David Marra
RENAISSANCERE HOLDINGSAbout David Marra
Executive Vice President and Group Chief Underwriting Officer at RenaissanceRe (RNR); age 50; over 25 years of insurance/reinsurance experience including 15+ years in Bermuda, with prior actuarial and underwriting roles . Joined RenaissanceRe in 2008; promoted to EVP & Group Chief Underwriting Officer effective January 2023 and previously President of Renaissance Reinsurance U.S. Inc. (RRUSI) . Company performance during his current tenure has been strong: 2024 net income $1.8B, ROAE 19.3%, underwriting income $1.6B, combined ratio 83.9%, and gross premiums written $11.7B; tangible book value per share plus accumulated dividends grew 26.0% in 2024 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| RenaissanceRe Holdings Ltd. | EVP & Group Chief Underwriting Officer | 2023–present | Leads underwriting strategy across risk appetite, client engagement, product and business development . |
| Renaissance Reinsurance U.S. Inc. (RRUSI) | Chief Executive Officer | Effective Jan 1, 2023 | Oversees U.S. underwriting platform; aligns with RNR’s integrated system and portfolio construction . |
| Renaissance Reinsurance U.S. Inc. (RRUSI) | President | 2016–Jan 2023 | Built the U.S. platform, strengthened client/broker relationships across underwriting book . |
| RenaissanceRe Holdings Ltd. | SVP & Chief Underwriting Officer – Casualty & Specialty | 2014–2022 | Grew Casualty & Specialty into an industry-leading franchise . |
| RenaissanceRe Holdings Ltd. | Vice President | Joined 2008 | Progression through underwriting leadership roles . |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $700,000 | $900,000 (increase in Nov 2024 to reflect role scale post-Validus) |
| Target Annual Bonus (% of Salary) | 150% | 150% |
| Actual Annual Bonus Paid ($) | $1,911,000 | $2,376,000 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive (2024 design and outcome)
| Metric | Weight | Target/Mechanics | Actual | Payout (% of Target) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Operating ROE vs target | 50% | Company-set target; CAPM-based approach | 28.8% achieved; 2.76x target | 200% |
| GPW vs Budget | 20% | Budget set for ~39% YoY growth | $11.7B; 100.6% of budget | 103% |
| Strategic goals | 30% | Board-approved strategic plan objectives | Score 2.65 | 185% |
| Bonus Pool Funding | — | — | — | 176% overall factor |
Long-Term Incentives (grants and structures)
| Grant | Grant Date | Type | Target Value ($) | Target Shares | Performance Metrics | Performance Period | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual LTI | 3/1/2024 | Performance Shares | $874,862 | 3,917 | 75% avg change in BVPS+div; 25% 3-yr underwriting expense ratio rank | FY2024–FY2026 | Cliff at end of service period, subject to metric achievement |
| Annual LTI | 3/1/2024 | Time-Vested Restricted Shares | $874,862 | 3,917 | Service-based | — | Four substantially equal annual installments starting 3/1/2025 |
| Performance Recognition Award | 11/7/2023 | Performance Shares | $749,814 | — | Same metric set as annual PS; focus on integration value creation | 1/1/2024–12/31/2026 | Earn-out per metrics; cliff vest |
Historical PSU Payout
| PSU Cycle | Metric outcome | Payout |
|---|---|---|
| 2022–2024 | Avg BVPS+div three-year 27.4% (target 7.0%); avg underwriting expense ratio rank 31.0% (9th of 13) | 180% of target |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total beneficial ownership | 90,723 common shares as of March 5, 2025 |
| Unvested equity | 14,647 time-vested restricted shares not yet vested; 30,749 performance shares eligible at maximum |
| Stock ownership guidelines | 4.5x target salary for NEOs; in 2025 changed to exclude unearned performance shares from ownership value |
| Compliance status | As of Dec 31, 2024, all NEOs met guidelines except Ms. Bender (grandfathered; not required to buy shares) |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited; insider trading policy restricts trading outside windows or without approved 10b5-1 plans |
