Ronald Herrmann
REINSURANCE GROUP OF AMERICAAbout Ronald Herrmann
Ronald “Ron” Herrmann is Executive Vice President and Head of the Americas at RGA, overseeing U.S. Individual Markets (Life, Health, Financial Solutions), U.S. Group Reinsurance, RGA Canada, RGA Latin America, TAI, and Pension Risk Transfer in the Americas; he joined RGA in 2020 and is a Certified Financial Planner with a B.S. in Finance from Penn State . He is 59 years old and has ~5 years of tenure at RGA as of 2025 . RGA’s incentive design ties his pay to enterprise performance: the 2024 Annual Bonus Plan (ABP) was funded 175% based on adjusted operating EPS ($22.57 vs target $19.98), New Business Embedded Value ($1,730m vs target $950m), and adjusted consolidated revenue ($22,107m vs target $22,298m); Herrmann’s ABP paid 200% of target ($1,755,000) . Long-term Performance Contingent Shares (PCS) measure three‑year adjusted operating ROE and three‑year book value per share growth (ex‑AOCI), modified ±20% by relative TSR; for 2022‑2024 the performance factor was 197.4%, driving substantial vesting outcomes .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Equitable | Head of Individual Life and Employee Benefits; Operating Committee member | — | Led growth and product portfolios in U.S. individual and group businesses |
| AXA, Prudential Financial, The Hartford | Senior sales and sales management roles | — | Built deep distribution and transactional expertise across large insurers |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| American Council of Life Insurers (ACLI) | Board of Directors; CEO Steering Committees (Prudential Issues; Reinsurance Executive Council) | — | Policy influence and industry stewardship |
| LL Global | Board of Directors | — | Industry research and standards leadership |
| FINSECA | Member | — | Advocacy and professional development network |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $624,231 | $649,615 | $674,519 |
| ABP Target (% of Salary) | 130% | 130% | 130% |
| ABP Actual Payout ($) | $1,060,970 | $1,300,000 | $1,755,000 |
2025 Compensation Actions for Herrmann:
- Base salary: $700,000 (+3.7%)
- ABP opportunity: 100% minimum, 200% target, 400% maximum of base salary (Adjusted Revenue removed; weights now 65% adjusted operating EPS ex notable items, 35% NBV)
Performance Compensation
Annual Bonus Plan (ABP) – 2024
| Performance Measure | Weight | Minimum | Target | Maximum | Actual Result | Payout Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Operating Income Per Share (ex notable items) | 60% | $15.98 | $19.98 | $23.98 | $22.57 | 98.9% of component; 120% at cap applies at enterprise calc |
| New Business Embedded Value (NBV) ($mm) | 30% | $531 | $950 | $1,370 | $1,730 | 60.0% of component; 144.2% used at enterprise calc |
| Adjusted Consolidated Revenue ($mm) | 10% | $17,839 | $22,298 | $26,758 | $22,107 | 9.8% of component; 120% at cap applies at enterprise calc |
| Enterprise Funding Factor | — | — | — | — | — | 175.0% |
Individual payout (Herrmann):
| Name | ABP Minimum | ABP Target | ABP Maximum | Target ABP ($) | Actual % of Target | Actual ABP ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ronald Herrmann | 65% | 130% | 260% | $877,500 | 200.0% | $1,755,000 |
Long-Term Incentives
- PCS metrics: 3-year average adjusted operating ROE; 3-year BVPS growth (ex‑AOCI); ±20% modifier based on peer relative TSR .
- Vesting: PCS fully vest after three years; RSUs vest ratably over three years (one-third each year); SARs vest ratably over three years (one-third each year) .
