
Olivier Loeillot
About Olivier Loeillot
Olivier Loeillot is President, Chief Executive Officer, and a director of Repligen Corporation (appointed CEO and elected to the Board effective September 1, 2024). He is 55, joined Repligen in October 2023 as President and Chief Commercial Officer, and previously held leadership roles at Ascensus Specialties, Cytiva/GE Healthcare Life Sciences, and Lonza. He holds a Master’s in Chemistry (European High Institute of Chemistry, Strasbourg) and an MBA (CESMA Business School of EM Lyon) . Repligen’s 2024 adjusted revenue was $634.8M (adjusted from $634.4M reported), adjusted EPS was $1.42 versus a $1.50 target (company objectives achieved at 94.2%), net income was $(25.5)M, and adjusted gross margin expanded by 140 bps YoY; a $100 investment 12/31/2019→12/31/2024 equated to $156 (company TSR shown for context) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ascensus Specialties | Chief Executive Officer | Not disclosed | Led specialty chemicals serving life sciences/pharma |
| Cytiva (Danaher) | Bioprocess President | 2018–2022 | Oversaw end‑to‑end Bioprocessing portfolio; built Enterprise Solutions; led Bioprocess Asia |
| GE Healthcare Life Sciences | Various leadership roles | Part of 12 years combined with Cytiva | Directed Genomics and Cellular Research division |
| Lonza | VP Sales, Custom Manufacturing; led Microbial Biopharmaceuticals | 12 years | Commercial leadership in biologics manufacturing |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Repligen Corporation | Director | Since 2024 | CEO and director; not independent per Nasdaq standards |
| Other public company boards | — | — | None disclosed for Loeillot |
Board service and governance notes:
- Committee memberships: None listed for Loeillot (CEO is not on Audit/Comp/N&CG committees). Board committees are fully independent directors .
- Independence: Board determined all nominees except CEO (Loeillot) and Executive Chair (Hunt) are independent .
- Leadership structure and dual-role implications: CEO is separate from Executive Chair and a Lead Independent Director is in place; independent director executive sessions occur at each Board meeting. This structure mitigates concentration of power and enhances oversight during leadership transition .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $138,462 | $650,000 (annualized $600k as CCO Jan–Aug, $750k as CEO Sep–Dec) |
| Target Bonus (%) | 75% (CCO) | 85% (CEO as of Sep 1, 2024); 75% (CCO Jan–Aug) |
| Non-Equity Incentive Paid ($) | — | $494,625 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | — | $5,000 (401k match) |
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Incentive Plan (2024)
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Payout Basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Revenue | 50% | $567.0M (90%) | $630.0M | $756.0M (120%) | $634.8M | Contributed to 94.2% company achievement |
| Adjusted EPS (FD) | 50% | 70% of target | $1.50 | 130% of target | $1.42 (adjusted for FX, acquisition, investment income, restatement effects) | Contributed to 94.2% company achievement |
| Individual Performance (CCO portion Jan–Aug) | 25% of CCO bonus | — | 100% | 200% | 110% | Determined by Compensation Committee |
Notes:
- CEO bonus tied solely to company objectives during CEO tenure; CCO tenure included 25% individual objectives, achieved at 110%, prorated across roles .
- Company objectives achievement calculated at 94.2% for 2024 .
Long‑Term Equity Incentives (structure)
- Target mix: 50% time‑based RSUs, 25% stock options (time‑vest), 25% PSUs (performance‑vest over 3 years, 50% Base Organic Revenue Growth, 50% Adjusted ROIC) .
- 2022 PSU program (3‑yr period ending 12/31/2024) paid 0% due to underachievement on Base Organic Growth and Adjusted ROIC (10.9% vs 15% threshold; 3.7% vs 11.5% threshold) .
