Curtis Perry - Executive Vice President, Chief Corporate Banking Officer | RENASANT (RNST) Executive Profile & Compensation

About Curtis Perry

Curtis J. Perry (age 62) is Executive Vice President and the Bank’s Chief Corporate Banking Officer at Renasant, a role he has held since June 2019 after serving in a similar corporate banking leadership role at Synovus Bank since 2009 . 2024 pay-for-performance outcomes tied to company metrics paid out at 108.4% of target under the annual cash plan (EPS, efficiency ratio, ROTCE), and the three‑year LTIP for the cycle ending 2024 paid 80% of target, reflecting relative performance percentiles of 48th (ROTCE), 33rd (ROTA), and 38th (TSR) . In 2023, discretionary bonuses (75% of target) were paid despite macro headwinds, supported by adjusted EPS growth of 5.0% and adjusted ROTCE growth of 5.6% YoY while the adjusted efficiency ratio deteriorated 4.4% YoY .

Past Roles

Organization	Role	Years	Strategic Impact
Renasant Corporation / Renasant Bank	Executive Vice President; Chief Corporate Banking Officer	2019–Present	Assumed commercial banking responsibilities following leadership transition in November 2019 .
Synovus Bank	Corporate Banking leadership (similar role)	2009–2019	External experience in corporate banking prior to joining Renasant .

External Roles

No public company external directorships or committee roles are disclosed in Perry’s proxy biography .

Fixed Compensation

Component ($)	2022	2023	2024
Base Salary	461,250	490,000	490,000
Discretionary/Contract Bonus	—	238,875	—
Stock Awards (Grant-date fair value)	472,360	507,151	478,121
Non‑Equity Incentive (Annual Cash)	599,625	—	541,664
Pension/Deferred “Above‑Market” Earnings	183	—	1,987
All Other Compensation	55,581	71,744	72,003
Total Compensation	1,588,999	1,307,770	1,583,775

Performance Compensation

Annual Performance-Based Cash (PBRP) – 2024 outcomes

Metric	Weight	Target	Actual (Adjusted)	Award Level	Perry Payout ($)
Diluted EPS	50%	Committee-set (absolute)	$2.91	112.4% of Target	318,500
Efficiency Ratio	30%	Committee-set (absolute)	67.31%	100.4% of Target	95,764
ROTCE (non‑GAAP)	20%	Committee-set (absolute)	12.46%	110.8% of Target	127,400
Total	100%	—	—	108.4% of Target	541,664

2023 discretionary cash bonuses were set at 75% of target; Perry received $238,875 . 2022 PBRP metrics exceeded “superior” levels (EPS $2.95; Efficiency 61.9%; ROTCE 13.97%), driving Perry’s $599,625 payout .

Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP)

Three-year cycle ended 12/31/2024 – relative metrics and outcomes:

Metric	Weight	Result (Peer Percentile)	Award Level	Perry LTIP Shares
ROTCE (non‑GAAP)	40%	48th	96% of Target	2,402
ROTA (non‑GAAP)	40%	33rd	66% of Target	1,908
TSR	20%	38th	76% of Target	1,037
Total	100%	—	80.0% of Target	5,347

2024 LTIP grants (awarded December 2023; performance cycle 2024–2026): target 7,098 performance-based shares and 7,098 time-based shares for Perry; time-based vest on January 1, 2027; PSU payouts range 0–150% with relative metrics: ROTCE (PPNR), ROTA (PPNR), TSR with thresholds at 25th percentile, target at 50th, superior at 75th .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Beneficial Ownership

As-of Date	Shares Beneficially Owned	% of Class
March 6, 2025	86,679	<1%
March 7, 2023	68,601	<1%

No pledged shares for Perry are disclosed in the beneficial ownership notes (pledging disclosures appear for other executives/directors, not for Perry) .

Stock Ownership Guidelines – Compliance

As-of Date	Guideline (Multiple of Salary)	Perry Ownership (% of Salary)
Jan 1, 2023	250%	357%
Jan 1, 2024	250%	389%
Jan 1, 2025	250%	476%

Anti-hedging policy prohibits hedging; pledging is discouraged and pledged shares excluded from guideline compliance .
Two-year post-vesting share retention requirement (no sale/pledge/disposition) reduces near-term selling pressure from vesting .

