Steven Creviston
About Steven Creviston
Steven E. Creviston, age 61, is Senior Vice President and President of Connectivity & Sensors at Qorvo, a role he has held since July 2022. He previously led Mobile Products from January 2015 to July 2022 and before the Qorvo merger held multiple leadership roles at RFMD dating back to 2002 . Qorvo’s executive compensation program ties payouts to revenue, non‑GAAP operating income, and non‑GAAP gross margin; in FY2025, the short‑term plan used revenue and non‑GAAP operating income and the new PBRSUs linked to non‑GAAP gross margin paid out at 113.3% based on actual performance . Company financial context: revenue and EBITDA over FY2023–FY2025 are shown below (values retrieved from S&P Global).*
| Metric | FY 2023 | FY 2024 | FY 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue ($USD Millions) | $3,569.4* | $3,769.5* | $3,718.97* |
| EBITDA ($USD Millions) | $648.52* | $726.88* | $672.97* |
*Values retrieved from S&P Global
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Qorvo | SVP & President, Connectivity & Sensors | Jul 2022–present | Led Connectivity & Sensors portfolio execution and growth initiatives |
| Qorvo | Corporate VP & President, Mobile Products | Jan 2015–Jul 2022 | Managed Mobile business post‑merger, product execution in handset RF |
| RFMD (predecessor) | Corporate VP & President, Cellular Products Group (CPG) | Aug 2007–Jan 2015 | Led CPG across device generations; portfolio optimization |
| RFMD | Corporate VP, CPG/Wireless Products | May 2002–Aug 2007 | Advanced product line leadership and commercialization |
| RFMD | Various roles | pre‑2002 | Progressive responsibilities in RF components; pipeline development |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years |
|---|---|---|
| LightPath Technologies, Inc. | Director | Mar 2021–present |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | FY 2023 | FY 2024 | FY 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $560,414 | $582,831 | $600,423 |
| Base Salary Rate ($) | — | $583,262 (2024 rate) | $600,760 (2025 rate) |
| Target Bonus % of Base | 90% | 90% | 90% |
| Short‑Term Incentive Paid ($) | $239,400 | $431,256 | $401,130 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | $10,878 | $12,547 | $13,988 |
| Total Compensation ($) | $3,110,693 | $3,326,721 | $3,315,539 |
Notes:
- Short‑term incentive plan metrics: revenue and non‑GAAP operating income (50% weighting each per half‑year period) .
- FY2025 half‑year payouts equaled ~108.1% and 40.4% of target, respectively, based on actual performance vs. targets .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentives (STI)
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual FY2025 | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 50% (per H1/H2) | Pre‑set (undisclosed) | Pre‑set (undisclosed) | Pre‑set (undisclosed) | Company actuals used | H1: 108.1% of target; H2: 40.4% of target |
| Non‑GAAP Operating Income | 50% (per H1/H2) | Pre‑set (undisclosed) | Pre‑set (undisclosed) | Pre‑set (undisclosed) | Company actuals used | H1: 108.1% of target; H2: 40.4% of target |
Definition notes: Non‑GAAP operating income excludes stock‑based comp, amortization, acquisition/integration costs, asset disposals, goodwill impairments, start‑up and restructuring charges, net adjustments tied to long‑term capacity reservations, and certain other items .
Long‑Term Incentives (Equity)
| Award Type | Grant Date(s) | Target | Actual/Earned | Vesting | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Objectives‑based PBRSUs (FY2025 grant cycle) | FY2025 awards | Company‑specific objectives (multi‑objective set) | Concluded FY2025 performance periods paid at 173% of maximum; Creviston earned 18,076 PBRSUs | 50% upon certification; 50% in equal annual installments over 2 years | 13% of objectives remained eligible to be achieved through period ending no later than June 2025 |
| Gross Margin PBRSUs (3 annual periods) | FY2025 grant | FY2025 non‑GAAP gross margin: 43.5% (50%), 45.0% (100%), 46.5% (200%) | Actual FY2025: 45.2% → 113.3% payout; Creviston earned 1,315 vs target 1,161 | Earn/vest after each annual period upon certification | Non‑GAAP GM excludes amortization, SBC, restructuring, acquisition/integration, and certain other items |
| Service‑based RSUs | 8/13/2024; 8/15/2023; 8/9/2022; 8/10/2021 | N/A | Outstanding unvested amounts below | 25% per year over 4 years | Typical annual grants in May/Aug |
FY2025 Grants of Plan‑Based Awards (Creviston)
| Grant Date | STI Threshold ($) | STI Target ($) | STI Max ($) | PBRSU Threshold (#) | PBRSU Target (#) | PBRSU Max (#) | Service RSUs (#) | Grant‑Date Fair Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N/A (STI) | $162,205 | $540,684 | $1,081,368 | — | — | — | — | — |
| 5/15/2024 | — | — | — | — | 13,932 | 27,864 | — | $1,379,965 |
| 8/13/2024 | — | — | — | — | — | — | 8,576 | $920,033 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership | 62,313 shares; less than 1% of shares outstanding (93,006,671 as of May 30, 2025) |
| Pledged/Hedging | None; hedging and pledging prohibited by policy |
| Ownership Guidelines | Section 16 officers must hold 1x base salary within 5 years; CEO 5x salary; directors 5x annual cash retainer |
| Options | None currently granted or outstanding to NEOs; company not granting options/SARs |
Outstanding equity awards at FY‑end (Mar 29, 2025):
| Type | Grant Date | Unvested (#) | Market Value ($) | Unearned PBRSUs (#) | Payout/Market Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Service RSUs | 8/13/2024 | 8,576 | $613,184 (at $71.50/sh) | — | — |
| Service/Earned RSUs | 5/15/2024 | 10,930 | $781,495 | 3,002 | $214,643 |
| Service RSUs | 8/15/2023 | 6,687 | $478,121 | — | — |
| Service/Earned RSUs | 5/15/2023 | 9,348 | $668,382 | — | — |
| Service RSUs | 8/9/2022 | 4,322 | $309,023 | — | — |
| Service/Earned RSUs | 5/16/2022 | 4,107 | $293,651 | — | — |
| Service RSUs | 8/10/2021 | 1,188 | $84,942 | — | — |
Vesting policies:
- Service‑based RSUs: 25% annually over 4 years .
