Jacob Moore
About Jacob Moore
Jacob “Jake” H. Moore is Executive Vice President, Consumer Payments at Repay Holdings Corporation, age 37, and has served in his current role since October 2022 after leading Corporate Development and Strategy from 2020 to 2022 . His background includes private equity (BlueArc Capital Management; Trinity Hunt Partners) and investment banking (SunTrust Robinson Humphrey M&A), followed by progressive corporate development roles at REPAY beginning in 2017, underpinning strong deal execution and growth responsibility in consumer payments . Company performance under the 2024 plan included 11% Adjusted EBITDA growth, a 75% free cash flow conversion, and ~3% Consumer Payments gross profit growth, while PSUs granted in 2022 paid at ~57% of target on relative TSR—reflecting mixed TSR outcomes but solid operating execution; Moore’s 2024 AIP paid 91.6% of target .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| REPAY LLC / Repay Holdings | EVP, Consumer Payments | Oct 2022–present | Leads Consumer Payments growth and client initiatives |
| REPAY LLC / Repay Holdings | EVP, Corporate Development & Strategy | 2020–Oct 2022 | Corporate development and strategy leadership (M&A, integration) |
| REPAY LLC | Head of Corporate Development | 2018–Mar 2020 | M&A execution and corporate development |
| REPAY LLC | VP, Corporate Development | Jan 2017–Dec 2017 | Early corporate development at REPAY |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| BlueArc Capital Management | Senior Associate (Private Equity) | May 2016–Jan 2017 | Investment execution; PE portfolio support |
| Trinity Hunt Partners | Associate (Private Equity) | Mar 2012–Jun 2014 | Middle-market investing and deal analysis |
| SunTrust Robinson Humphrey (M&A) | Investment Banker | 2010–2012 | Transaction execution in M&A |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $360,000 | $369,000 |
| Target Bonus (%) | 75% of base | 75% of base |
| Actual AIP Bonus ($) | $267,543 | $252,555 |
| Total AIP Payout (%) | 99.1% | 91.6% |
Performance Compensation
2024 AIP Performance Structure and Outcomes (Moore)
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout % |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA | 35% | $141.9m | $140.8m | 97% |
| Consumer Payments Gross Profit | 40% | $202.7m | $193.1m | 82% |
| Individual Objectives | 25% | 100% | Achieved 100% | 100% |
Equity Grants and Vesting
| Award | Grant Date | Type | Quantity | Grant Date Fair Value ($) | Vesting | Performance Criteria |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual RSA (2024) | 2/19/2024 | Time-based RSAs | 69,095 | $549,996 | 4-year, equal annual tranches | Service-based |
| PSU (2024) – Adjusted EBITDA | 5/30/2024 | Performance RSUs | Target 28,350 | $274,995 | 3-year; cliff vest post-measurement | Yearly Adjusted EBITDA growth vs target (0–200% scale) |
| PSU (2024) – TSR | 5/30/2024 | Performance RSUs | Target 28,351 | $463,822 | 3-year; cliff vest post-measurement | Relative TSR vs Russell 2000 (0–200% scale) |
| Annual RSA (2023) | 3/19/2023 | Time-based RSAs | 81,566 | Included in 2023 stock awards | 4-year, equal annual tranches | Service-based |
| PSU (2023) – TSR | 3/19/2023 | Performance RSUs | Target 81,566 | Included in 2023 stock awards | 3-year; cliff vest post-measurement | Relative TSR vs Russell 2000 (0–200% scale) |
| PSU (2022) – TSR (payout result) | 2/23/2022 | Performance RSUs | Target 14,345 (assumed at 12/31/24) | Paid at 57.1% of target (Feb 21, 2025) | 3-year | Relative TSR; 28.55th percentile; 57.1% payout |
One-Time Performance Stock Options (PSOs) – Granted 3/19/2023
- Grant: 191,470 options to Moore; exercise price $6.13; three tranches conditioned on price hurdles and service .