Outstanding Equity Awards and Vesting (as of 12/31/2024)

Award Type	Shares Unvested	Vest/Cycle End	Market Value ($)
Time-based RSU	6,169	1/1/2025	220,542
Time-based RSU	4,973	1/1/2026	177,785
Time-based RSU	7,098	1/1/2027	253,754
Performance RSU (target)	5,961	12/31/2025	213,106
Performance RSU (target)	988	12/31/2025	35,321
Performance RSU (target)	7,098	12/31/2026	253,754

2024 vested restricted stock: 15,993 shares valued at $541,535 .
Named executives did not own stock options as of year-end 2024 .

Deferred Compensation

Plan	2022 Exec Contributions	2024 Above-Market Earnings	2024 Plan Balance
Deferred Income Plan	$129,991	$1,987	— (balance not tabled for 2024 in excerpt)
Deferred Stock Unit Plan (DSU)	—	$1,202 earnings	$49,585 balance
DSU Units (Allocated as of 1/1/2023)	—	—	1,319 units

Employment Terms

Key Economics and Triggers

Change in Control: Double-trigger required (CIC + termination without cause or constructive termination within 24 months); Perry cash multiple = 2.0x base salary + average bonus over prior two years; up to 18 months COBRA; no tax gross-ups; 280G cutback applies; performance equity deemed at target and vesting accelerated only upon qualifying termination post-CIC .
Constructive termination definition includes material reduction in salary/authority, material breach, unlawful acts, or relocation >30 miles; cure rights apply .

Potential Payments (valued at $35.75 per share; as of 12/31/2024)

Scenario	Cash Payments ($)	Perf RSU ($)	Time RSU ($)	COBRA ($)	Total ($)
Disability/Retirement	541,664	441,358	423,649	—	1,406,671
Death	541,664	441,358	423,649	—	1,406,671
Termination Without Cause / Constructive Termination	808,500	441,358	423,649	43,890	1,717,397
Change in Control (double-trigger assumed)	1,760,539	722,722	652,080	43,890	3,179,231
Expiration of Agreement	808,500	441,358	423,649	43,890	1,717,397

Performance & Track Record

Annual (2024): Company achieved adjusted EPS $2.91 (112.4% of target), efficiency ratio 67.31% (100.4%), ROTCE 12.46% (110.8%), yielding Perry’s total cash payout of $541,664 (108.4% of target) .
Long-term (Cycle ended 2024): Relative outcomes vs. peers produced an 80% of target LTIP payout for Perry (5,347 shares), with ROTCE 48th percentile, ROTA 33rd percentile, TSR 38th percentile .
2023: Discretionary bonuses at 75% of target driven by adjusted EPS +5.0% and adjusted ROTCE +5.6% YoY, with adjusted efficiency ratio deterioration (4.4%) .

Compensation Committee Analysis

2024 committee members: Donald Clark, Jr.; John M. Creekmore; Albert J. Dale, III; Jill V. Deer; Richard L. Heyer, Jr.; Neal A. Holland, Jr.; all independent and no related‑person transactions requiring disclosure (other than noted employment of certain family members) .
Anti‑hedging, pledging discouragement, stock ownership guidelines, and two‑year equity retention are designed to align executives with shareholders and mitigate compensation risk .

Investment Implications

Alignment and at‑risk pay: Perry’s compensation is heavily performance‑linked across both annual and multi‑year frameworks, with explicit metric weightings and relative LTIP measures; two‑year post‑vesting retention reduces near‑term selling pressure and incentivizes longer‑term value creation .
Retention risk: Significant unvested RSUs (time‑based through 2027; performance cycles through 2026) and ownership guideline compliance (476% of salary as of 2025) indicate strong retention hooks and alignment; no stock options outstanding reduces repricing risk .
Change‑of‑control economics: Double‑trigger protection with 2.0x cash multiple and prorated/target equity treatment create balanced outcomes; absence of tax gross‑ups and presence of 280G cutback are shareholder‑friendly features .
Trading signals: 2024 vesting volume (15,993 shares) is subject to two‑year retention, tempering immediate supply; hedging prohibited and pledging discouraged; no pledged shares disclosed for Perry, lowering leverage‑related risk flags .