Nathan Lowe

About Nathan Lowe

Nathan Lowe is Chief Financial Officer of Reynolds Consumer Products (REYN), appointed in January 2025. He is 45 years old, has been with REYN since 2019 in FP&A and divisional CFO roles, and holds dual bachelor’s degrees in Commerce & Accounting and Applied Finance from Macquarie University; he is a Chartered Accountant . Company performance metrics used to align executive pay include Adjusted EBIT ($549m in FY 2024), net income ($352m), and cumulative TSR ($100 initial investment to $109 in 2024 vs $105 in 2023), which frame Lowe’s pay-for-performance environment as CFO .

Past Roles

External Roles

• Not disclosed in company filings for Nathan Lowe .

Fixed Compensation

• Program architecture (company-wide for NEOs): Base salary plus Annual Incentive Program (AIP) heavily weighted to Adjusted EBIT growth (80%) and Revenue growth (20%). For FY 2024, targets were set to Adjusted EBIT of $527m (103% of FY 2023) and Revenue of $3,850m (102.5% of FY 2023), with payout curves from 25%–200% of target; actual total AIP payout level was 121% of target on combined metrics .

• Best practices: No excise tax gross-ups; limited perquisites; clawback applies to incentive-based pay; non-competition agreement required for equity award eligibility .

Performance Compensation

• Long-Term Incentive (LTI) mix: 50% time-based RSUs (vest 1/3 annually over three years), 50% PSUs (one-year performance period with vesting on the third anniversary) . PSU metrics for FY 2024 were Adjusted EPS Growth (vs 2023) and Free Cash Flow; final PSU attainment was 188% of target (190.9% on Adjusted EPS, 185.7% on FCF, equally weighted) .

• Pay vs performance context: CAP vs TSR/net income/Adjusted EBIT is disclosed in proxy; company-selected measure for CAP is Adjusted EBIT .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

• Stock ownership guidelines: CFOs must hold stock equal to 3x annual base salary; achieve by July 1, 2028 or within 5 years of becoming subject to the guidelines; 50% net share retention until guideline met; 100% retention if below guideline thereafter. RSUs and earned PSUs count; options/unearned PSUs do not .
• Anti-hedging/anti-pledging: Hedging and pledging of company securities are prohibited for employees and directors .
• Clawback: Amended and Restated Compensation Recoupment Policy effective Oct 2, 2023; recovers erroneously awarded incentive compensation for the 3 completed fiscal years preceding a required accounting restatement, via reasonable and prompt methods, subject to Nasdaq exceptions .

Employment Terms

• Employment agreements (NEO program framework): For NEOs (other than the CEO’s amended terms), severance if terminated without cause is 12 months of base salary; if within 12 months post “Sale of Business,” 24 months of base salary plus prorated target annual incentive, with one-year non-competition and non-solicitation covenants; health plan continuation typically 12 months (18 months for CEO under updated agreement) .
• Change in control equity: Equity awards vest and settle upon a change in control; PSUs vest based on likely or actual performance achievement at the discretion of the CNG Committee. In October 2024, future awards for then-CFO (now CEO) were changed to double-trigger vesting; plan default remains single-trigger for others unless modified .

Compensation Structure Analysis

• Heavy weighting to EBIT growth and EPS/FCF PSUs underscores focus on profitability and cash generation—consistent with staples margin expansion agendas and controlled-company oversight. For 2024, AIP paid above target (121%) driven by EBIT outperformance despite revenue modestly below target, while PSUs paid at 188% on EPS and FCF—indicative of strong execution on cost/mix and cash conversion .
• Governance practices include no excise tax gross-ups, anti-hedging/pledging, stock ownership guidelines, and an updated clawback—all supportive of shareholder alignment and risk control .
• Peer benchmarking uses a defined group of CPG/packaging peers (e.g., Clorox, Church & Dwight, Sonoco, Silgan, Pactiv Evergreen, Yeti), targeting ~50th percentile for compensation elements with Pearl Meyer advising; 2024 peer group adjustments reflect market-cap changes .

Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback

• Say-on-pay support was ~99% at the 2024 annual meeting; no material program changes were made in response, indicating high investor acceptance of pay-for-performance structure .
• 2025 proxy includes an advisory vote on 2024 NEO compensation and reaffirms the pay philosophy and governance practices .

Investment Implications

• Alignment: Lowe’s CFO role sits within a rigorously pay-for-performance framework anchored to EBIT, EPS and FCF—metrics that historically drove above-target payouts in 2024 (AIP 121%; PSUs 188%). This signals continuing incentives to expand margins and cash generation, beneficial for equity holders if sustained .
• Risk controls: Anti-hedging/pledging, stock ownership guidelines (3x salary for CFO), and the clawback policy reduce agency risk and insider selling pressure, supporting governance quality and longer-term alignment .
• Transaction dynamics: Plan-level single-trigger CIC vesting can create retention/transaction incentives across the executive team; note the CEO’s move to double-trigger post-2024, but no disclosed modification for other officers, which investors should monitor in future grants to Lowe .
• Governance context: As a controlled company under Nasdaq rules, director nomination rights reside with PFL; compensation oversight remains via the CNG Committee and independent consultant benchmarking, which investors should consider in pay and succession decisions .