Jeffrey Yeh
About Jeffrey Yeh
Jeffrey Yeh, 63, is Executive Vice President and Chief Credit Officer of RBB Bancorp and Royal Business Bank (EVP/CCO since January 2014; acting CCO in 2013; joined the Bank in 2008). He holds a B.A. from Soochow University and an M.B.A. from the University of Missouri, with a career spanning portfolio administration, credit leadership, lending and investment management across U.S. and Asia-focused institutions . Company performance context for 2024: net income declined to $26.7 million (diluted EPS $1.47) amid higher funding costs and credit provisioning, while tangible book per share rose 4% to $24.51 and Q4 net interest margin expanded to 2.76%; PRSU incentives for executives now tie to relative TSR, ROAA, and ROATCE through year-end 2026 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Royal Business Bank | First Vice President, Portfolio Administration Manager | 2008–2012/2013 | Portfolio administration and credit support |
| Royal Business Bank | Senior Vice President & Acting Chief Credit Officer | 2013 | Interim credit oversight |
| RBB Bancorp / Royal Business Bank | Executive Vice President & Chief Credit Officer | Jan 2014–Present | Enterprise credit risk management and policy leadership |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Universal Science Industrial Co., Ltd. | Finance Director & Business Control Manager | 2001–2003 | Corporate finance and controls |
| Overseas Chinese Finance, Ltd. | Director & General Manager | 1999–2001 | General management across lending/investment activities |
| Bank of Overseas Chinese | Lending & Investment Manager | 1995–1999 | Credit and investment portfolio management |
| General Bank | Various positions | 1989–1995 | Banking operations and credit roles |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $328,743 | $323,136 | $353,000 |
2024 “All Other Compensation” breakdown:
| Component | Amount ($) |
|---|---|
| Perquisites (vehicle/car allowance, housing, other) | $18,000 |
| Company 401(k) Match | $13,428 |
| Dividends on vested equity | $2,504 |
| Bank-Owned Life Insurance (BOLI) income | $3,135 |
| Total | $37,067 |
Performance Compensation
2024 Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) Structure and Outcome
| Metric | Weighting (%) | Threshold | Target | Maximum | 2024 Result | % Achieved | Payout % Contribution |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Diluted EPS | 30% | $1.68 | $2.12 | $2.76 | $1.47 | 0% | 0% |
| ROAA | 10% | 0.80% | 1.00% | 1.30% | 0.44% | 0% | 0% |
| Efficiency Ratio | 5% | 55% | 50% | 45% | 61% | 0% | 0% |
| Leadership/Board Discretion | 20% | 80% | 100% | 130% | 130% | 150% | 30% |
| NPLs/Loans HFI | 15% | 1.04% | 0.94% | 0.84% | 2.64% | 0% | 0% |
| Loan Growth ($mm) | 10% | $151.7 | $284.2 | $369.5 | $31.0 | 0% | 0% |
| Retail Deposit Growth ($mm) | 5% | $139.3 | $220.9 | $287.1 | $157.9 | 61% | 3% |
| DDA as % of Total Deposits | 5% | 18.1% | 19.3% | 20.6% | 17.5% | 0% | 0% |
| Overall Score | — | — | — | — | — | — | 33% |
AIP payout summary (2024):
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Base Salary | $353,000 |
| AIP Target (% of Salary) | 40% |
| AIP Target ($) | $141,200 |
| Payout % Earned (scorecard) | 13% |
| Base Cash Incentive ($) | $46,695 |
| Supplemental Amount (10% of salary) | $35,300 |
| Total Cash Incentive ($) | $81,995 |
| Total Cash Incentive (% of Salary) | 23% |
Notes: The Compensation Committee applied discretion via a supplemental 10% of base salary to recognize leadership and remediation achievements; overall NEO payouts remained below targets (40%–60% of salary) .
