Robert Rehard
About Robert J. Rehard
Robert J. Rehard, 56, is Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Regal Rexnord (RRX). He joined the company in January 2015 as Vice President, Corporate Controller and Principal Accounting Officer, and became CFO in April 2018. Prior roles include Division Controller at Eaton and senior finance positions at Baxter, Emerson, Masco, and Cooper; he began his career at Deloitte & Touche in Costa Mesa, CA . Under RRX’s 2024 performance, the company reported $6.03B in sales, Adjusted EBITDA margin of 22.1%, Adjusted Free Cash Flow of $511.8M, Adjusted EPS of $9.12, paid down $938M of gross debt, and delivered $101M of synergies . Shareholder “say‑on‑pay” support was >98% in April 2024, reflecting strong compensation alignment .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Regal Rexnord | EVP, CFO | 2018–present | Principal financial officer; Section 302/906 certifications and 10-K signatory . |
| Regal Rexnord | VP, Corporate Controller & PAO | 2015–2018 | Led accounting and controls; prepared for CFO role . |
| Eaton | Division Controller | Not disclosed | Oversight of divisional financial operations . |
| Baxter; Emerson; Masco; Cooper | Finance leadership roles | Not disclosed | Senior finance roles across diversified industrial/healthcare firms . |
| Deloitte & Touche | Auditor | Not disclosed | Began career in public accounting . |
External Roles
No external public company board roles disclosed in RRX’s executive officer biographies .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 603,720 | 655,810 | 745,306 |
| Target Bonus % of Base | — | — | 85% |
| Target Bonus $ (ICP) | — | — | 643,314 |
| Actual Bonus Paid (ICP) ($) | 510,833 | 665,537 | 561,613 |
| Stock Awards ($) | 1,139,417 | 2,186,543 | 1,932,706 |
| Option Awards ($) | 350,005 | 512,515 | 481,278 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 116,614 | 153,879 | 181,288 |
| Total Compensation ($) | 2,720,589 | 4,174,284 | 3,902,191 |
Additional salary context: Rehard’s base salary as of December 31, 2024 was set at $756,840 (+6.0% YoY) .
Perquisites (2024): Company car $6,811; personal aircraft $14,333; life insurance premiums $1,872; 401(k) contribution $13,800; SRP contribution $140,015; executive physical $4,457 .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (ICP) – 2024 Design and Outcome
- Corporate NEO weighting: 90% total company financial measures; 10% policy deployment metrics .
- Committee exercised negative discretion, reducing total-company ICP payout from 97% of target to 87.3%, reflecting below-target EPS offset by strong Adjusted FCF conversion and policy deployment .
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout | Vesting/Timing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Free Cash Flow Conversion | Part of 90% total company | Not disclosed | 105.5% of target after negative discretion | Contributed to 87.3% total payout | Annual cash paid after FY |
| EPS | Part of 90% total company | Not disclosed | Below target | Reduced payout via negative discretion | Annual cash paid after FY |
| Total Company Policy Deployment | 10% | Not disclosed | Above target | Included in 87.3% total payout | Annual cash paid after FY |
| Total ICP Outcome (Rehard) | — | $643,314 target | — | $561,613 paid | Cash bonus for FY2024 |
Long-Term Incentives (Equity) – 2024 Grants
| Award Type | Grant Date | Quantity | Exercise Price | Grant Date Fair Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs (2024–2026 performance cycle) | 2/23/2024 | 5,713 target (range 1,428–11,426) | — | $1,451,388 |
| RSUs | 2/23/2024 | 2,857 | — | $481,319 |
| Stock Appreciation Rights (SARs) | 2/23/2024 | 7,657 | $168.47 | $481,278 |
Vesting schedules:
- RSUs: 34% year 1, 33% year 2, 33% year 3 .
- SARs: 34%/33%/33% over 3 years; 10-year term .
- PSUs: 3-year performance period; payouts capped at 200% of target .
PSU track record (2022–2024 cycle):
| PSU Metric (2022 grant) | Achievement | Payout Contribution |
|---|---|---|
| Total Shareholder Return (relative) | 0% of target | 0% |
| Return on Invested Capital | 179% of target | Drove overall 90% payout |
| Overall PSU Payout (2022–2024) | — | 90% of target |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial Ownership (as of March 10, 2025)
| Holding Type | Quantity | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Shares beneficially owned | 96,105 | Includes direct and option-related holdings per SEC rules |
| RSUs (restricted stock units) | 9,771 | Subject to vesting |
| Options/SARs exercisable within 60 days | 64,122 | Included in beneficial ownership |
Stock ownership policy:
- CFO must hold company stock equal to 4x base salary; all NEOs are currently in compliance. Hedging and pledging are prohibited; no directors or executive officers have hedged or pledged shares .
