Brian J. Fisher
About Brian J. Fisher
Brian J. Fisher (age 41) is Executive Vice President and Chief Strategy and Development Officer at Regional Management Corp. (RM) since September 2020; he previously served as General Counsel and Secretary from January 2013 to September 2020. He holds a B.A. in Economics from Furman University and a J.D. from the University of South Carolina School of Law . Company performance in 2024 included record revenue of $589 million (+6.7% y/y) and net income of $41.2 million, driving annual incentive payouts at 112.3% of target; the Company’s 2022–2024 cumulative TSR was -26.3%, resulting in a 64% payout of 2022 PRSUs .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Regional Management Corp. | General Counsel and Secretary | 2013–2020 | Not disclosed |
| Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice LLP (now Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP) | Attorney (Corporate & Securities) | 2009–2013 | Not disclosed |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| None disclosed | — | — | — |
Fixed Compensation
Multi-year compensation summary (Fisher):
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | 412,000 | 412,000 | 412,000 |
| Stock Awards ($) | 674,919 | 674,968 | 674,978 |
| Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation ($) | 445,422 | 520,800 | 462,676 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 37,589 | 70,744 | 55,421 |
| Total ($) | 1,569,930 | 1,678,512 | 1,605,075 |
Base salary and target bonus:
| Year | Base Salary ($) | Target Bonus (% of Salary) |
|---|---|---|
| 2023 | 412,000 | 100% |
| 2024 | 412,000 | 100% |
| 2025 | 412,000 | 100% |
Performance Compensation
2024 Annual Incentive Program (AIP) metrics, targets, actuals, and payout:
| Metric | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Weight | Payout % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-Provision Net Income ($000s) | 31,343 | 44,776 | 53,731 | 50,452 | 15.0% | 19.8% |
| Pre-Provision ROA (%) | 2.07% | 2.43% | 2.79% | 2.79% | 15.0% | 22.3% |
| Average Finance Receivables ($000s) | 1,617,580 | 1,797,311 | 1,977,042 | 1,788,481 | 15.0% | 14.6% |
| Net Credit Losses (% AFR) | 12.33% | 10.72% | 9.11% | 11.19% | 15.0% | 12.8% |
| G&A as % of Revenue | 46.53% | 43.28% | 40.03% | 42.09% | 15.0% | 17.8% |
| Qualitative Component | N/A | N/A | N/A | Paid 100% | 25.0% | 25.0% |
| Total AIP Payout | — | — | — | — | 100.0% | 112.3% |
Fisher’s AIP awards:
| Year | Eligible Base ($) | Target % | Target ($) | Actual ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 412,000 | 100% | 412,000 | 462,676 |
| 2025 (target) | 412,000 | 100% | 412,000 | N/A |
2024 Long-Term Incentive (LTI) awards granted to Fisher:
| Award Type | Grant Date | Threshold (#) | Target (#) | Maximum (#) | Grant Date Fair Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PRSU (absolute TSR) | 6/3/2024 | 6,438 | 12,876 | 19,314 | 337,480 |
| RSA (time-based) | 6/3/2024 | — | 11,968 | — | 337,498 |
2024 PRSU design and vesting terms:
- Metric: Absolute cumulative TSR over 3-year performance period (June 3, 2024–June 3, 2027); vesting date Dec 31, 2026; 1-year post-vest holding to Dec 31, 2027 .
- Performance schedule: Threshold -20% TSR → 50% payout; Target +20% TSR → 100% payout; Maximum +50% TSR → 150% payout; linear interpolation between points .
2025 PRSU redesign (Stockholder feedback response):
- Metric: Relative TSR vs custom 131-company peer set (S&P SmallCap 600 Financials + select peers); Target at 55th percentile; Maximum ≥80th percentile (150% payout) .
- Modifier: Additive pre-provision ROA over 2025–2027 can adjust payout ±20%, capped at 170% total; vesting Dec 31, 2027 with 1-year holding .
Historical PRSU payout (2012–2024 performance period):
| Program | Final TSR | Payout (% of target) |
|---|---|---|
| 2022 PRSU (performance period 2022–2024) | -26.3% | 64.1% |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial ownership and guideline compliance:
| Holder | Shares Beneficially Owned | % Outstanding | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brian J. Fisher | 123,990 | 1.2% | Includes 73,672 options exercisable within 60 days |
Stock ownership policy and pledging/hedging:
- Stock ownership guideline: 2x base salary for NEOs; retention of 50% of net shares for 12 months and until guidelines met; all covered employees in compliance as of Dec 31, 2024 .
- Prohibitions: Hedging and pledging of Company stock are prohibited; shares subject to retention requirements may not be pledged .