2024 Long-Term Equity Incentives (granted March 20, 2024 unless noted)
| Grant Date | Award Type | Units (#) | Grant-Date Fair Value ($) | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2/21/2024 | RSU | 2,765 | $48,498 | 33.3% annually in 2025/2026/2027 |
| 3/20/2024 | RSU | 3,978 | $70,610 | 33.3% annually in 2025/2026/2027 |
| 3/20/2024 | PRSU (TSR @ target) | 1,989 | Included in total below | Earned over 3-year period; vests after FY2026 filing in Q1 2027 |
| 3/20/2024 | PRSU (ROAA @ target) | 994 | Included in total below | As above |
| 3/20/2024 | PRSU (ROATCE @ target) | 994 | Included in total below | As above |
| 3/20/2024 | PRSUs (Total @ target) | 3,978 | $76,079 | As above |
PRSU performance design:
| Metric | Weighting | Measurement | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Payout Range |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Relative TSR | 50% | vs. peer group | 25th percentile | 50th percentile | 75th percentile | 50%–150% |
| ROAA | 25% | Absolute | 80% of target | Approved 2026 forecast | 130% of target | 50%–150% |
| ROATCE | 25% | Absolute | 80% of target | Approved 2026 forecast | 130% of target | 50%–150% |
Outstanding Equity Awards at 12/31/2024
| Grant Date | Unvested RSUs (#) | Market Value ($) | Target PRSUs (#) | Market Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1/19/2022 | 675 | $13,831 | — | — |
| 1/18/2023 | 1,684 | $34,505 | — | — |
| 2/21/2024 | 2,765 | $56,655 | — | — |
| 3/20/2024 | 3,978 | $81,509 | — | — |
| 3/20/2024 | — | — | 3,978 | $81,509 |
Vesting mechanics and change-in-control:
- RSUs: Accelerate and vest in full upon change-in-control only if consideration is all cash; otherwise vest per schedule (33.3% annually for 2024 grants; 50% tranches for 2023 grants; 100% on 2025 anniversary for 2022 grant) .
- PRSUs: Earned pro rata based on months elapsed in performance period; vest after FY2026 10-K filing (Q1 2027) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Ownership Component | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (direct/indirect shares) | 56,800 shares; <1% of outstanding class (17,738,627 shares) |
| Vested vs. Unvested | Unvested RSUs/PRSUs as above; no options listed for Mr. Yeh in 2024 |
| Stock ownership guidelines (NEOs) | 1× base salary in Qualifying Shares; CEO 2×; based on $18 share price |
| Compliance status | As of proxy date, only Mr. Yeh met his ownership requirement (others have deadlines in 2028–2029) |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for executives and directors per Insider Trading Policy |
| Say-on-Pay support | 96% approval in 2024; program overhauled to tie more pay to performance |
| Peer group benchmarking | Used a 24-bank peer group; NEO total direct compensation generally at market median; CEO below median |
Related party transactions and insider indebtedness:
- No related party loans; no transactions >$120,000 involving insiders since Jan 1, 2017; ordinary banking relationships with insiders conducted on market terms; deposits from insiders’ group totaled $32.5 million as of 12/31/2024 .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms (Mr. Yeh) |
|---|---|
| Agreement term and renewal | 3-year term with automatic one-year renewals unless notice given 3 months prior |
| Base elements | Annual salary (Board-adjusted), stock options eligibility, discretionary bonus, auto expense reimbursement, medical insurance, other benefits |
| Severance (no change-in-control) | If terminated without cause: 12 months base salary via salary continuation |
| Change-in-control (double trigger) | If terminated without cause or due to material adverse alteration post-CoC: 12 months base salary + 100% annual target bonus for year of termination + 12 months medical/dental continuation; vested options remain exercisable through term |
| Equity acceleration | All unvested awards vest upon change-in-control; PRSUs vest pro rata for months elapsed; RSUs vest fully only where consideration is solely cash |
| Clawbacks | Two policies: discretionary Clawback for unsafe/unsound practices; Mandatory NASDAQ/SEC-compliant recovery on restatements for Section 16 officers covering prior 3 years |
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Yeh is the only NEO already meeting share ownership guidelines, with meaningful unvested RSUs and PRSUs aligning incentives to shareholder value (TSR, ROAA, ROATCE) through 2026; hedging/pledging is prohibited, reducing misalignment risk .
- Near-term selling pressure: Scheduled RSU installments vest annually in 2025–2027 and 2022/2023 tranches vest in 2025/2026, creating periodic potential supply; PRSUs cliff vest post-FY2026, contingent on performance .
- Pay-for-performance: 2024 financial underperformance drove low AIP scorecard payouts (13% of salary), but the Committee exercised discretion via a 10% supplement; continued heavy weighting to leadership/controls suggests payouts hinge on operational remediation and credit outcomes in 2025 .
- Retention risk and change-in-control economics: Severance at 1.0× salary plus target bonus under CoC and 1.0× salary otherwise is moderate for a CCO, offering balanced retention without excessive golden parachutes; equity vesting terms incentivize continuity through FY2026 reporting .
- Governance: Strong say-on-pay support (96%) and adoption of dual clawbacks, anti-hedging/pledging, and peer benchmarking reduce compensation-related risk signals; absence of related-party loans or transactions >$120k limits conflict risk .