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Steven Creviston

Senior Vice President and President of Connectivity & Sensors at QorvoQorvo
Executive

About Steven Creviston

Steven E. Creviston, age 61, is Senior Vice President and President of Connectivity & Sensors at Qorvo, a role he has held since July 2022. He previously led Mobile Products from January 2015 to July 2022 and before the Qorvo merger held multiple leadership roles at RFMD dating back to 2002 . Qorvo’s executive compensation program ties payouts to revenue, non‑GAAP operating income, and non‑GAAP gross margin; in FY2025, the short‑term plan used revenue and non‑GAAP operating income and the new PBRSUs linked to non‑GAAP gross margin paid out at 113.3% based on actual performance . Company financial context: revenue and EBITDA over FY2023–FY2025 are shown below (values retrieved from S&P Global).*

MetricFY 2023FY 2024FY 2025
Revenue ($USD Millions)$3,569.4*$3,769.5*$3,718.97*
EBITDA ($USD Millions)$648.52*$726.88*$672.97*

*Values retrieved from S&P Global

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
QorvoSVP & President, Connectivity & SensorsJul 2022–present Led Connectivity & Sensors portfolio execution and growth initiatives
QorvoCorporate VP & President, Mobile ProductsJan 2015–Jul 2022 Managed Mobile business post‑merger, product execution in handset RF
RFMD (predecessor)Corporate VP & President, Cellular Products Group (CPG)Aug 2007–Jan 2015 Led CPG across device generations; portfolio optimization
RFMDCorporate VP, CPG/Wireless ProductsMay 2002–Aug 2007 Advanced product line leadership and commercialization
RFMDVarious rolespre‑2002 Progressive responsibilities in RF components; pipeline development

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYears
LightPath Technologies, Inc.DirectorMar 2021–present

Fixed Compensation

ComponentFY 2023FY 2024FY 2025
Base Salary ($)$560,414 $582,831 $600,423
Base Salary Rate ($)$583,262 (2024 rate) $600,760 (2025 rate)
Target Bonus % of Base90% 90% 90%
Short‑Term Incentive Paid ($)$239,400 $431,256 $401,130
All Other Compensation ($)$10,878 $12,547 $13,988
Total Compensation ($)$3,110,693 $3,326,721 $3,315,539

Notes:

  • Short‑term incentive plan metrics: revenue and non‑GAAP operating income (50% weighting each per half‑year period) .
  • FY2025 half‑year payouts equaled ~108.1% and 40.4% of target, respectively, based on actual performance vs. targets .

Performance Compensation

Annual Incentives (STI)

MetricWeightingThresholdTargetMaximumActual FY2025Payout
Revenue50% (per H1/H2) Pre‑set (undisclosed) Pre‑set (undisclosed) Pre‑set (undisclosed) Company actuals used H1: 108.1% of target; H2: 40.4% of target
Non‑GAAP Operating Income50% (per H1/H2) Pre‑set (undisclosed) Pre‑set (undisclosed) Pre‑set (undisclosed) Company actuals used H1: 108.1% of target; H2: 40.4% of target

Definition notes: Non‑GAAP operating income excludes stock‑based comp, amortization, acquisition/integration costs, asset disposals, goodwill impairments, start‑up and restructuring charges, net adjustments tied to long‑term capacity reservations, and certain other items .

Long‑Term Incentives (Equity)

Award TypeGrant Date(s)TargetActual/EarnedVestingNotes
Objectives‑based PBRSUs (FY2025 grant cycle)FY2025 awards Company‑specific objectives (multi‑objective set) Concluded FY2025 performance periods paid at 173% of maximum; Creviston earned 18,076 PBRSUs 50% upon certification; 50% in equal annual installments over 2 years 13% of objectives remained eligible to be achieved through period ending no later than June 2025
Gross Margin PBRSUs (3 annual periods)FY2025 grant FY2025 non‑GAAP gross margin: 43.5% (50%), 45.0% (100%), 46.5% (200%) Actual FY2025: 45.2% → 113.3% payout; Creviston earned 1,315 vs target 1,161 Earn/vest after each annual period upon certification Non‑GAAP GM excludes amortization, SBC, restructuring, acquisition/integration, and certain other items
Service‑based RSUs8/13/2024; 8/15/2023; 8/9/2022; 8/10/2021 N/AOutstanding unvested amounts below25% per year over 4 years Typical annual grants in May/Aug

FY2025 Grants of Plan‑Based Awards (Creviston)

Grant DateSTI Threshold ($)STI Target ($)STI Max ($)PBRSU Threshold (#)PBRSU Target (#)PBRSU Max (#)Service RSUs (#)Grant‑Date Fair Value ($)
N/A (STI)$162,205 $540,684 $1,081,368
5/15/202413,932 27,864 $1,379,965
8/13/20248,576 $920,033

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Beneficial Ownership62,313 shares; less than 1% of shares outstanding (93,006,671 as of May 30, 2025)
Pledged/HedgingNone; hedging and pledging prohibited by policy
Ownership GuidelinesSection 16 officers must hold 1x base salary within 5 years; CEO 5x salary; directors 5x annual cash retainer
OptionsNone currently granted or outstanding to NEOs; company not granting options/SARs

Outstanding equity awards at FY‑end (Mar 29, 2025):

TypeGrant DateUnvested (#)Market Value ($)Unearned PBRSUs (#)Payout/Market Value ($)
Service RSUs8/13/20248,576 $613,184 (at $71.50/sh)
Service/Earned RSUs5/15/202410,930 $781,495 3,002 $214,643
Service RSUs8/15/20236,687 $478,121
Service/Earned RSUs5/15/20239,348 $668,382
Service RSUs8/9/20224,322 $309,023
Service/Earned RSUs5/16/20224,107 $293,651
Service RSUs8/10/20211,188 $84,942

Vesting policies:

  • Service‑based RSUs: 25% annually over 4 years .
  • Objectives‑based PBRSUs: 50% vests at certification; remaining 50% vests in equal annual installments over 2 years .
  • Gross margin PBRSUs: vest upon certification of performance each year .

