Thomas Kassberg
About Thomas Kassberg
Thomas Kassberg is Executive Vice President (since January 2016) and Chief Business Officer (since November 2011) at Ultragenyx (RARE). He is 64 years old and holds a B.A. in Business Administration from Gustavus Adolphus College and an M.B.A. from Northwestern University . Company performance during his tenure includes 2024 revenue of $560 million (+29% YoY) and multi-year pay-versus-performance metrics showing TSR values of $99 (2024), $112 (2023), and $108 (2022) on a $100 base, alongside reported net losses of $569 million (2024), $607 million (2023), and $707 million (2022) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ultragenyx Pharmaceutical Inc. | Chief Business Officer; Senior Vice President | Nov 2011–Jan 2016 | Led corporate/business development during growth stage |
| Ultragenyx Pharmaceutical Inc. | Executive Vice President | Jan 2016–Present | Enterprise-level BD leadership and partnering |
| Corium International, Inc. | Vice President, Business Development | Jul 2010–Oct 2011 | BD for biotech portfolio expansion |
| Independent consultant | Corporate development and strategy | Mar 2009–Jun 2010 | BD advisory across biopharma clients |
| Proteolix, Inc. (acquired by Onyx) | Senior Vice President, Corporate Development | Jan 2008–Feb 2009 | Corporate development at oncology biotech |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years |
|---|---|---|
| Passage Bio, Inc. | Director (public biotech) | Current as of 2025 proxy |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $390,000 | $405,600 | $418,443 |
| Target Bonus (%) | 40% | — | — |
| Actual Bonus Paid (Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation) ($) | $165,750 | $166,296 | $168,600 |
Historical offer terms: In 2014, Kassberg’s offer letter set a base salary of $350,000 with a bonus opportunity up to 30% of base salary (later increased to 40% by 2015) .
Performance Compensation
| Metric | Weighting | Performance Period | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Vesting Timing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 PSUs – Revenue Portion | 1/3 of PSUs | Jan 1, 2024–Dec 31, 2025 | 50% of target | 100% | 200% | Later of certification or Mar 1, 2026 |
| 2024 PSUs – Relative TSR Portion | 1/3 of PSUs | Jan 1, 2024–Dec 31, 2026 | 25th percentile = 25% | 50th percentile = 100% | 90th percentile = 200% | Later of certification or Mar 1, 2027 |
| 2024 PSUs – Strategic Performance Portion | 1/3 of PSUs (longer 3-year horizon) | Jan 1, 2024–Dec 31, 2026 | — | — | — | Later of certification or Mar 1, 2027 |
| 2022 PSUs – Revenue-Based Outcome | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aggregate revenue-based vesting | $815M (50%) | $907M (100%) | $1,075M (200%) | $798M | 0% |
Annual bonus program design: For executives other than the CEO, bonuses are based on corporate goals and individual objectives; corporate achievement was 110% for fiscal 2024 (bonuses paid Mar 2025), with individual components assessed by the CEO and Compensation Committee and maximum bonus caps at 200% of target for non-CEO executives .
Equity mix: Executive officers (other than CEO) received roughly equal value split among options, RSUs, and PSUs in 2024; 2025 program increases PSU share to 50% for executive officers (excluding CEO, who remains at 60% PSU) and caps TSR PSU payout at target if absolute TSR is negative .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Grant Date (2014 Table) | Options Exercisable (#) | Options Unexercisable (#) | Exercise Price ($) | Option Expiration | Unvested RSUs (#) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 11/16/2011 | 63,308 | 46,426 | 0.31 | 11/16/2021 | — |
| 10/31/2013 | 10,800 | 29,078 | 6.86 | 10/31/2023 | — |
- Early exercises: Kassberg exercised 50,646 options (Nov 28, 2012) and 42,204 options (Sep 27, 2013) under his 2011 grant .
- Vesting norms: Executive options typically vest 25% on first anniversary then 1/48 monthly; RSUs vest 25% annually over four years; PSUs reported at target with vesting upon certified achievement and subject to double-trigger acceleration in covered transactions .
Alignment Policies
- Hedging/pledging prohibited for directors and employees, including executive officers .
- Clawback policy compliant with Rule 10D-1 with discretionary recoupment for fraud or intentional misconduct, covering time-based and performance-based equity and bonuses .
- Stock ownership guidelines require 3x base salary for CEO, 1x base salary for other named executive officers, and 3x annual retainer for directors; compliance noted for those required as of 2024/2023, respectively (guidelines apply to NEOs and directors) .
Employment Terms
- Offer letter/at-will: Kassberg joined via an offer letter in Oct 2011; employment is at will with eligibility for base salary, annual bonus opportunity, and initial equity; 2014 disclosed salary $350,000 with bonus up to 30% of base, later increased to 40% by 2015 .
- Covered transaction/change-in-control: Company uses double-trigger vesting of outstanding equity awards following covered transactions under employment arrangements .
- Definitions/coverage: Current proxies describe severance constructs for executive officers (CEO and NEOs); covered transaction protection periods and definitions of “cause,” “good reason,” and “constructive termination” are detailed for executives, establishing eligibility for salary/bonus multiples, COBRA reimbursement, and equity acceleration on qualifying terminations (illustrated for NEOs) .
Historical Potential Payments (2017 valuation basis)
| Scenario (as of Dec 29, 2017) | Base Salary Continuation ($) | Equity Acceleration ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Termination by Company without Cause | $421,500 | — | $421,500 |
| Resignation due to Constructive Termination | $421,500 | — | $421,500 |
| Termination without Cause or Resignation due to Constructive Termination following Covered Transaction | $421,500 | $579,750 | $1,001,250 |
These historical figures were calculated using a closing stock price of $47.82 as of the last trading day of 2017 for equity acceleration valuation methodologies described in the proxy .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Kassberg’s incentive mix historically included options, RSUs, and PSUs; current program tilts toward performance-based PSUs (with TSR caps and longer strategic horizons), which can enhance long-term alignment and reduce pure revenue targeting risk . The 2022 revenue PSUs paid 0% given underperformance versus threshold, evidencing program rigor .
- Retention and change-of-control economics: Double-trigger equity acceleration and salary/bonus multiples in covered transactions provide retention ballast; historical covered-transaction estimates for Kassberg show meaningful equity acceleration potential, which can influence departure calculus and post-deal selling pressure once awards vest .
- Insider selling pressure and ownership: Historical option exercises occurred during early-tenure grants; vesting conventions (25% cliff then monthly) and periodic annual grants create recurring vest events that may drive 10b5-1 sales, though hedging/pledging is prohibited (reducing collateralization risks) .
- Governance and clawbacks: Strong clawback policy and prohibition on hedging/pledging mitigate headline risk from misalignment behaviors; compensation benchmarking to a robust biotech peer set targets competitive but disciplined pay practices .
- Performance backdrop: 2024 revenue grew 29% to $560M while multi-year TSR under the pay-versus-performance disclosure suggests shareholder returns around par in 2022–2024; strategic wins (e.g., UX143 Breakthrough Designation, GTX-102 Phase 3 start) can bolster value creation prospects in Kassberg’s BD remit .