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Emil Kakkis

Emil Kakkis

President and Chief Executive Officer at Ultragenyx PharmaceuticalUltragenyx Pharmaceutical
CEO
Executive
Board

About Emil Kakkis

Founder, President & CEO of Ultragenyx (RARE); age 64; CEO and director since inception in April 2010; M.D./Ph.D. (UCLA) and B.A. Biology (Pomona); board-certified in Medical Genetics; prior BioMarin executive and CMO (1998–2009) . Ultragenyx revenue grew from $363.3M (FY22) to $434.2M (FY23) to $560.2M (FY24) . Pay-versus-performance shows 2024 value of a $100 investment at $99 (company TSR), versus $112 (2023) and $108 (2022) . 2024 GAAP results: revenue $560,230k and net loss $(569,183)k (Pay vs Performance table) .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
UltragenyxFounder; President & CEO; interim PFO (Nov 2022–Oct 2023)2010–presentBuilt rare disease platform; led commercial expansion and multiple late-stage programs; bridged CFO transition .
BioMarin PharmaceuticalVarious exec roles incl. Chief Medical Officer1998–2009Advanced rare disease development portfolio .
BioMarin (consultant)Development consultant2009–2010Continued pipeline support post-executive tenure .

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsNotes
EveryLife Foundation for Rare DiseasesFounder2009–presentAdvocacy, policy, and ecosystem support for rare diseases .
Other public company boardsOther public directorships: 0 .

Fixed Compensation

Component202220232024
Salary (SCT, $)796,154 823,692 856,008
Target Bonus (% of base)80%
Actual Annual Bonus ($)558,000 622,656 757,768
Bonus as % of Base Salary88% (110% corporate score × 80% target)

Notes:

  • 2024 base salary rate as of 12/31/2024 was $861,000 (4% increase YoY) .

Performance Compensation

Equity Award Mix, Sizing, and 2024 Grants

  • CEO equity mix: 60% PSUs, 20% RSUs, 20% options (maintained for 2024 and 2025) .
  • 2024 plan grants to CEO (Ultragenyx): options 70,094 @ $53.69 (10-year term; usual 4-yr vest, 25%/anniv + monthly), RSUs 38,428 (25% per anniversary over 4 years), PSUs target 115,284 (1/3 revenue 2-yr; 1/3 relative TSR 3-yr; 1/3 strategic 3-yr) .
2024 Grants (Ultragenyx)Grant dateQuantityKey terms
Stock options3/1/202470,094$53.69 strike; exp. 3/1/2034; typical vest 25% at 1-yr, monthly thereafter .
RSUs3/1/202438,42825% per year over 4 yrs .
PSUs (target)3/1/2024115,284Revenue 2-yr; Rel. TSR 3-yr; Strategic 3-yr; 50–200% payout curves .

Additional subsidiary grant (Amlogenyx PSOs):

  • 350,000 performance stock options granted 10/21/2024 @ $2.31; vest on clinical milestone achievements (4 criteria × 25%) within 18-month period ending 4/21/2026; otherwise forfeit .

2024 Annual Cash Bonus Structure and Outcomes

MetricWeightTargetOutcomeWeighted achievement
Commercial (revenue)30%FY revenue goalsExceeded; 123%37%
Development (clinical milestones)60%UX143, UX111 BLA, GTX-102, UX701, DTX401Met base60%
People & Governance10%Culture/engagement/governance/budget70% (budget not met)7%
Total corporate score110%110%

CEO bonus is 100% corporate; payout equals 110% × 80% target = 88% of base; paid $757,768 for 2024 .

PSU Program Mechanics and Recent Payouts

PSU grantStructurePerformance periodCertified result
2024 PSUs1/3 revenue (2-yr), 1/3 rel. TSR (3-yr), 1/3 strategic (3-yr); 50–200% payout2024–2025 (rev); 2024–2026 (TSR/strategic)In-flight; not yet certified .
2023 PSUs50% revenue (2-yr), 25% rel. TSR (3-yr), 25% strategic (2-yr)2023–2024 (rev/strat)Revenue earned at 74% of target; Strategic earned at 125%; both vested 3/1/2025 .
2022 PSUs80% revenue (2-yr), 20% rel. TSR (3-yr)2022–2023 (rev)Revenue portion forfeited; Relative TSR earned at 124% (rank 62nd percentile); vested 3/1/2025 .

Summary Compensation (Grant-Date Fair Value)

($)202220232024
Stock Awards (RSUs/PSUs)7,463,295 9,456,663 9,374,511
Option Awards (incl. Amlogenyx PSOs in 2024)3,310,681 2,161,782 2,715,600 (incl. $586,950 Amlogenyx PSOs)

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Total beneficial ownership3,293,909 shares; 3.5% of outstanding as of 3/7/2025 .
Shares outstanding reference93,892,528 as of 3/7/2025 .
Footnote breakdown2,158,985 shares held by the Emil Kakkis & Jenny Soriano Living Trust; 533,532 shares held directly; 601,392 shares issuable via options exercisable within 60 days .
Vested vs unvested (selected 12/31/24 snapshot)RSUs unvested include 38,428 (2024 grant), 129,036 (2023), 38,926 (2022), 4,500 (2021); PSUs unearned 115,284 (2024), 44,314 (2023) .
2024 vesting activityRSUs vested: 36,442 shares ($1,956,571); no option exercises in 2024 .
Ownership guidelinesCEO required to hold stock = 3x base salary; all executives and directors required to be in compliance by end of 2024 met the guidelines .
Hedging/pledgingProhibited for directors and employees (incl. executives) .
ClawbackNasdaq Rule 10D-1 compliant clawback; also discretionary recoupment for fraud/misconduct .