Outstanding Awards at FY2024 Year-End (Rehard)
| Award | Exercisable (#) | Unexercisable (#) | Exercise Price | Expiration |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Options/SARs (various grants) | 2,164 | — | $76.99 | 5/10/2027 |
| Options/SARs | 7,730 | — | $74.04 | 5/9/2028 |
| Options/SARs | 15,382 | — | $78.05 | 5/8/2029 |
| Options/SARs | 12,340 | — | $84.39 | 2/18/2030 |
| Options/SARs | 9,276 | — | $133.77 | 2/23/2031 |
| Options/SARs | 5,555 | 2,737 | $151.27 | 2/23/2032 |
| Options/SARs | 3,215 | 6,241 | $154.20 | 2/23/2033 |
| Options/SARs | — | 7,657 | $168.47 | 2/23/2034 |
| Stock Awards | Unvested RSUs (#) | Market Value ($) | Unearned PSUs (#) | Payout/Market Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| As of 12/31/2024 | 5,894 | 914,338 | 12,510 | 1,940,741 |
Insider selling/vesting (2024):
| Transaction | Quantity | Value Realized ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Options/SARs exercised | 5,465 | 648,911 |
| Shares vested (stock awards) | 8,698 | 1,465,352 |
Deferred compensation (SRP) balance and activity (2024):
| Item | Amount ($) |
|---|---|
| Executive contributions | 200,153 |
| Company contributions (included in “All Other Compensation”) | 140,015 |
| Aggregate earnings | 71,285 |
| Fiscal year-end balance | 917,793 |
Employment Terms
- Executive Severance Policy established November 3, 2023; prior individual severance agreements terminated (and CEO agreement amended). Company uses double‑trigger for change‑in‑control agreements and equity awards; no tax gross‑ups (“best net” 280G cutback approach) .
- Clawbacks: Dodd‑Frank “no‑fault” recovery for Section 16 officers on mandatory restatements (3‑year period), plus supplemental recovery for fraud, misconduct, materially inaccurate financials, policy violations, damage to property/reputation, or non‑compete/non‑solicit violations .
- Hedging/pledging: Prohibited; no directors or executive officers have hedged or pledged shares .
Change-in-control and termination economics (Rehard):
| Scenario | Total ($) |
|---|---|
| Voluntary termination | 58,218 |
| Involuntary termination (not CIC) | 2,019,985 |
| For cause termination | 58,218 |
| Change in control without termination | 3,373,745 |
| Involuntary or Good Reason termination in connection with CIC | 7,328,063 |
| Death or disability | 4,113,576 |
Component details include current-year ICP cash incentive ($561,613), termination payments ($1,400,154 or $3,194,672 under CIC termination), accelerated RSUs ($844,024), SARs ($5,501), PSUs ($2,524,220), post‑termination health/life ($49,131), accruals, and services (accounting/legal $15,000; outplacement $75,684) per scenario .
Performance & Track Record
| Year | RRX TSR (Index = $100) | S&P 400 Industrials TSR ($100 base) | Net Income ($mm) | Adjusted EPS ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | 145.52 | 116.49 | 187.7 | 4.92 |
| 2021 | 213.28 | 149.62 | 229.6 | 8.59 |
| 2022 | 151.96 | 132.42 | 488.9 | 10.75 |
| 2023 | 189.28 | 174.04 | (57.4) | 9.15 |
| 2024 | 200.14 | 197.51 | 196.2 | 9.12 |
Additional 2024 company levers: $6.03B reported sales; Adjusted EBITDA margin 22.1%; Adjusted FCF $511.8M; paid down $938M gross debt; delivered $101M synergies; consistent quarterly dividends .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: High equity exposure (RSUs, PSUs, SARs) and compliance with stringent 4x‑salary ownership guideline, with hedging/pledging prohibited, support shareholder alignment; no tax gross‑ups and robust clawbacks reduce governance risk .
- Incentive design: ICP heavily weighted to total company metrics (90%) and policy deployment (10%), with demonstrated negative discretion (87.3% of target) when EPS misses—indicative of disciplined pay-for-performance oversight .
- Retention and overhang: Meaningful outstanding unvested RSUs (5,894; $914K) and PSUs (12,510; $1.94M) plus staged SAR vesting promote retention; however, ongoing vesting and periodic exercises (5,465 options exercised; $0.65M realized in 2024) can create modest selling pressure signals to monitor around vest dates .
- Change‑of‑control economics: Double‑trigger structure with “best net” 280G cutback; maximum CIC termination value of ~$7.33M for Rehard is material but standard relative to role/scope—watch for any policy changes or enhanced severance terms in future proxies .