2024 Grants to Olivier Loeillot
| Grant Date | Type | Units | Exercise Price | Fair Value ($) | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2/27/2024 | Options | 2,860 | $192.71 | $279,084 | 3 equal annual tranches 2025–2027 |
| 2/27/2024 | RSUs | 2,880 | — | $555,005 | 3 equal annual tranches 2025–2027 |
| 2/27/2024 | PSUs (target) | 1,440 | — | $277,502 | Cliff vest on 2/27/2027 subject to 2024–2026 goals |
| 9/3/2024 | Options | 16,278 | $141.79 | $1,173,364 | 3 equal annual tranches 2025–2027 |
| 9/3/2024 | RSUs | 17,631 | — | $2,499,900 | 3 equal annual tranches 2025–2027 |
| 9/3/2024 | PSUs (target) | 8,815 | — | $1,249,879 | Cliff vest on 9/3/2027 subject to 2024–2026 goals |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (as of March 7, 2025) | 22,617 shares; includes 5,800 options exercisable within 60 days; <1% of outstanding shares (56,148,556) |
| Outstanding Awards (12/31/2024) | Options: 4,847 exercisable; 19,389 unexercisable (10/2/2023 grant). Additional unexercisable options from 2/27/2024 (2,860) and 9/3/2024 (16,278). RSUs: 10,325 (10/2/2023), 2,880 (2/27/2024), 17,631 (9/3/2024). PSUs: 720 (2/27/2024), 4,408 (9/3/2024) |
| Market Value of Unvested RSUs (12/31/2024) | 10,325 RSUs: $1,486,181; 2,880 RSUs: $414,547; 17,631 RSUs: $2,537,806 (based on $143.94 closing price) |
| Ownership Guidelines | CEO must hold 5x base salary within 5 years; directors 4x annual cash retainer; NEOs 1x salary. All directors and NEOs comply or are on track |
| Hedging/Pledging | Anti‑hedging and anti‑pledging policy; pledging requires Audit Committee pre‑approval; margin accounts prohibited |
| Insider Trading Controls | Quarterly blackout policies and clawback policy adopted October 2023 |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Base Case | Change‑in‑Control (Double Trigger) |
|---|---|---|
| Salary/Bonus | Base salary $750,000; target bonus 85% of salary | Lump‑sum 2.0x (salary + target bonus); pro‑rata target bonus |
| Equity Acceleration | If terminated without cause or resigns for good reason: 100% of unvested equity from initial hire accelerates; 50% of all other time‑based awards accelerate; PSUs vest pro‑rata at end of period based on actual performance; vested options exercisable up to 1 year | If awards assumed/continued/substituted: all equity awards accelerate and vest; PSUs treated at greater of target or actual performance. If awards not assumed, 100% of time‑based awards and all PSUs accelerate at greater of target or actual |
| COBRA | Company pays COBRA premiums up to 18 months (base and CIC scenarios) | |
| Disability/Death | Pro‑rata vesting of time‑based awards; PSUs pro‑rata vest based on actual performance; vested options exercisable up to 1 year | |
| Clawback | Compensation recovery for restatements (3 years look‑back) | |
| Tax Gross‑Ups | None provided under 280G/409A; no tax gross‑ups |
Additional severance valuation tables (intrinsic value) are disclosed for hypotheticals as of 12/31/2024, illustrating base continuation, equity acceleration, and COBRA; e.g., CIC double‑trigger valuation for Loeillot totaled $5.65M at that date context (2.0x cash comp, pro‑rata bonus, equity acceleration, COBRA) .
Compensation Committee & Peer Group
- Committee composition: Independent directors; current members include Barthelemy, Mhatre, Muir, Pax; Chair: Pax (effective Feb 2025). Committee met 4 times in FY2024 .
- Independent consultant: Meridian Compensation Partners assists on benchmarking and design; committee found no conflicts of interest .
