Robert Qutub
RENAISSANCERE HOLDINGSAbout Robert Qutub
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of RenaissanceRe since August 2016; age 63; prior CFO roles at MSCI and segment CFO roles at Bank of America; U.S. Marine Corps veteran; director at USAA Federal Savings Bank since June 2014 . Company performance under current leadership: 2024 net income available to common shareholders $1.8B, ROAE 19.3%, gross premiums written $11.7B, adjusted operating ROE 28.8%, and 2014–2024 TSR CAGR 10.9% .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| MSCI Inc. | Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer | 2012–2016 | Led finance for a global index/risk analytics firm, aligning capital allocation to growth . |
| Bank of America | Segment CFO roles | 1994–2012 | Managed finance across multiple segments amid regulatory and market cycles . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| USAA Federal Savings Bank | Director | 2014–present | Oversight of a major retail bank’s risk and governance . |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | 650,000 | 668,750 | 675,000 |
| Stock Awards ($, grant-date FV) | 1,624,832 | 2,774,459 | 1,687,186 |
| Non-Equity Incentive ($) | 1,179,750 | 1,842,750 | 1,782,000 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 530,932 | 610,196 | 590,804 |
| Total ($) | 3,985,514 | 5,896,155 | 4,734,990 |
| 2024 Perquisites Detail | Amount ($) |
|---|---|
| Company 401(k)/Pension Match | 20,700 |
| Life Insurance Premiums | 2,370 |
| Personal Travel (incl. aircraft and exec physicals) | 209,730 |
| Housing Allowance | 338,004 |
| Other Benefits | 20,000 |
| Total All Other Compensation | 590,804 |
| Annual Bonus Target (% of Salary) | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Qutub | 150% | 150% |
Notable policies: no tax gross-ups on perquisites, anti-hedging/anti-pledging, clawback policy, and insider trading windows/10b5-1 plan governance .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Program (2024)
| Component | Weighting | Target | Actual/Payout |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Operating ROE vs target | 50% | Target 10.44% | Actual 28.8% |
| Ratio of Gross Premiums Written to Budget | 20% | Budgeted GWP (100%) | Actual $11.7B (100.6%) |
| Strategic Goals & Objectives (Board-approved) | 30% | Pre-set | Achieved; overall bonus factor 176% of target |
| Qutub Annual Incentive ($) | — | Target $1,012,500 | Paid $1,782,000 (176% of target) |
Design changes in 2024: simplified metrics (removed relative peer metrics), increased financial weighting to 70% .
Long-Term Incentive Awards (Granted March 1, 2024; approved Feb 6, 2024)
| Award Type | Shares/Units | Vesting Schedule | Performance Metrics |
|---|---|---|---|
| Time-Vested Restricted Shares | 3,777 | 4-year, equal annual installments (service-based) | n/a |
| Performance Shares (threshold/target/max) | 1,321 / 3,777 / 7,554 | 3-year performance period; service through 12/31/2026 | 75% avg change in book value + dividends; 25% avg underwriting expense ratio rank vs peers |
2024 vesting realized: 13,238 shares vested for Qutub; value realized $3,057,289; no options outstanding or exercised in 2024 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Amount |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (common shares) | 82,859 shares |
| % of Shares Outstanding | ~0.17% (82,859 / 49,004,247) |
| Unvested Time-Vested Restricted Shares | 10,110 shares |
| Performance Shares eligible at max (unearned) | 42,377 shares |
| Shares Outstanding (record date 3/5/2025) | 49,004,247 |
| Stock Ownership Guideline | 4.5x target salary for NEOs |
| Compliance Status | All NEOs met guidelines as of 12/31/2024, except Bender; Qutub compliant |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited by policy |
Ownership policy change (2025): unearned performance shares no longer count toward ownership value .
Employment Terms
| Term | Detail |
|---|---|
| Role Start Date | Executive VP & CFO since August 2016 |
| Agreement Term | One-year term auto-renews absent 30 days’ notice by either party (Qutub) |
| Non-Compete/Non-Interference | 12 months post-termination; for Qutub, extended beyond resignation without good reason/non-renewal only if Company elects to pay Installment/Lump Sum salary percentages |
| Severance Structure | Installment Percent 75% of salary+bonus; Lump Sum Percent 25% of salary+bonus; doubles to 150%/50% if qualifying termination within 12 months post-change-in-control (double trigger) |
| Benefits | 12 months health benefits continuation; pro rata target bonus on termination; certain award vesting per agreement |
Potential Payments (as of 12/31/2024; closing price $248.81 used in calc)
| Scenario | Salary ($) | Bonus ($) | Accelerated Vesting ($) | Life Insurance ($) | Health ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination without Cause / Good Reason (pre-CIC) | 675,000 | 2,794,500 | 8,277,660 | — | 54,913 | 11,802,073 |
| Termination without Cause / Good Reason (post-CIC, double trigger) | 1,350,000 | 4,576,500 | 8,277,660 | — | 54,913 | 14,259,073 |
| Non-Extension by Executive | 675,000 | 1,012,500 | — | — | 54,913 | 1,742,413 |
| Resignation without Good Reason | 675,000 | — | — | — | 54,913 | 729,913 |
| Death | — | 1,012,500 | 8,277,660 | 795,000 | — | 10,085,160 |
| Disability | 675,000 | 1,012,500 | 8,277,660 | — | 54,913 | 10,020,073 |
Clawback applies to incentive compensation; no excise tax gross-ups; no option repricing; performance shares do not vest if threshold unmet .
Compensation Committee & Peer Group
- Governance and Human Capital Committee (comp committee): Henry Klehm (Chair), David Bushnell, Cynthia Trudell; independent consultant Mercer engaged; no interlocks or insider participation .
- Compensation peer group updated in 2024 to reflect scale post-Validus; added Hartford, RGA, CNA, Cincinnati; removed Argo and Greenlight; list spans reinsurers and P&C insurers competing for talent/business .
Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 2024 say-on-pay support was 72% versus ~95% average prior four years; Board engaged shareholders representing ~68% of shares outstanding to gather feedback .
- Responses/actions: affirmed limited use of one-time awards (none planned absent exceptional circumstances); enhanced disclosure of management-related objectives; simplified annual bonus design and increased financial weighting .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment is robust: 2024 annual bonuses paid at 176% driven by 28.8% adjusted operating ROE and 100.6% GWP to budget; LTI metrics emphasize book value growth and underwriting discipline, supporting shareholder value creation .
- Retention risk appears contained: double-trigger change-in-control economics and 12-month non-compete (with Company election for extensions) plus material unvested equity ($8.28M accelerated value in certain events) incentivize continued tenure .
- Insider selling pressure: regular vesting events (13,238 shares vested; $3.06M value in 2024) can create episodic supply; anti-pledging/hedging and trading window controls mitigate risk of opportunistic selling; monitor Form 4 activity around vest dates and windows .
- Governance feedback: 72% say-on-pay indicates scrutiny of one-time awards; 2024 program modifications and disclosure enhancements reduce future compensation controversy risk .