Employment Terms

ProvisionTerm
General SeveranceUp to 26 weeks of base salary under general severance program upon involuntary termination; otherwise, no cash severance for Creviston absent change in control
Change‑in‑Control (Double Trigger)One times highest annual base salary and one times target annual bonus if terminated without cause or for good reason within two years post‑CIC (or within 90 days prior for termination without cause); plus continuation of benefits for one year and equity treatment as noted
CIC Economics (as of Mar 29, 2025)Base: $600,760; Bonus: $540,684; Stock Awards (intrinsic value of unvested PBRSUs & RSUs): $3,443,440; Benefits: $2,552; Total: $4,587,436
Clawback/ForfeitureCompany‑wide clawback policy adopted in 2023 for erroneously awarded incentive comp upon accounting restatement; award agreements include clawback/forfeiture for prohibited conduct and restrictive covenants
Hedging/PledgingProhibited for directors and employees; none engaged
Equity Grants TimingGenerally May and August; no options/SARs currently granted; ESPP available

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Mix and risk: Majority of NEO compensation is at‑risk and performance‑based; for other NEOs (including Creviston), 56% of target total direct compensation tied to performance .
  • 2025 design changes: Introduction of non‑GAAP gross margin PBRSUs (25% of PBRSU target value) adds multi‑year profitability focus; FY2025 actual achieved 113.3% of target .
  • Peer benchmarking: Committee uses a peer group refreshed annually; FY2025 peers include AEIS, ALGM, CIEN, CRUS, COHR, DIOD, ENTG, KEYS, MRVL, MCHP, MKSI, ON, STX, SWKS, TER, TRMB, ZBRA; Qorvo positioned ~28th percentile in revenue and ~40th percentile in market cap within the group at determination .
  • Governance strength: Double‑trigger CIC; prohibition on hedging/pledging; no repricing; robust ownership guidelines; independent consultant (Compensia) .

Performance & Track Record

MetricFY 2024FY 2025Notes
Gross Margin (%)39.5% 41.3% Improvement driven by utilization and mix; ASP erosion headwind
Operating Income ($MM)$91.7 $95.5 Modest uptick year over year
Diluted EPS ($)-$0.72 $0.58 Return to profitability
Cash from Operations ($MM)$833.2 $622.2 Lower CFO YoY

Pay vs performance drivers: Top three measures linking compensation actually paid to company performance are Revenue, Non‑GAAP Operating Income, and Non‑GAAP Gross Margin .

Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • FY2024 say‑on‑pay approval: 94.2% in favor .
  • 2024 Annual Meeting detailed vote results disclosed in 8‑K; Proposal 2 approved (For: 67,230,394; Against: 4,062,440; Abstain: 106,246) .

Equity Ownership & Alignment — Additional Detail

  • Stock ownership guidelines: 1x base salary for Section 16 officers; compliance status not individually disclosed; counts include common stock and time‑vested RSUs/stock held directly/indirectly per policy .
  • None of directors or executive officers has pledged common stock; company prohibits hedging/pledging .
  • No stock options currently outstanding for NEOs; equity grants are RSUs and PBRSUs .

Employment Contracts & Restrictions

  • Change‑in‑control agreements with double‑trigger equity acceleration upon qualifying termination post‑CIC; prudent CIC definitions and administration under the Amended & Restated 2022 Stock Incentive Plan .
  • RSU continuity: Upon termination other than for cause, certain service‑based RSUs and PBRSUs may continue to vest over the original term subject to compliance with restrictive covenants and other conditions .
  • No tax gross‑ups disclosed; general practices emphasize clawback and forfeiture risk controls .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Creviston’s pay is substantially variable and linked to revenue, non‑GAAP operating income, and multi‑year non‑GAAP gross margin, adding incentives for sustained margin improvement. FY2025 equity payouts (PBRSUs) reflect above‑target achievement on concluded performance periods (173% of maximum) and GM PBRSUs at 113.3% .
  • Retention vs selling pressure: Significant unvested RSUs across multiple annual grants with 25% annual vesting could produce periodic sell‑to‑cover activity; no options or repricing risk and hedging/pledging prohibitions reduce misalignment risks .
  • CIC economics: Double‑trigger severance with ~$4.59M total as of FY2025 provides protection, but equity intrinsic value forms the majority (aligns with shareholder outcomes in a transaction) .
  • Ownership: Beneficial ownership is modest (<1%), partially offset by strong ownership guidelines and performance‑weighted equity mix; however, limited direct ownership can be a signal to monitor versus peers for “skin in the game” .
  • Governance: High say‑on‑pay support (94.2%) and independent compensation oversight (Compensia) suggest shareholder acceptance of structure; focus on non‑GAAP profitability and revenue is consistent with semiconductor cycle realities .