Ross Curtis
RENAISSANCERE HOLDINGSAbout Ross Curtis
Ross A. Curtis is Executive Vice President and Chief Portfolio Officer at RenaissanceRe (RNR), a role he has held since January 2023 after serving as Group Chief Underwriting Officer from 2014–2022; he joined RNR in 1999 and is 52 years old . Under RNR’s leadership team, 2024 company performance included $1.8B net income to common, 19.3% ROAE, $1.6B underwriting income with an 83.9% combined ratio, and 32.4% GPW growth to $11.7B; TSR compounded at 10.9% from 2014–2024, aligning incentives with shareholder value creation . The 2024 annual bonus plan paid at 176% of target on metrics centered on Adjusted Operating ROE and profitable growth, underscoring pay-for-performance rigor .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| RenaissanceRe | Chief Portfolio Officer (EVP) | 2023–present | Oversees portfolio construction across Three Drivers of Profit; senior member of management governance committee . |
| RenaissanceRe | Group Chief Underwriting Officer | 2014–2022 | Led global underwriting; pivotal through market cycle and portfolio transformation . |
| RenaissanceRe (London) | Chief Underwriting Officer, European Operations | 2010–2014 | Led European underwriting platform . |
| RenaissanceRe (Bermuda) | SVP, International and retrocessional property-cat; specialty reinsurance development | 2006–2010 | Responsible for international/retro catastrophe underwriting and building specialty reinsurance lines . |
| RenaissanceRe | Catastrophe Reinsurance Analyst | 1999 (joined) | Early technical underwriting/analytics foundation . |
External Roles
No external public company directorships or outside roles for Mr. Curtis are disclosed in the latest proxy’s executive officer biographies .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Base salary ($) | 725,000 | 725,000 |
| Target bonus (% of base) | — | 150% |
| Target bonus ($) | — | 1,087,500 |
| Actual annual incentive ($) | 1,979,250 | 1,914,000 |
| Total reported compensation ($) | 6,026,447 | 4,628,798 |
2024 perquisites/other: company retirement match $20,700; life insurance premiums $5,962; personal aircraft/commercial travel $142,474; other benefits $8,400; total other compensation $177,536 .
Performance Compensation
Annual incentive design (2024):
- Weighting and metrics: Adjusted Operating ROE vs target (50%), ratio of GPW to budget (20%), strategic goals/objectives (30%) .
- Outcome: 2024 business performance factor = 176% of target; Curtis’ actual bonus $1,914,000 vs $1,087,500 target .
| Metric | Weight | Target | Actual/Result | Payout Link | Vesting/Period |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Operating ROE vs target | 50% | 10.44% | 28.8% | Contributed to 176% overall bonus factor | 1-year performance (2024) |
| GPW vs budget | 20% | 100% of budget | 100.6% ($11.7B GPW) | Contributed to 176% overall bonus factor | 1-year performance (2024) |
| Strategic goals/objectives | 30% | Pre-set Board-approved goals | Strong execution (Validus integration, talent/succession) | Contributed to 176% overall bonus factor | 1-year performance (2024) |
Long-term incentives (granted 3/1/2024):
- 50% time-vested RS, 50% performance shares; grant approved 2/6/2024 .
- Performance shares metrics: 3-year average change in BVPS + dividends (75%); 3-year average underwriting expense ratio rank vs peers (25%) .
| Award | Grant date | Shares/Units | Grant-date FV ($) | Vesting/Performance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Performance Shares (threshold/target/max) | 3/1/2024 | 1,419 / 4,057 / 8,114 | 906,131 | 3-year performance ending 12/31/2026; vests based on goals and service . |
| Time-vested Restricted Shares | 3/1/2024 | 4,057 | 906,131 | Vests in four equal annual installments beginning 3/1/2025 . |
Recent performance share payout (cycle ended 12/31/2024): 180% of target based on 27.4% avg change in BVPS+div and 5th-best expense ratio rank; Curtis vested 14,166 shares in 2024 (value realized $3,270,872) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (common shares) | 188,059; less than 1% of outstanding . |
| Included unvested time-vested restricted shares | 10,960 (included in beneficial ownership) . |
| Performance shares eligible at maximum (unearned) | 45,615 (included for disclosure; still subject to performance/service) . |
| Outstanding unvested RS by grant | 1,168 (3/1/2021); 3,114 (3/1/2022); 3,820 (3/1/2023); 4,057 (3/1/2024) . |
| Outstanding unearned PS by grant | 10,186 (3/1/2023); 7,232 (11/7/2023); 8,114 (3/1/2024) . |
| Options | None outstanding or exercised in 2024 . |
Alignment policies:
- Executive ownership guideline: 4.5x target salary; unearned performance shares excluded; Curtis in compliance as of 12/31/2024 .