Plan-level dilution and option moneyness context (potential selling pressure):

  • Overhang projected ~21% post-plan approval; many outstanding options are underwater (7.64M options underwater at $38.62 stock price vs weighted average exercise price $63.62 as of 3/7/2025), which may temper near-term exercise-related sales .

Employment Terms

ProvisionBaselineChange-in-control (Covered Transaction)
Cash severance24 months base salary + target bonus; COBRA reimbursements for 24 months 24 months base salary + 2x target bonus; COBRA reimbursements for 24 months; double-trigger accelerated vesting for unvested equity
Illustrative payout (12/31/2024 assumption)$2,450,886 total (Base $1,722,000; Bonus $688,800; COBRA $40,086) $18,726,116 total (Base $1,722,000; Bonus $1,377,600; Equity accel $15,586,430; COBRA $40,086)
Employment termAt-will; either party may terminate (notice terms apply)
Clawback and restrictive conductClawback policy; insider trading/hedging/pledging prohibitions
Tax gross-upsNone for change-in-control payments

Board Governance (Director Service, Roles, Independence)

  • Director since 2010; Class I director continuing in office until 2026; not independent (as CEO) .
  • Committee: Research & Development Committee member; independent Chairman (Daniel G. Welch); Audit/Comp/Nominating committees comprised solely of independent directors .
  • Board and committee meeting attendance in 2024: 100% for all directors .
  • Independent director executive sessions: met four times in 2024; independent Chairman presides .
  • Other public directorships (Kakkis): 0 .

Dual-role implications:

  • CEO-director, not independent, mitigated by an independent Chairman, fully independent key committees, anti-hedging/pledging and robust governance practices .

Compensation Committee and Peer Benchmarking

  • Compensation Committee (independent): Chair Michael Narachi; members Deborah Dunsire, Daniel G. Welch .
  • Independent consultant: Aon; 2024 fees ~$208,597 for exec/dir comp advisory; independence affirmed .
  • 2024 peer group (20 biopharma companies) includes ACADIA, Alkermes, Amicus, Apellis, BioCryst, BioMarin, Blueprint, BridgeBio, Corcept, Exelixis, FibroGen, Halozyme, Insmed, Intra-Cellular, Ionis, Jazz, Neurocrine, PTC, Sage, Sarepta .

Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • 2024 say-on-pay support: 74%; Company increased performance-based equity weighting (PSUs) for executives (50% in 2025 for NEOs excluding CEO), maintained CEO PSU mix at 60%, lengthened strategic PSU horizon to 3 years, and added a cap on relative TSR PSU payout to target when absolute TSR is negative .

Performance Context

Metric202220232024
Revenue ($M)363.3 434.2 560.2
Net Income (Loss) ($M)(707.4) (606.6) (569.2)
Value of $100 investment (TSR proxy)$108 $112 $99

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Increased performance orientation: CEO equity 60% PSUs; for other NEOs, PSUs raised to 50% in 2025 without increasing total grant value .
  • PSU metric reweighting: 2024 PSUs reduced revenue portion to 1/3 and increased strategic and relative TSR portions to add rigor; strategic portion extended to 3 years .
  • Payout discipline: 2023 revenue PSU paid at 74% of target; 2022 revenue PSU forfeited; 2022 relative TSR PSU earned at 124% (62nd percentile), demonstrating variability tied to outcomes .
  • No option repricing; no CoC tax gross-ups; robust anti-hedging/pledging and clawback policies .

Related-Party Transactions and Red Flags

  • Related-party transactions since Jan 1, 2024: none disclosed; formal related-person transaction policy in place with Audit Committee oversight .
  • Option repricing: prohibited without shareholder approval .
  • Hedging/pledging: prohibited .
  • Say-on-pay at 74% signals some investor concern; Company responded with program changes .

Director Compensation (for context; CEO is employee-director)

  • Non-employee director annual 2024 compensation ranged ~$464k–$500k (cash + RSUs + options); CEO does not receive director fees .

Equity Award and Vesting Schedules (Selected Details)

AwardGrant dateQuantityExercise/vestingExpiration
Stock options3/1/202470,094$53.69; typical 4-yr vest (25% then monthly)3/1/2034
RSUs3/1/202438,42825% annually over 4 years
PSUs (2024 target)3/1/2024115,284Revenue (2-yr), Rel. TSR (3-yr), Strategic (3-yr); 50–200% payout
Amlogenyx PSOs10/21/2024350,000$2.31; vest on 4 clinical milestones (25% each) by 4/21/202610/21/2034

Investment Implications

  • Alignment and retention: High equity emphasis, with CEO PSU weight at 60% and increased PSU rigor (longer strategic horizon, TSR cap in negative absolute TSR) indicate strong pay-for-performance and support retention through multi-year vesting .
  • Near-term selling pressure: 2024 showed no option exercises by the CEO and 36,442 RSUs vested; many outstanding options remain underwater relative to recent prices, which reduces near-term exercise-driven supply .
  • Change-in-control leverage: Double-trigger equity acceleration plus 2x target bonus in a covered transaction produces substantial CIC value ($18.7M modeled at 12/31/24), potentially influencing deal dynamics and negotiation incentives .
  • Execution risk: While revenue growth is strong (FY22–FY24), the company remains loss-making; PSU outcomes (revenue-based forfeitures in 2022; sub-target 2023 revenue PSUs) underscore sensitivity to commercial ramp and pipeline milestones .
  • Governance mitigants for dual role: An independent Chairman and fully independent key committees constrain CEO influence at the board level; attendance and independent executive sessions are robust .