Eric Crombez
About Eric Crombez
Eric Crombez, M.D., age 52, is Ultragenyx’s Chief Medical Officer and Executive Vice President (since March 2023). He is a board‑certified clinical geneticist with prior leadership in gene therapy programs at Dimension Therapeutics and industry experience at Shire; he trained at UCLA and holds a B.S. in biology (University of Michigan) and M.D. (Wayne State University) . In role‑related performance incentives, annual bonuses are determined by corporate and individual goal achievement; 2024 corporate goals were achieved at 110% and Dr. Crombez’s individual goals at 115% (bonus paid March 2025) . Ultragenyx emphasizes performance equity via PSUs with revenue, relative TSR, and strategic components (longer 3‑year horizons for TSR and strategic metrics from 2024/2025 awards), and strengthened at‑risk pay for 2025 by increasing PSUs to 50% of executive equity grants (excluding CEO) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ultragenyx Pharmaceutical | Chief Medical Officer, Gene Therapy & Inborn Errors of Metabolism; led global clinical development | Nov 2017–Mar 2023 | Oversaw gene therapy programs and clinical execution post‑acquisition of Dimension |
| Dimension Therapeutics | Chief Medical Officer | Dec 2014–Nov 2017 | Led clinical development in Hemophilia B/A, OTC deficiency, GSDIa gene therapies |
| UCLA School of Medicine | Assistant Professor, Pediatrics/Medical Genetics; fellowship in biochemical genetics | n/d | Academic and clinical genetics expertise foundation |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years |
|---|---|---|
| Abeona Therapeutics Inc. | Board of Directors (public company) | Current |
| FDA Cellular, Tissue and Gene Therapies Advisory Committee | Appointed industry representative | Current |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY 2024 |
|---|---|
| Base Salary | $591,846 |
| Target Bonus (% of Base) | 50% |
| Actual Bonus Paid (for FY2024, paid Mar 2025) | $382,030 |
| Bonus Achieved (% of Base) | 63% |
Performance Compensation
Annual Bonus – FY 2024
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout | Vesting/Timing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Corporate goals score | n/d | 100% | 110% | Funds bonus pool | Paid Mar 2025 |
| Individual goals score | n/d | n/d | 115% | Determines individual payout | Paid Mar 2025 |
| Total bonus | n/a | n/a | $382,030 | 63% of base | n/a |
Equity – FY 2024 Grants (mix of RSUs, Options, PSUs)
| Instrument | Grant Date | Count/Target | Fair Value | Key Terms |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Options | 3/1/2024 | 34,200 | $1,038,603 | 10‑yr term; 25% vest at 1 year, then monthly to 4 years; strike $53.69; expires 3/1/2034 |
| RSUs | 3/1/2024 | 19,400 | $1,041,586 | Vests 25% each anniversary over 4 years |
| PSUs (Revenue, TSR, Strategic portions) | 3/1/2024 | Threshold 8,085; Target 19,400; Max 38,800 | $1,230,358 (grant date fair value) | Revenue portion (33.4%) 2‑yr performance; TSR (33.3%) 3‑yr; Strategic (33.3%) 3‑yr; payouts 0–200% of target |
Program design notes: Typical option awards for executive officers vest 25% at year one and monthly thereafter to four years; typical RSUs vest 25% annually over four years . PSU mix shifted to emphasize relative TSR and strategic goals; PSU upside capped if absolute TSR is negative beginning in 2025 .