- Anti-hedging/anti-pledging: Hedging, short sales, margin loans, and pledging prohibited; NEOs in compliance .
- Clawback policy in place for incentive compensation; minimum vesting standards; no option/SAR repricing .
Vesting cadence and potential selling windows:
- RSUs vest annually each March 1, 2025–2028 for 2024 grant; earlier grants vest/vested 2024–2027 .
- 2024 performance share cycle completes 12/31/2026, with settlement post-committee determination in 2027 (double-trigger treatment on CIC) .
Employment Terms
| Term | Key provisions |
|---|---|
| Contract term | One-year term, auto-renews absent 30 days’ non-renewal notice (Curtis) . |
| Non-compete / non-solicit | 12 months post-termination; for resignation without good reason or executive non-extension, company may elect to pay to extend non-compete coverage (installment and lump-sum salary percentages) . |
| Severance multiples (pre-CIC) | Installment Percent 75% of salary+bonus; Lump Sum Percent 25% of salary+bonus (paid after 12 months); pro rata bonus at target; 12 months health continuation; certain equity vesting as described below . |
| Severance multiples (within 12 months post-CIC) | Installment Percent 150% of salary+bonus; Lump Sum Percent 50% of salary+bonus; same benefits framework . |
| Equity vesting on termination | Time-vested awards vest on death, disability, good reason, without cause, or company non-renewal; performance shares continue to be earned based on actual performance; double-trigger applies on CIC if awards assumed; acceleration if not assumed . |
Estimated payments (as of 12/31/2024; illustrative):
| Scenario | Salary ($) | Bonus ($) | Accelerated equity ($) | Health ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination without cause/for good reason (pre-CIC) | 725,000 | 3,001,500 | 8,990,749 | 54,913 | 12,772,162 |
| Termination without cause/for good reason (within 12 months post-CIC) | 1,450,000 | 4,915,500 | 8,990,749 | 54,913 | 15,411,162 |
| Executive non-extension | 725,000 | 1,087,500 | — | 54,913 | 1,867,413 |
| Resignation without good reason | 725,000 | — | — | 54,913 | 779,913 |
| Death | — | 1,087,500 | 8,990,749 | — | 12,078,249 |
| Disability | 725,000 | 1,087,500 | 8,990,749 | 54,913 | 10,858,162 |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Cash vs equity mix: For NEOs, 2024 at-risk pay 76–80% with balanced RS/PS mix, aligning outcomes with multi-year BVPS growth and expense discipline . The 2024 annual bonus structure increased financial metric weight to 70% and simplified metrics, addressing investor feedback and market practice .
- One-time awards/retention: Company affirmed no intention for additional one-time awards absent exceptional circumstances after 2023 CEO/team recognition awards; shareholder engagement drove disclosure enhancements and design changes .
- Clawbacks/hedging/pledging: Robust clawback and trading restrictions mitigate risk-taking and misalignment .
Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback
Say-on-pay support in 2024 was 72% (below the ~95% prior four-year average); the Governance and Human Capital Committee responded with bonus design simplification, disclosure enhancements, and an explicit stance on limited use of one-time awards .
Investment Implications
- Incentive alignment: High proportion of performance-contingent compensation (Adjusted Operating ROE; multi-year BVPS+div and underwriting expense rank) strengthens linkage between portfolio outcomes and pay—supportive for long-term value and TSR continuity (10.9% CAGR since 2014) .
- Retention risk: Contract auto-renewal, 12-month non-compete (company-electable enforcement on certain voluntary exits), and meaningful unvested equity (time-vested and performance shares) reduce near-term departure risk .
- Trading/overhang: Annual RSU vesting dates (beginning March 1 each year) and the 2024–2026 PS cycle settlement in 2027 may create periodic liquidity events; hedging/pledging prohibitions and ownership guidelines limit adverse alignment concerns .
- Pay scrutiny: The lower 2024 say-on-pay vote keeps pressure on design discipline; 2024 changes increased financial rigor and transparency, which should moderate governance risk going forward .