Troy Brunk
President, Collins Aerospace at RTX
Executive
About Troy Brunk
Troy D. Brunk is President, Collins Aerospace at RTX, appointed on July 17, 2024, after leading Avionics and Mission Systems; he is age 55 with 33 years of RTX experience and holds a BS in Industrial Engineering and an MBA from the University of Iowa . RTX delivered strong 2024 performance including 41% TSR, 17.1% GAAP net sales growth (8.8% adjusted), adjusted diluted EPS $5.73, and $4.5B free cash flow, with Collins cited for multiple operational and customer achievements under Brunk’s leadership .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Collins Aerospace | President, Collins Aerospace | Appointed July 17, 2024 | Led achievements including EPACS 80kW cooling demonstration; teaming with Raytheon on Future Vertical Lift; 3,000th F-35 Gen III HMDS delivery; and major customer wins (Air Europa 10-year MRO) . |
| Collins Aerospace | President, Mission Systems | Until July 17, 2024 | Leadership contributing to Collins achievements and wins cited for 2024; transitioned as part of planned leadership changes . |
| Collins Aerospace | President, Avionics | Until January 7, 2024 | Drove operations prior to role change; part of multi-SBU leadership background referenced by CEO . |
External Roles
No public company directorships or committee roles disclosed for Brunk in the 2025 proxy .
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2024 Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $750,000 | Increased from $590,000 in 2024 upon ELG appointment and promotion; below market median for role . |
| Target Annual Incentive (% of Salary) | 105% | Increased from 80% in 2023; business unit executive target . |
| Actual Annual Incentive ($) | $565,000 | Aligned with Collins Aerospace performance factor of 84% . |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) Structure and Outcomes
| Metric | Weight (Business Unit Execs) | Measurement Level | 2024 RTX Actual | Resulting Factor |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings (Adjusted Net Income, $M) | 40% financial split with RTX/company and BU-level | RTX and BU | $7,722 | 141% (RTX-wide) . |
| Free Cash Flow ($M) | 40% financial split with RTX/company and BU-level | RTX and BU | $5,607 | 95% (RTX-wide) . |
| Employee Retention (%) | 5% | RTX | 96.0% | 150% . |
| Total Representation (%) | 5% | RTX | 43.1% | 75% . |
| GHG Emissions vs. 2019 | 5% | RTX | -21.4% | 104% . |
| Water Usage vs. 2019 | 5% | RTX | -9.7% | 68% . |
| RTX-wide Performance Factor (weighted) | — | RTX | — | 114% . |
| Collins Aerospace Performance Factor | — | Business Unit | — | 84% . |
Notes:
- For business unit executives including Brunk, financial metrics are funded equally by RTX-wide and business unit performance; CRS metrics are measured solely at RTX level .
- For 2025 AIP, metrics will be solely financial (earnings and FCF for RTX and BU), removing CRS from funding .
Long-Term Incentive (LTI) Mix and Grants
| Grant Date | Instrument | # Units | Exercise Price / Terms | Grant Date FV ($) | Key Vesting / Features |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2/8/2024 | PSUs (2024–2026) | Target 4,395; Max 8,790 | — | $410,755 | 4-metric design: Adjusted EPS (35%), ROIC (35%), TSR vs S&P 500 (15%), TSR vs Core A&D Peers (15); 0–200% payout; TSR portions capped at 100% if negative TSR . |
| 2/8/2024 | SARs | 18,400 | $91.04; expire 2/7/2034 | $400,384 | Vest 3 years from grant; settled in RTX shares upon exercise . |
| 2/8/2024 | RSUs (time-based) | 2,250 | — | $204,840 | Vest 3 years; dividend equivalents reinvested . |
| 3/1/2024 | ELG RSUs (retention) | 11,326 | — | $1,017,075 | Vest only upon qualifying separation (ELG program), death or disability; dividend equivalents reinvested . |
| 12/18/2024 | ELG RSUs (supplemental) | 17,480 | — | $2,000,586 | Same ELG terms; supplemental awards reinforce retention . |
| 2/6/2025 | LTI Award (value) | — | — | $3,500,000 | 2025 LTI approved for performance year 2024; below market median for Collins President . |
2022–2024 PSU outcome (applies to PSU grants from Feb 15, 2022): Final vesting factor 110% based on Adjusted EPS (94%), ROIC (82%), TSR vs S&P 500 (198%), TSR vs Core A&D Peers (122%) .
Vesting Schedules and Mechanics
- SARs: vest at 3 years; 10-year term; exercise price equals NYSE close on grant .
- RSUs: vest at 3 years; dividend equivalents reinvested; 2021 RSUs vested Feb 15, 2025 (general program example) .
- PSUs: 3-year performance period; payout 0–200%; capped if RTX 3-year TSR is negative for TSR portions .
- ELG RSUs: vest only upon qualifying separation, death or disability; designed as severance replacement and retention tool .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial Ownership (as of Feb 18, 2025)
| Holder | SARs Exercisable within 60 days (#) | RSUs Convertible within 60 days (#) | DSUs within 60 days (#) | Total Shares Beneficially Owned (#) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Troy D. Brunk | 4,828 | — | — | 10,066 . |
Notes:
- None of the listed individuals or group beneficially owned ≥1% of RTX Common Stock .