Outstanding Equity Awards at 12/31/2024 (Selected)
| Type | Grant Date | Status | Quantity | Exercise Price | Expiration | Market/Payout Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Options | 3/1/2024 | Unexercisable | 34,200 | $53.69 | 3/1/2034 | n/a |
| RSUs | 3/1/2024 | Unvested | 19,400 | n/a | n/a | $816,158 |
| PSUs | 3/1/2024 | Unearned (target) | 19,400 | n/a | n/a | $816,158 |
| Options | 5/1/2023 | Exer./Unexer. | 3,310 / 5,052 | $44.03 | 5/1/2033 | n/a |
| RSUs | 5/1/2023 | Unvested | 18,464 | n/a | n/a | $776,780 |
| PSUs | 5/1/2023 | Unearned (target) | 7,029 | n/a | n/a | $295,710 |
| Options | 3/1/2023 | Exer./Unexer. | 4,308 / 5,537 | $45.65 | 3/1/2033 | n/a |
| RSUs | 3/1/2023 | Unvested | 5,538 | n/a | n/a | $232,984 |
| Options | 3/1/2022 | Exer./Unexer. | 7,491 / 8,249 | $67.37 | 3/1/2032 | n/a |
PSU payout precedent: The revenue portion of the 2023 PSUs paid out below target, at 74% .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (as of 3/7/2025) | 98,113 shares; <1% of outstanding (93,892,528 shares) |
| Stock ownership guidelines | 1x base salary for named executive officers (3x for CEO; 3x for directors) |
| Guideline compliance | All required named executive officers and directors were in compliance as of 12/31/2024 |
| Hedging/pledging | Not disclosed in retrieved documents |
Insider Trading Plans (Rule 10b5‑1)
| Name | Date Adopted | Aggregate Shares to be Sold (conditions apply) | Plan End Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eric Crombez, EVP, CMO | Dec 3, 2024 | Up to 64,235 shares (28,500 via option exercise) | Dec 3, 2025 |
| Eric Crombez, EVP, CMO | Sep 5, 2025 | Up to 45,238 shares | Sep 5, 2026 |
Employment Terms
| Scenario | Base Salary | Bonus | Equity Acceleration | COBRA Reimbursements | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Qualifying termination (without cause or constructive termination) | $604,000 | $302,000 | — | $20,043 | $926,043 |
| Qualifying termination following a Covered Transaction (double trigger) | $906,000 | $453,000 | $3,040,735 | $30,064 | $4,429,799 |
- Equity plans do not provide automatic single‑trigger acceleration in a covered transaction; acceleration requires specific conditions (double trigger) .
- Clawback: Ultragenyx’s policy (effective Oct 2, 2023) requires mandatory recovery of excess incentive‑based compensation upon accounting restatement and permits discretionary recovery for fraud or intentional misconduct; awards are subject to forfeiture and recovery under the plan and company policy .
Performance & Track Record
- Program leadership: Public statements emphasize accelerating Angelman syndrome trials (GTX‑102) to broaden patient access; Crombez highlighted “open‑label basket design” to efficiently evaluate across ages/genotypes in the Aurora study, with Aspire Phase 3 fully enrolled .
- Role progression: Elevated to company‑wide CMO in March 2023 after leading gene therapy development since the Dimension acquisition .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Increased at‑risk equity for 2025: PSUs increased to 50% of annual equity grants for executive officers (excluding CEO), adding rigor and TSR cap if absolute TSR is negative .
- Longer performance horizons: Strategic PSU portion extended to 3 years; relative TSR portion weighted more heavily, with 1/3 allocation alongside strategic and revenue portions .
- Base salary realignment: Crombez’s base salary increased 15% in 2024 to align closer to peer median for similar roles, indicating market‑based adjustments rather than guaranteed pay inflation .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Crombez’s pay mix has material performance linkage via PSUs with multi‑year revenue/TSR/strategic metrics and no single‑trigger acceleration—positive alignment and retention design .
- Selling pressure: Two sequential 10b5‑1 plans (Dec 2024 and Sep 2025) authorize sales up to 64,235 and 45,238 shares, respectively, which may create periodic supply overhang; monitor plan executions and Form 4s around trial/data milestones .
- Ownership: Beneficial ownership is <1%, typical for R&D executives; compliance with 1x salary ownership guideline mitigates misalignment concerns, but absolute stake is modest .
- Change‑of‑control economics: Double‑trigger equity acceleration and cash severance amounts are moderate; equity acceleration value (~$3.0M) ties directly to unvested awards, limiting windfall risk absent a qualifying termination .
- Execution risk: Delivery on GTX‑102 and broader pipeline milestones drives incentive outcomes; 2023 revenue PSU under‑target payout (74%) underscores performance sensitivity—portfolio/milestone timing will influence realized comp and potential insider sale pacing .