Philip Jasper
President, Raytheon at RTX
Executive
About Philip Jasper
Philip J. Jasper is President of Raytheon (an RTX business unit), appointed on January 7, 2024. He is 56 years old with 33 years of RTX experience, previously serving as President of Collins Aerospace Mission Systems before his Raytheon appointment . Under Jasper’s leadership, Raytheon increased backlog from $52 billion in 2023 to $63 billion in 2024 and achieved multiple major contract wins (Patriot GEMT, Javelin, AN/SPY‑6, SM‑3) . RTX delivered a 41% total shareowner return (TSR) in 2024, outpacing the S&P 500 and Core A&D Peers, with strong bookings ($112B), adjusted net income of $7.7B, and free cash flow (FCF) of $4.5B, providing favorable company-level performance context during his tenure .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Raytheon (RTX) | President | 2024–present | Backlog rose from $52B (2023) to $63B (2024); full‑rate SM‑3 Block IIA production approval; NG‑OPIR sensor payload delivery; major wins across Patriot, Javelin, AN/SPY‑6, SM‑3 |
| Collins Aerospace (RTX) | President, Mission Systems | Prior to Jan 7, 2024 (end date disclosed) | Led Mission Systems prior to appointment as Raytheon President |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2024 Detail |
|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $724,167 |
| Target Bonus (% of salary) | Increased from 80% (2023) to 105% (2024) |
| Actual Bonus Paid ($) | $950,000 |
Performance Compensation
- Jasper’s 2024 Annual Incentive used the Raytheon business unit performance factor of 105%; his award of $950,000 was above the unit factor reflecting individual performance considerations .
2024 Annual Incentive Plan (RTX-wide metrics and outcomes)
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Performance Factor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Net Income ($M) | 40% | 6,135 | 7,220 | 8,445 | 7,722 | 141% |
| Free Cash Flow ($M) | 40% | 4,700 | 5,700 | 7,300 | 5,607 | 95% |
| Employee Retention (%) | 5% | 93.3% | 95.1% | 96.9% | 96.0% | 150% |
| Total Representation (%) | 5% | 42.9% | 43.3% | 44.3% | 43.1% | 75% |
| GHG Emissions vs. 2019 | 5% | -18% | -21% | -30% | -21.4% | 104% |
| Water Usage vs. 2019 | 5% | -9% | -11% | -20% | -9.7% | 68% |
| RTX Performance Factor | — | — | — | — | — | 114% |
- AIP design: Corporate executives are funded entirely on RTX-wide metrics; business unit executives’ financial metrics are 50% RTX-wide and 50% business unit results (CRS at RTX level); 2025 AIP moves solely to financial metrics (earnings, FCF) .
Long-Term Incentive (LTI) structure
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Mix: 60% PSUs / 40% SARs for NEOs (including Jasper) .
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PSU Metrics and Goals (2024–2026 cycle): | Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | |--------|-----------|----------:|-------:|--------:| | Adjusted EPS (CAGR, 3 yrs) | — | 6.0% | 11.8% | 15.6% | | ROIC (quarterly avg, 3 yrs) | — | 7.0% | 8.1% | 8.9% | | TSR vs. Core A&D Peers | — | 25th pct | 50th pct | 75th pct | | TSR vs. S&P 500 | — | 25th pct | 50th pct | 75th pct | Notes: Payouts capped at 100% for TSR metrics if RTX TSR is negative; overall PSU value capped at 400% of grant value at vesting .
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Recent PSU vesting (company-level): 2022–2024 PSU awards vested at 110% based on EPS 94%, ROIC 82%, TSR vs S&P 198%, TSR vs Core A&D 122% .