| Options | No options outstanding or exercised; equity mix is restricted and performance shares |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms |
|---|---|
| Contract term | One-year term with automatic extension; Marra requires 90 days’ notice to not renew |
| Non-compete & non-solicit | 12 months post-termination (Company may elect to extend via severance consideration); standard confidentiality and invention assignment |
| Severance (qualifying termination) | Installment Percent 75% of salary+bonus over 12 months; Lump Sum Percent 25% of salary+bonus after 12 months; pro-rata target bonus; 12 months of health benefits; time-vested equity vests; performance shares follow actual performance |
| Change-in-control (double-trigger) | Multiples increase to 150% (installment) and 50% (lump sum); accelerated vesting per plan if awards not assumed; otherwise vest on qualifying termination |
| Clawback | Dodd-Frank/NYSE-compliant clawback for incentive comp on restatements; additional clawback/setoff remedies for misconduct |
| Tax gross-ups | None on perquisites; executives pay imputed income taxes |
| Pre-paid non-compete consideration | $75,000 reported in 2024 for Marra under Section 457A structure; subject to clawback on cause or covenant breach |
Estimated Payments (as of 12/31/2024)
| Scenario | Total Estimated ($) |
|---|---|
| Termination without cause (pre-CIC) | $10,543,492 |
| Termination without cause (post-CIC) | $13,819,492 |
| Non-extension by Company | $1,550,141 |
| Executive resignation without good reason | $200,141 |
| Death | $8,717,351 |
| Disability | $8,167,492 |
Performance Compensation — Plan Detail
| Component | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout mechanics |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Operating ROE vs target | 50% | CAPM-derived target; threshold 0.5x target; maximum ≥1.5x target | 28.8% achieved; 2.76x target | 200% payout on this component |
| GPW vs Budget | 20% | 70% threshold; 100% target; ≥120% maximum | $11.7B; 100.6% of budget | 103% payout |
| Strategic accomplishments | 30% | Score 0.9/1.8/≥2.8 map to 10%/100%/200% | Score 2.65 | 185% payout |
| Total bonus factor | — | — | — | 176% applied to individual target bonus |
Other Compensation & Perquisites (indicative 2024)
- Personal travel (corporate aircraft, executive physical travel, limited spousal travel): $145,661 .
- Company 401(k)/pension match: $20,700 .
- Life insurance premiums: $1,932 (death benefit up to $750,000 for U.S.-based employees) .
- “No tax gross-ups” on perquisites; imputed income applies .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment is high: NEO at-risk pay 76–80% and CEO 87%, with bonus metrics skewed 70% to financial outcomes and 30% to strategic goals; 2024 bonus funded at 176% on strong results, indicating upside sensitivity to underwriting/investment performance .
- Retention risk appears contained: salary increased to $900k in Nov 2024 to reflect post-Validus scale, robust severance/change-in-control protections (75%/25% pre-CIC; 150%/50% post-CIC), and multi-year equity with 3–5 year vesting; management governance committee perquisites support Bermuda-based leadership continuity .
- Trading signal from vesting schedules: multiple unvested restricted grants (2021–2024) vest annually through 2028, plus performance share cliffs in 2025–2026; while hedging/pledging are prohibited, periodic vesting could create incremental supply if shares are sold for tax/liquidity, warranting monitoring around March/February vest dates .
- Ownership alignment: 90,723 shares beneficially owned with additional unvested equity; executives must hold 4.5x target salary and cannot hedge/pledge; 2025 guideline tightened to exclude unearned performance shares—reducing leverage to awards not yet earned .
- Governance/comp feedback: 2024 say-on-pay support at 72% prompted simplification toward absolute ROE and higher financial weighting—reducing peer dependency and potential volatility from IFRS 17 comparability issues; suggests ongoing responsiveness to shareholder input .