Grants of Plan-Based Awards in 2024 (Herrmann):
| Grant Date | ABP Min ($) | ABP Target ($) | ABP Max ($) | PCS Min (#) | PCS Target (#) | PCS Max (#) | RSUs (#) | SARs (#) | SAR Exercise Price | Grant-Date Fair Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3/15/2024 | $438,750 | $877,500 | $1,755,000 | — | 5,465 | 10,930 | 1,822 | 4,967 | $185.28 | $1,012,555 (PCS) ; $337,580 (RSU) ; $337,508 (SAR) |
2024 Vesting/Realization:
| Name | Shares Vested (PCS/RSU) | Value Realized on Vesting ($) | SAR/Option Exercises | Value Realized on Exercise ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ronald Herrmann | 9,385 total; 7,004 PCS; 1,774 2022 RSU; 607 2024 RSU | $1,835,825 | — | $— |
2025 LTI allocations (Herrmann):
- PCS granted: 5,984 shares
- SARs granted: 5,448; RSUs granted: 1,995; both vest ratably over three years
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (12/31/2024) | 15,094 shares; includes 11,772 shares subject to RSUs/SARs exercisable/settling within 60 days; <1% of class; none pledged |
| Outstanding equity awards at 12/31/2024 (Herrmann) | RSUs unvested: 7,006 (grant 12/1/2020; MV $1,496,692), 1,410 (2023; MV $301,218), 1,215 (2024; MV $259,560). PCS unearned: 8,458 (2023; payout value $1,806,883), 5,465 (2024; payout value $1,167,488). SARs unexercised: 2,577 (2021; $129.01, exp 3/11/2031), 3,094 + 1,547 unexercisable (2022; $106.53, exp 3/22/2032), 2,065 + 2,066 unexercisable (2023; $138.34, exp 3/9/2033), 1,655 + 3,312 unexercisable (2024; $185.28, exp 3/15/2034) |
| Stock ownership guidelines | EVP requirement: 2x–5x base salary; executives must retain net shares from SAR/option exercises and PCS/RSU vesting until requirement met |
| Compliance status (12/31/2024) | Herrmann joined Nov 2020; not yet met guideline due to tenure; required to retain net shares until met |
Nonqualified Deferred Compensation (2024):
| Name | Executive Contributions ($) | Registrant Contributions ($) | Aggregate Earnings ($) | Withdrawals/Distributions | Aggregate Balance at FYE ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ronald Herrmann | $53,961 | $134,499 | $34,064 | — | $515,290 |
Pension/Retirement Eligibility:
- Not eligible for Performance Pension Plan or Augmented Plan pension element; vested in savings plans/EDSP; eligible for Savings Plan, Augmented Plan (savings component), and EDSP upon termination .
Employment Terms
- No employment, severance, or change‑of‑control cash agreements for NEOs (including Herrmann) .
- Equity upon change of control: Committee may adjust/accelerate awards; SARs automatically accelerate subject to Committee authority; PCS/RSUs deliver at target post‑period/end of vesting schedule .
- Value of equity upon certain events (Herrmann): Change of Control—Options/SARs $415,128; PCS/RSU (full at target) $4,128,399. Disability/Death—Options/SARs $415,128; PCS/RSU (pro rata) $2,475,401 .
- Clawbacks: NYSE-mandated recoupment policy (mandatory clawback on restatements) and Executive Incentive Recoupment Policy (intentional misconduct, materially inaccurate metrics, reputational injury, Code violations; up to 4 years) apply to awards; integrated into Flexible Stock Plan .
- Perquisites: No personal-benefit perqs (aircraft, cars, club dues) in U.S.; Herrmann’s perqs < $10,000 in 2024 .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment is strong: Herrmann’s 2024 ABP paid 200% of target on robust enterprise results, especially adjusted operating EPS and NBV; PCS metrics emphasize 3-year ROE and BVPS growth with a relative TSR modifier, anchoring multi-year value creation .
- Retention risk appears contained: Significant unvested RSUs/PCS and multi-year SARs create ongoing vesting through 2026–2027; RGA’s ownership guidelines require net-share retention until compliance, reducing near-term selling pressure despite annual vesting .
- Change-of-control equity exposure: Herrmann’s COC equity value ($4.54m combined PCS/RSU and SARs) indicates meaningful acceleration sensitivity; absence of cash COC/severance agreements limits fixed payouts and governance risk .
- Insider activity signal: 2024 showed no SAR/option exercises by Herrmann and substantial PCS/RSU vesting ($1.84m value realized), consistent with performance-cycle settlement rather than discretionary selling; coupled with retention requirements, this suggests neutral selling pressure from personal transactions .
- Governance and clawbacks: Dual recoupment frameworks (NYSE-required and discretionary policy) mitigate pay risk from restatements or misconduct, supportive of investor confidence in incentive integrity .
Herrmann’s compensation levers emphasize long-duration value creation (ROE/BVPS growth with TSR overlay) and enterprise outcomes (EPS/NBV), with policy features that temper liquidity-driven selling. For equity holders, this translates to incentives aligned with profitable growth and book value compounding, while limiting misaligned COC cash outcomes.