negative TSR caps payout at 100%; vest on committee certification .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment is tight: zero annual bonus in 2024 for CFO despite plan design permitting up to 200% payouts, reflecting underperformance on consolidated revenue and AOI thresholds .
- Forward selling pressure: substantial unvested RSUs (13,732) and unearthed PSUs (10,343 from 2023; 10,442 from 2024) scheduled over 2025–2026 create predictable vesting events; 7,115 shares vested in 2024 including earned 2022 PSUs .
- Equity risk mix: Shift toward PSUs (relative TSR) and options across 2023–2024 awards ties outcomes to shareholder returns; pre-2023 options remain underwater, reducing immediate exercise/sale risk .
- Retention dynamics: Severance provides 1x salary plus pro rata bonus and contingent equity acceleration under specified conditions; double-trigger structure reduces windfalls and supports retention through CIC scenarios .
- Governance safeguards: No hedging/pledging and clawback policy mitigate misalignment and reduce governance risk .