Nick Anderson
About Nick Anderson
Nick W. Anderson is QCR Holdings’ incoming Chief Financial Officer, effective immediately following the annual meeting on May 22, 2025, after serving as Senior Vice President and Chief Accounting Officer since late 2019; he is a Certified Public Accountant and a graduate of Western Illinois University . As CAO, he oversaw all internal and external financial reporting; under company leadership, QCR posted record 2024 net income of $113.9M and adjusted EPS of $7.03, and delivered cumulative TSR value of 188 in 2024 (company-level metrics) . Age is not disclosed in filings reviewed.
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| QCR Holdings, Inc. | Chief Financial Officer | May 22, 2025 – present | Executive leadership of finance; RSU award and incentive plan aligned to performance . |
| QCR Holdings, Inc. | SVP, Chief Accounting Officer | Late 2019 – May 2025 | Oversaw internal and external financial reporting; supported investor communications . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Project Renewal of Davenport, Inc. | Vice President | Current | Community engagement; programs for children; local stakeholder goodwill . |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Detail | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | $220,000 annual | |
| Target Annual Incentive Bonus | 49% of base salary (40% cash; 9% equity) | |
| Review Cadence | Salary reviewed annually starting 2026; may increase, not decrease |
Performance Compensation
| Element | Metric/Structure | Weighting/Target | Payout Basis | Vesting | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual Incentive Bonus | Board-determined performance goals | Target 49% of base (40% cash; 9% equity) | Paid within 2.5 months after fiscal year-end audit | N/A | |
| Initial RSU Award (post-appointment) | RSUs grant value $75,000 | N/A | 60% of award subject to performance-based vesting conditions | Vests 20% on Jan 1 of 2026–2030 | |
| Company performance metrics historically used | Adjusted EPS, net income, nonperforming assets/total assets, adjusted loan growth, noninterest income, ROAE | N/A | Used by Compensation Committee to align pay with performance | N/A |
RSU Vesting Schedule (Grant Value Basis)
| Vest Date | Portion | Value (Grant Basis) |
|---|---|---|
| Jan 1, 2026 | 20% | $15,000 |
| Jan 1, 2027 | 20% | $15,000 |
| Jan 1, 2028 | 20% | $15,000 |
| Jan 1, 2029 | 20% | $15,000 |
| Jan 1, 2030 | 20% | $15,000 |
Note: The 60% performance-conditioned portion will vest only upon Compensation Committee certification of conditions; RSUs are subject to the 2024 Equity Incentive Plan terms .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Company Policy / Status | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Stock Ownership Guidelines (NEOs other than CEO/President) | 3,626 shares within 3 years of date of hire; must maintain thereafter | |
| Insider Trading Windows | Trading permitted only in defined windows; pre-clearance required for Section 16 insiders | |
| Anti-Hedging Policy | Hedging of company stock prohibited for all employees and directors | |
| Anti-Pledging Policy | Pledging prohibited without Nomination & Governance Committee approval; none in violation | |
| Clawback Policy | Nasdaq-compliant recoupment upon accounting restatement; adopted Aug 2023 | |
| Equity Plan CIC Treatment | Double-trigger: full vesting if awards not assumed; if assumed, vest on termination without cause or resignation for good reason |
Employment Terms
| Term | Key Provision | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Effective Date | Immediately following May 22, 2025 annual meeting | |
| Employment Period | Through Dec 31, 2027; auto-extends 1 year each Jan 1 unless 90-day non-renewal notice | |
| Base Salary | $220,000 | |
| Target Bonus | 49% of base (40% cash; 9% equity) | |
| Initial RSU Award | $75,000 grant value; 20% vest per year 2026–2030; 60% performance-based | |
| Severance (no CIC) | 100% of then-current base salary; installments; COBRA at active employee rate | |
| Severance (within 24 months post-CIC) | Lump sum = 200% of Base Compensation (greater of current base or base one day before CIC, plus most recent cash bonus); COBRA at active employee rate | |
| Release Requirement | Severance contingent on executing and not revoking release within 45 days; payments start ~60th day | |
| Good Reason Triggers | Adverse role change; ≥10% pay or bonus reduction; material benefit reduction; relocation >25 miles; acquirer fails to assume agreement; material breach | |
| Non-Compete | 24 months post-termination; 60-mile radius around each subsidiary bank’s main office; includes non-solicit of employees and customers | |
| Arbitration | Mediation then arbitration; injunctive relief available for covenant breaches | |
| Indemnification & D&O | Standard D&O insurance and indemnification; advance of expenses with undertaking | |
| 280G / 4999 | Best-net approach with potential reduction to avoid excise tax |
Compensation Committee, Peer Group, and Say‑on‑Pay
- 2024 say‑on‑pay support: ~96% approval (advisory) .
- Peer group (16 banks; median assets $7.8B) used for market benchmarking (e.g., First Merchants, Lakeland Financial, National Bank Holdings) .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and retention: Strong governance overlay (ownership guidelines in 3 years, anti-hedging/pledging, clawback) with double-trigger CIC vesting reduces single-trigger windfalls while protecting executives, suggesting balanced alignment and lower headline risk .
- Incentive design: Bonus and RSU structures are explicitly performance-based, with 60% of RSUs contingent on targets and historical emphasis on net income, adjusted EPS, asset quality, and ROAE—supportive of value creation in a bank context .
- Liquidity/selling pressure: RSU vesting spans 2026–2030 in 20% tranches, which smooths potential sales; hedging/pledging prohibitions and trading windows further mitigate near-term insider selling pressure .
- Retention and change-of-control economics: Severance is moderate (1x base; 2x base comp on CIC) with non-compete/non-solicit for 24 months, balancing retention and shareholder protection; release conditions and 280G best-net rules constrain excess payouts .
- Execution risk: Transition to CFO from CAO role with deep reporting experience should be operationally seamless per company statement; continued delivery against bank performance metrics will be the key driver of payout and alignment .