Outstanding equity at 12/31/2024 (Fisher):
| Award | Quantity | Value/Terms |
|---|---|---|
| Options (Exercisable) | 12,379 @ $17.08 exp 03/29/26; 8,918 @ $19.99 exp 03/15/27; 8,071 @ $28.25 exp 02/07/28; 11,081 @ $27.89 exp 02/06/29; 18,828 @ $16.66 exp 03/26/30; 14,395 @ $30.22 exp 02/04/31 | Exercise prices and expirations as noted |
| Unvested RSA (2014–2024 grants) | 3,686 shares (market value $125,250) | Vests 3 equal tranches: 12/31/2023–2025 |
| Unvested RSA (2023 grant) | 7,979 shares (market value $271,126) | Vests 3 equal tranches: 12/31/2024–2026 |
| Earned PRSU (2022 program) | 4,151 units (market value $141,051) | Vested 12/31/2024; 1-year hold to 12/31/2025 |
| PRSU (2023 program, at target) | 10,416 units (market value $353,936) | Performance period ends 6/14/2026; vest 12/31/2025; hold to 12/31/2026 |
| PRSU (2024 program, at target) | 12,876 units (market value $437,526) | Performance period ends 6/3/2027; vest 12/31/2026; hold to 12/31/2027 |
| Shares Acquired on Vesting (2024) | 18,931 shares; value realized $598,708 | PRSUs remain subject to 1-year hold (to 12/31/2025) |
Employment Terms
Severance and change-in-control economics (Severance Plan effective 4/6/2023):
- Multiples: Non-CIC “qualifying termination” (good reason or without cause) = 1x salary + 1x average bonus; CIC window (6 months before or 12 months after) = 2x salary + 2x average bonus; pro-rata current-year bonus; COBRA reimburse up to 12 months; outplacement up to $25k; 30-day notice or salary in-lieu .
- Equity treatment: Pro-rata vesting for termination without cause/good reason/disability/death; double-trigger CIC accelerates options/RSA/RSU; PRSUs accelerate at target on double-trigger CIC .
- Restrictive covenants: Non-compete and non-solicit for 1 year (2 years for CEO); confidentiality and non-disparagement; clawback and recoupment policies apply .
Scenario values as of 12/31/2024 (Fisher):
| Scenario | Notice Pay ($) | Severance ($) | Annual Incentive ($) | LTI Vesting ($) | Other Benefits ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Qualifying termination (non-CIC) | 33,863 | 773,049 | 462,676 | 508,817 | 25,533 | 1,803,938 |
| Qualifying termination (CIC) | 33,863 | 1,546,098 | 462,676 | 1,232,225 | 25,533 | 3,300,395 |
| Death | — | — | 462,676 | 508,817 | — | 971,493 |
Clawbacks and perquisites:
- Dodd-Frank compliant clawback policy (2023) for restatements over a 3-year recovery period; supplemental policy for covenant violations and certain restatements; no excise tax gross-ups .
- 2024 perquisites (for Fisher): dividends ($31,009), 401(k) match ($13,800), optional annual health screening ($3,446), long-term disability insurance benefits ($7,166) .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix and at-risk pay: Fisher’s 2024 compensation emphasized variable AIP and LTI; AIP paid at 112.3% on objective targets and qualitative achievements; 2022 PRSUs paid 64% on negative TSR, demonstrating payout sensitivity to performance .
- Program changes: After 68% say-on-pay support in 2024, PRSUs shifted from absolute TSR to relative TSR with an ROA modifier starting 2025, raising rigor and alignment with shareholder preferences .
- Ownership alignment: 1.2% beneficial ownership and compliance with 2x salary stock guideline; mandatory post-vest hold and prohibition on hedging/pledging mitigate short-term selling pressure .
Performance & Track Record
- 2024 operating highlights: Net finance receivables +$121 million (+6.8%), revenue $589 million (+6.7% y/y), operating expense ratio improved to 13.8%, net income $41.2 million, diluted EPS $4.14; AIP metrics met or exceeded most targets .
- Capital actions: $30 million repurchase authorization; $16 million returned via dividends and buybacks; fixed-rate debt 79% with 4.1% weighted coupon .
- TSR context: Company TSR “value of $100” rose to 130.77 in 2024 vs 92.44 in 2023; peer index 156.47 in 2024 .
Compensation Peer Group & Governance Signals
- 2025 peer group: 16 consumer/specialty finance peers (e.g., Credit Acceptance, Enova, Green Dot, Upstart); removed OneMain (size) and CURO (bankruptcy) from prior peer set .
- Positioning: No specific percentile target; base salaries assessed as 14th–36th percentile in 2024 benchmarking; program overseen by independent Compensation Committee with FW Cook as advisor .
Equity Ownership & Alignment (Skin-in-the-Game) – Additional Detail
- Stock ownership and retention policy: 2x base salary for NEOs; retain 50% of net shares for 12 months and until guidelines met; all compliant as of 12/31/2024 .
- Hedging/pledging: Explicitly prohibited; retention shares may not be pledged .
Employment Terms – Additional Mechanics
- Double-trigger CIC: Equity awards accelerate (PRSUs at target) on termination without cause or for good reason within 6 months before or 12 months after CIC .
- Non-compete/non-solicit: One year (two years for CEO) post-termination; benefits contingent on release and compliance .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Program now ties LTI to relative TSR with an internal ROA modifier, increasing pay-for-performance rigor and potentially improving say-on-pay outcomes; Fisher’s equity holdings, mandatory holds, and anti-hedging/pledging policies strengthen alignment with long-term shareholders .
- Retention risk: Severance economics (~$1.8 million non-CIC; ~$3.3 million CIC at 12/31/2024) and continued vesting/pro-rata treatment on certain separations reduce near-term transition risk; double-trigger CIC provisions protect continuity while capping PRSU acceleration at target .
- Trading signals: 2024 vesting delivered 18,931 shares with a 1-year hold to Dec 31, 2025 and 50% net-share retention requirements, tempering sell pressure; upcoming tranches (RSAs in 2025–2026; PRSU potential vest in 2025–2026–2027) should be monitored around vest dates for liquidity dynamics .
- Performance sensitivity: AIP paid 112.3% on improved operating results, but historical PRSU payout at 64% on negative TSR underscores downside risk in equity-linked pay—credible signal that awards can and do decrease when TSR underperforms .