Andrew Murphy
About Andrew Murphy
Andrew J. Murphy, Ph.D. (age 67) is Executive Vice President, Research at Regeneron, leading core discovery platforms and multiple therapeutic areas; he is a co‑inventor of VelociGene and VelocImmune and has been with Regeneron since 1999, serving as EVP Research since January 2019 . Education: B.S. Molecular Biology (University of Wisconsin) and Ph.D. Human Genetics (Columbia University College of Physicians & Surgeons) . Company performance context during his tenure includes 2024 revenue of $14.2B (+8% YoY) and GAAP diluted EPS up 10% YoY; the board also highlights cumulative TSR of ~3,300% since the 1991 IPO, reflecting long‑term value creation from R&D productivity .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Regeneron | Executive Vice President, Research | 2019–present | Leads discovery platforms and therapeutic focus areas; co‑inventor of VelociGene/VelocImmune |
| Regeneron Laboratories | Senior Vice President, Research | 2013–2018 | Scaled R&D leadership across programs |
| Regeneron | Vice President, Target Discovery | 2005–2012 | Built target discovery capability |
| Regeneron | Vice President, Gene Discovery & Bioinformatics | 2001–2005 | Advanced genomics/data capabilities |
| Regeneron | Director, Genomics & Bioinformatics | 1999–2000 | Established foundational genomics functions |
External Roles
- Not disclosed in the 2025 proxy.
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 (set in Dec-2024) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $750,000 | $776,250 | $803,600 | $819,672 (2.0% merit) |
| Target Bonus (%) | 65% | 65% | 65% | 65% (unchanged) |
| Actual Cash Incentive ($) | $848,250 | $877,939 | $783,510 (Company multiplier 1.5; Personal 1.5; 60/40 weight) |
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Incentive Mechanics (2024)
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout Basis | Vesting/Timing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Corporate Performance Multiplier | 60% | Pre-set goals (R&D, commercial, regulatory) | 1.5 (down from 1.9 in 2023) | Committee framework (milestones plus adjustments) | Paid after year-end |
| Personal Performance Multiplier | 40% | Role-specific contributions | 1.5 | Committee assessment | Paid after year-end |
| Target Dollar ($) | — | $522,340 | $783,510 | Formula: Base×Target%×weighted multipliers | Paid in 2025 for 2024 |
2024 Equity Awards (granted 12/06/2024)
| Instrument | Shares Granted | Grant-Date Fair Value ($) | Exercise/Strike ($) | Close Price on Grant Date ($) | Vesting Schedule |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Options (Non-qualified) | 13,472 | $4,049,729 | $771.64 | $778.00 | 25% per year over 4 years; 10-year term |
| Restricted Stock Awards (RSAs) | 3,499 | $2,699,968 | — | — | 50% on 2nd anniversary; 50% on 4th anniversary |
| Total Year-End Equity (Target Value) | — | $6,750,000 (60% options / 40% RSAs) | — | — | Subject to clawback policy |
Realized Equity Value (2024)
| Metric | Amount |
|---|---|
| Options Exercised (shares) | 40,000 |
| Value Realized on Option Exercises ($) | $26,279,800 |
| RSAs Vested (shares) | 3,029 |
| Value Realized on RSA Vesting ($) | $2,267,791 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Metric | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (shares) | 268,499 total; includes 215,077 options exercisable or within 60 days, 18,778 RSAs, and 4,348 shares in 401(k); less than 1% of common shares outstanding |
| Ownership Guidelines | NEOs must own shares valued at least 2× base salary; CEO/CSO 6×; company prohibits hedging and pledging |
| Insider Trading Policy | Formal insider trading policy; disclosed in 10-K exhibit and summarized in proxy |
| Alignment Indicators | Broad-based equity, long-term vesting, clawback; options deliver value only with post-grant stock appreciation |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Key Terms |
|---|---|
| Change-in-Control Severance Plan | Applies to NEOs (excluding CEO); double-trigger required (termination without cause or for good reason within 2 years after/180 days before CoC) |
| Cash Severance Multiple | 2× (base salary + average cash incentive prior 3 years) |
| Benefits Continuation | Up to 24 months for medical, dental, vision, disability, life; includes tax/financial planning advisory; medical benefits assumed taxable with gross-up under plan |
| Equity Treatment | Double-trigger acceleration; options/RSAs vest as specified; exercise period extension subject to plan limits; PSU treatment differs for CEO/CSO 2020 grant |
| 280G Cutback | Payments reduced to avoid excise tax unless net-of-tax benefit is higher without reduction |
| Restrictive Covenants | Includes one-year non-solicitation of employees; value not ascribed in excise tax analysis |
| Clawback | Broad policy covering incentive compensation; enhanced in 2023 per Nasdaq listing standards |
| Perquisites Policy | Committee-approved senior officer perquisites policy adopted in 2024 |
Estimated CoC Economics (Hypothetical as of 12/31/2024)
| Component | Amount ($) |
|---|---|
| Cash Severance | $3,304,266 |
| Benefits Continuation | $133,507 |
| Value of Accelerated Options/RSAs | $13,626,617 |
| Total | $17,064,390 |
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Murphy’s cash bonus framework is tied to corporate milestones and personal contributions (1.5 multipliers, 60/40 weight), while substantial option/RSAs grants vest over multiple years, supporting long-term retention and alignment .
- Selling pressure vs. retention: 2024 realizations ($26.3M via option exercises; $2.27M RSA vesting) indicate periodic monetization, but sizable unvested RSAs and multi-year vesting on 2024 grants mitigate near-term sell pressure; double-trigger CoC terms further discourage opportunistic departures .
- Governance safeguards: Prohibitions on hedging/pledging, robust clawback, ownership guidelines, and excise tax cutback reduce misalignment and windfall risks; medical benefit gross-up exists under the plan but no excise tax gross-ups (CEO exception only) .
- Execution risk: Committee lowered 2024 corporate multiplier to 1.5 due to missed commercial/regulatory goals (EYLEA HD U.S. net sales target miss; FDA CRLs for odronextamab/linvoseltamab), highlighting sensitivity of incentive outcomes to pipeline execution under Murphy’s research remit .
Overall, Murphy’s incentives are structured to drive long-term R&D outcomes, with retention supported by multi-year equity vesting and CoC protections, while realized exercises suggest ongoing diversification; watch FDA timelines and pivotal readouts for oncology/immunology programs as primary drivers of future payouts and potential insider activity .