- Objectives‑based PBRSUs: 50% vests at certification; remaining 50% vests in equal annual installments over 2 years .
- Gross margin PBRSUs: vest upon certification of performance each year .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Term |
|---|---|
| General Severance | Up to 26 weeks of base salary under general severance program upon involuntary termination; otherwise, no cash severance for Creviston absent change in control |
| Change‑in‑Control (Double Trigger) | One times highest annual base salary and one times target annual bonus if terminated without cause or for good reason within two years post‑CIC (or within 90 days prior for termination without cause); plus continuation of benefits for one year and equity treatment as noted |
| CIC Economics (as of Mar 29, 2025) | Base: $600,760; Bonus: $540,684; Stock Awards (intrinsic value of unvested PBRSUs & RSUs): $3,443,440; Benefits: $2,552; Total: $4,587,436 |
| Clawback/Forfeiture | Company‑wide clawback policy adopted in 2023 for erroneously awarded incentive comp upon accounting restatement; award agreements include clawback/forfeiture for prohibited conduct and restrictive covenants |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for directors and employees; none engaged |
| Equity Grants Timing | Generally May and August; no options/SARs currently granted; ESPP available |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix and risk: Majority of NEO compensation is at‑risk and performance‑based; for other NEOs (including Creviston), 56% of target total direct compensation tied to performance .
- 2025 design changes: Introduction of non‑GAAP gross margin PBRSUs (25% of PBRSU target value) adds multi‑year profitability focus; FY2025 actual achieved 113.3% of target .
- Peer benchmarking: Committee uses a peer group refreshed annually; FY2025 peers include AEIS, ALGM, CIEN, CRUS, COHR, DIOD, ENTG, KEYS, MRVL, MCHP, MKSI, ON, STX, SWKS, TER, TRMB, ZBRA; Qorvo positioned ~28th percentile in revenue and ~40th percentile in market cap within the group at determination .
- Governance strength: Double‑trigger CIC; prohibition on hedging/pledging; no repricing; robust ownership guidelines; independent consultant (Compensia) .
Performance & Track Record
| Metric | FY 2024 | FY 2025 | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin (%) | 39.5% | 41.3% | Improvement driven by utilization and mix; ASP erosion headwind |
| Operating Income ($MM) | $91.7 | $95.5 | Modest uptick year over year |
| Diluted EPS ($) | -$0.72 | $0.58 | Return to profitability |
| Cash from Operations ($MM) | $833.2 | $622.2 | Lower CFO YoY |
Pay vs performance drivers: Top three measures linking compensation actually paid to company performance are Revenue, Non‑GAAP Operating Income, and Non‑GAAP Gross Margin .
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- FY2024 say‑on‑pay approval: 94.2% in favor .
- 2024 Annual Meeting detailed vote results disclosed in 8‑K; Proposal 2 approved (For: 67,230,394; Against: 4,062,440; Abstain: 106,246) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment — Additional Detail
- Stock ownership guidelines: 1x base salary for Section 16 officers; compliance status not individually disclosed; counts include common stock and time‑vested RSUs/stock held directly/indirectly per policy .
- None of directors or executive officers has pledged common stock; company prohibits hedging/pledging .
- No stock options currently outstanding for NEOs; equity grants are RSUs and PBRSUs .
Employment Contracts & Restrictions
- Change‑in‑control agreements with double‑trigger equity acceleration upon qualifying termination post‑CIC; prudent CIC definitions and administration under the Amended & Restated 2022 Stock Incentive Plan .
- RSU continuity: Upon termination other than for cause, certain service‑based RSUs and PBRSUs may continue to vest over the original term subject to compliance with restrictive covenants and other conditions .
- No tax gross‑ups disclosed; general practices emphasize clawback and forfeiture risk controls .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Creviston’s pay is substantially variable and linked to revenue, non‑GAAP operating income, and multi‑year non‑GAAP gross margin, adding incentives for sustained margin improvement. FY2025 equity payouts (PBRSUs) reflect above‑target achievement on concluded performance periods (173% of maximum) and GM PBRSUs at 113.3% .
- Retention vs selling pressure: Significant unvested RSUs across multiple annual grants with 25% annual vesting could produce periodic sell‑to‑cover activity; no options or repricing risk and hedging/pledging prohibitions reduce misalignment risks .
- CIC economics: Double‑trigger severance with ~$4.59M total as of FY2025 provides protection, but equity intrinsic value forms the majority (aligns with shareholder outcomes in a transaction) .
- Ownership: Beneficial ownership is modest (<1%), partially offset by strong ownership guidelines and performance‑weighted equity mix; however, limited direct ownership can be a signal to monitor versus peers for “skin in the game” .
- Governance: High say‑on‑pay support (94.2%) and independent compensation oversight (Compensia) suggest shareholder acceptance of structure; focus on non‑GAAP profitability and revenue is consistent with semiconductor cycle realities .