- Tranche hurdles: $10.00 (31%), $14.50 (32%), $19.54 (37%); first tranche vested after price condition met on Apr 9, 2024 .
- 2024 activity: Moore exercised 58,892 options; realized $113,374 on exercise .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (Class A) | 219,917 shares; <1% of class |
| Unvested RSAs (12/31/2024) | 69,095 shares; market value $527,195 at $7.63 close |
| Unvested PSUs (2023 cycle, TSR) | 81,566 target units outstanding at 12/31/2024 |
| Unvested PSUs (2024 cycle, EBITDA) | 28,350 target units outstanding |
| Unvested PSUs (2024 cycle, TSR) | 28,351 target units outstanding |
| Performance Options Outstanding (Unearned) | 132,578 unearned options (remaining tranches) at $6.13 strike, expiring 3/18/2030 |
| 2024 Option Exercises | 58,892 shares; value realized $113,374 |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | Executives must hold equity ≥3x base salary; policy compliance affirmed in latest review |
| Anti-Hedging / Anti-Pledging | Hedging and short sales prohibited; pledging discouraged and requires pre-clearance; all executives in compliance |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Detail |
|---|---|
| Agreement & Role Alignment | Employment agreement entered April 1, 2020; amended Mar 20, 2023 upon promotion to EVP, Consumer Payments |
| Base Salary Floor | ≥$206,000; current $369,000 base (comp table; policy floor in contract) |
| Target Bonus | 75% of base salary under AIP |
| AIP Design (2024) | For business unit leaders: 35% Adjusted EBITDA, 40% Consumer Payments gross profit, 25% individual |
| Term & Auto-Renewal | Auto-renews in successive 1-year terms unless notice 90 days before expiration |
| Severance (No Cause/Good Reason/Non-Renewal) | 18 months of base + target bonus; immediate vesting of time-based equity through severance period; performance awards remain eligible through severance period; options remain outstanding up to severance period end or original expiration |
| Severance on Change-in-Control (Double Trigger) | Severance period extends to 30 months if terminated on/within 24 months post-CoC or in anticipation; equity treatment varies by assumption/substitution and performance measurement mechanics |
| Non-Compete & Non-Solicit | 24-month non-compete in restricted territory; 24-month non-solicit of customers/vendors/employees |
| Death/Incapacity | Earned annual bonus for applicable period payable |
| Clawback | Dodd-Frank compliant clawback effective Oct 2, 2023 covering three prior fiscal years for restatements; plan-level clawback applies to EVPs and above |
| Illustrative Termination Values (12/31/2024) | Without cause/Good Reason: base $553,500; annual bonus $667,680; time-based equity accel $649,542; performance equity $937,551; PSO accel $0. On CoC+termination: base $922,500; annual bonus $944,430; time-based equity accel $1,068,734; performance equity $1,004,178; PSO accel $198,867 (values at $7.63 close) |
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Moore’s 2024 bonus paid at 91.6% amid strong Adjusted EBITDA performance but below-target Consumer Payments gross profit, aligning cash outcomes to operating realities; long-term equity split between internal EBITDA growth and relative TSR adds balance to incentives .
- Vesting overhang and potential selling pressure: Remaining PSO tranches require sustained price appreciation to $14.50 and $19.54 by Mar 2028, creating both retention hooks and potential future exercise-related liquidity events; Moore already exercised 58,892 options in 2024 .
- Ownership alignment and risk controls: Beneficial ownership is sub-1% but supported by time-based RSAs and PSUs; anti-hedging/anti-pledging and 3x-salary ownership guidelines (with compliance affirmed) reduce misalignment and pledging risk .
- Change-in-control economics and retention: Double-trigger severance (30 months) and structured equity treatment under CoC scenarios provide continuity incentives; restrictive covenants (24-month non-compete/non-solicit) mitigate transition risk .
- Execution track record: Company achieved 11% Adjusted EBITDA growth and 75% free cash flow conversion in 2024; however, TSR outcomes drove only 57.1% payout for 2022 PSUs—suggesting equity realizations remain sensitive to market-relative performance .