- 2024 benchmarking peer group (17 companies), including Azenta, Bio‑Rad, Bruker, Bio‑Techne, Insulet, Medpace, Natera, Neogen, Waters, Halozyme, NeoGenomics, 10x Genomics, Mesa Labs, Avid Bioservices, Quanterix, NovaCure (listed as NovaCure Limited, Inc.), Maravai LifeSciences .
- Say‑on‑Pay support: 2023 approval ~94%; annual say‑on‑pay proposed for 2025 .
Director Compensation (context for dual role)
Non‑employee director retainer: $60,000; Lead Independent Director additional $45,000; committee chair/member fees disclosed; annual equity grants of $240,000 ($275,000 Chair) split 50% RSUs / 50% options, vesting in ~1 year .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: CEO pay mix is equity‑heavy (RSUs/options/PSUs) with PSUs tied to three‑year Base Organic Growth and Adjusted ROIC, reinforcing long‑term value creation; 2022 PSU forfeitures signal challenging targets and reduced windfall risk .
- Near‑term selling pressure risk: Large time‑based RSU/option tranches vest annually each September (2025–2027) from 9/3/2024 grants; monitor Form 4s around vest dates and blackout windows for potential selling pressure .
- Ownership skin‑in‑the‑game: Beneficial ownership is modest (<1%); guidelines require 5x salary within five years, supporting progressive alignment but potentially slow accumulation given award structures .
- Change‑in‑control economics: Double‑trigger 2.0x cash plus full equity acceleration if assumed, PSUs at ≥target/actual; meaningful protection could influence negotiation stance in strategic events .
- Governance mitigants: Separation of CEO and Executive Chair roles with Lead Independent Director and independent committees reduce dual‑role independence concerns; robust anti‑hedging/pledging and clawback policies lower governance risk .
- Company performance context: 2024 adjusted revenue achieved, EPS below target leading to 94.2% payout for company objectives; margins expanded (+140 bps) despite net loss, indicating operational efficiency improvements amid headwinds .
Appendix: Key Outstanding Awards and Vesting Detail (Olivier Loeillot)
| Award | Units | Vesting Dates (equal or cliff) |
|---|---|---|
| 10/2/2023 Options (Exercisable/Unexercisable) | 4,847 / 19,389 | 10/2/2024, 10/2/2025, 10/2/2026, 10/2/2027, 10/2/2028 |
| 10/2/2023 RSUs | 10,325 | 10/2/2024–10/2/2028 annual |
| 2/27/2024 Options | 2,860 | 2/27/2025–2/27/2027 annual |
| 2/27/2024 RSUs | 2,880 | 2/27/2025–2/27/2027 annual |
| 2/27/2024 PSUs (target) | 720 | Cliff at 2/27/2027; 2024–2026 performance |
| 9/3/2024 Options | 16,278 | 9/3/2025–9/3/2027 annual |
| 9/3/2024 RSUs | 17,631 | 9/3/2025–9/3/2027 annual |
| 9/3/2024 PSUs (target) | 4,408 | Cliff at 9/3/2027; 2024–2026 performance |
Related policies: No re‑pricing of underwater options without shareholder approval; clawback policy adopted Oct 2023 .
Disclosures and Governance
- Related party transactions: None >$120k since Jan 1, 2024 beyond compensation arrangements .
- Section 16(a): Company noted an administrative error for a director (corrected), no issues disclosed for Loeillot .
- Board meetings: Board met six times in FY2024; directors generally 100% attendance with one exception (committee attendance) .
Investment Implications
- Expect equity‑driven compensation to tie realized pay to multi‑year operating performance; monitor Base Organic Growth and Adjusted ROIC trends for PSU vesting outcomes .
- Potential overhang from sizable annual vesting tranches through 2027; watch insider trading windows and any Rule 10b5‑1 plans to gauge supply risk .
- Governance structure and independence mitigants reduce dual‑role concerns; continued high say‑on‑pay support (~94%) suggests investor acceptance of pay design, but EPS under‑target in 2024 could temper payouts and support discipline .