2024 LTI Grants to Philip Jasper (grant date: Feb 8, 2024)
| Award Type | Grant Details | Valuation |
|---|---|---|
| PSUs | Target 21,420; Threshold 803; Maximum 42,840 | Grant date fair value $2,001,902 |
| SARs | 59,500 units; Exercise price $91.04; 10-year term (expire 2/7/2034); vest after 3 years | Grant date fair value $1,294,720 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (as of Feb 18, 2025) | Total shares beneficially owned: 62,839; SARs exercisable within 60 days: 42,888; none >1% ownership of RTX |
| Unvested RSUs (by grant) | 2023 RSUs: 2,783 ($322,049); 2022 RSUs: 2,961 ($342,647) |
| Unvested PSUs (by grant) | 2024 PSUs: 42,840 ($4,957,445); 2023 PSUs: 11,060 ($1,279,863); 2022 PSUs: 6,320 ($731,293) |
| Unexercisable SARs (by grant) | 2024: 59,500 (ex. price $91.04); 2023: 21,900 (ex. price $97.65); 2022: 26,100 (ex. price $94.04) |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | 4x base salary for business unit presidents |
| Compliance Status | All directors and ELG members comply or are on track within five years |
| Hedging/Pledging | Short sales, pledging, and hedging transactions are prohibited for officers/directors |
| 2024 Equity Activity | No option exercises; 17,545 shares vested (value $1,601,265) |
Employment Terms
| Scenario (as of Dec 31, 2024) | Cash Payment | Health & Welfare Continuation | Accrued PTO | Options (SARs) | Stock Awards | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Involuntary separation (for cause) | $0 | $0 | $16,712 | $0 | $0 | $16,712 |
| Involuntary (without cause) | $829,500 | $32,456 | $16,712 | $961,581 | $4,118,070 | $5,958,319 |
| Voluntary separation | $0 | $0 | $16,712 | $961,581 | $2,675,851 | $3,654,144 |
| Separation following change-in-control | $829,500 | $32,456 | $16,712 | $2,430,041 | $9,075,515 | $12,384,224 |
Key provisions and policies:
- ELG program: RSUs serve as retention and severance replacement; ELG RSUs vest upon qualifying separation (mutually agreeable separation after 3 years ELG, retirement ≥62 after 3 years ELG, or involuntary/for-good-reason within 2 years post change-in-control) .
- Restricted covenants: duty to protect confidential info; 2-year non-solicitation; 1-year non-compete (additional 1-year non-compete when ELG benefits provided); 2-year non-disparagement; IP agreement; release of claims/cooperation required when ELG benefits are provided .
- LTI acceleration under change-in-control: performance awards vest at greater of actual or target; time-based awards accelerate on qualifying termination within two years post event .
- Clawbacks: broad corporate clawback policy covering restatements, miscalculations, Code violations, safety noncompliance, post-employment covenant breaches, and negligence causing significant harm; executive-officer clawback compliant with SEC/NYSE recovers incentive compensation on material misstatement .
Performance & Track Record
- Business outcomes: Raytheon backlog increased to $63B in 2024; full-rate production approval for SM‑3 Block IIA; NG‑OPIR sensor payload delivery; major awards across Patriot GEMT (NATO), Javelin (U.S. Army), AN/SPY‑6 (U.S. Navy), SM‑3 Block IIA (U.S./Japan) .
- Company performance context: 2024 TSR of 41% and strong cash generation and bookings provided favorable backdrop for incentive funding and LTI alignment .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- At‑risk pay dominant: Jasper’s total direct compensation components in 2024 included base, annual incentive, and LTI; his 2025 LTI approved at $4.0M, aligned to market median for role .
- Metrics rigor: AIP used financial (earnings, FCF) and CRS metrics; PSUs tied to EPS CAGR, ROIC, and relative TSR, with caps to protect alignment (e.g., TSR cap if absolute TSR negative) .
- Design improvements: RTX shifted away from RSUs to SARs over recent years to strengthen pay‑for‑performance and reduce guaranteed equity .
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- Say‑on‑Pay approval: Approximately 86% support at 2024 Annual Meeting, reflecting investor endorsement of program design and direction .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Jasper’s pay is heavily contingent on multi‑year performance metrics (EPS, ROIC, TSR) and annual financial outcomes, with strict clawbacks and ownership guidelines enhancing alignment .
- Retention risk: ELG RSUs vest only upon qualifying separation; restrictive covenants and change‑in‑control protections reduce flight risk while balancing shareholder interests .
- Selling pressure: No option exercises in 2024; meaningful unvested PSU/SAR overhang suggests future vesting events more than open‑market selling; 2024 vesting of 17,545 shares noted .
- Execution signals: Raytheon backlog growth and major awards under Jasper’s leadership support value creation; company‑level TSR and cash generation underscore incentive payout quality .