- Shares outstanding as of record date March 4, 2025: 1,335,089,924 .
Outstanding Equity Awards (Year-end 2024)
| Grant Date | Unexercisable SARs (#) | Exercise Price ($) | Expiration | Unvested RSUs (#) | Market Value of Unvested RSUs ($) | Unearned PSUs (#) | PSU Market/Payout Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2/8/2024 | 18,400 | 91.04 | 2/7/2034 | 2,250 | $260,370 | 8,790 | $1,017,179 . |
| 2/8/2023 | 12,600 | 97.65 | 2/7/2033 | 2,400 | $277,728 | 4,770 | $551,984 . |
| 2/15/2022 | 6,800 | 94.04 | 2/14/2032 | 3,871 | $447,952 | 2,459 | $284,498 . |
| 3/1/2024 | — | — | — | 11,326 (ELG RSUs) | $1,310,645 | — | — . |
| 12/18/2024 | — | — | — | 17,480 (ELG RSUs) | $2,022,786 | — | — . |
Stock ownership guidelines: 4x base salary for business unit presidents; RSUs/restricted stock count toward compliance; options/SARs/PSUs excluded. Must achieve within 5 years; cannot sell shares until compliant; directors/ELG/officers currently comply or are on track .
Prohibitions: No short sales, pledging, or hedging of RTX securities by directors and executive officers .
Insider transactions: In 2024, Brunk exercised 21,140 SARs for $656,321 and had 3,692 shares vest (value $339,555), deferring $269,569 of 2021 PSUs into the RTX PSU Deferral Plan .
Deferred compensation: 2024 contributions and balances include RTX Compensation Deferral Plan (contribution $141,202; balance $756,540) and RTX PSU Deferral Plan (contribution $258,524; balance $336,215); additional balances in legacy deferral plans are disclosed .
Employment Terms
ELG Program, Restrictive Covenants, and Change-in-Control
| Topic | Key Terms |
|---|---|
| ELG RSU Program | Current ELG program (covers all NEOs except Hayes) grants RSUs upon ELG appointment (≥$1.5M value) as severance replacement and retention; supplemental ELG RSUs may be granted for critical talent/role expansion; vest only upon qualifying separation, death or disability; dividend equivalents reinvested . |
| Qualifying Separation | Mutually agreeable separation after 3 years in ELG; retirement at/after age 62 after 3 years in ELG; involuntary (not for cause) or voluntary (for good reason) within 2 years post change-in-control . |
| Restrictive Covenants | Duty to protect confidential info; 2-year post-employment employee non-solicitation; 1-year post-employment noncompetition (plus an additional 1-year noncompete if ELG separation benefits provided); 2-year non-disparagement; IP agreement; release and cooperation requirements upon ELG benefits . |
| Clawbacks | Comprehensive RTX Clawback Policy covering annual incentives and gains from vested LTI for restatements, miscalculations, Code violations, health/safety failures, restrictive covenant violations, excessive risk, negligence. Separate Executive Officer Clawback Policy compliant with SEC/NYSE requires recoupment of erroneously awarded incentive comp on restatement . |
| Pledging/Hedging | Prohibited for directors and executive officers . |
| Employment Contracts | RTX generally does not use fixed-term executive employment contracts for U.S.-based executives; exceptions rare (M&A or non-U.S. regulatory) . |
Potential Payments Upon Separation (As of Dec 31, 2024)
| Scenario | Cash Payment ($) | Health & Welfare ($) | Options ($) | Stock Awards ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Involuntary Separation (for Cause) | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 . |
| Involuntary Separation (without Cause) | $672,750 | $24,966 | $375,106 | $1,562,162 | $2,634,984 . |
| Voluntary Separation | $0 | $0 | $375,106 | $1,562,162 | $1,937,268 . |
| Separation following a Change-in-Control | $672,750 | $24,966 | $829,218 | $6,173,141 | $7,700,075 . |
Notes:
- Retirement eligibility status provides beneficial treatment for annual LTI awards held >1 year (SARs/RSUs vest; PSUs remain eligible to vest on original date, subject to performance); ELG RSUs forfeited unless 3+ years in ELG at separation (not yet met as of Dec 31, 2024) .
- In change-in-control double-trigger, all outstanding awards vest; PSUs vest at greater of actual or target performance .
Investment Implications
- Compensation alignment: High proportion of at-risk pay through AIP and LTI; 2024 AIP funded on mixed RTX and BU financial/CRS metrics, with Collins factor 84% translating to Brunk’s $565k payout; 2025 moves to purely financial AIP, sharpening cash EPS/FCF focus .
- Retention risk: Significant ELG RSU awards ($1.017M in March and $2.001M in December 2024) vest only on qualifying separation; forfeiture risk if <3 years in ELG, increasing near-term retention incentive .
- Insider selling pressure: 2024 SAR exercise (21,140; $656k) indicates some liquidity events; however, strict prohibitions on pledging/hedging and share ownership requirements constrain discretionary selling until guideline compliance .
- Equity ownership alignment: Modest direct ownership (10,066 shares; none ≥1% individually), but sizable unvested RSUs/PSUs and SARs tie outcomes to long-term stock and performance metrics; LTI design emphasizes EPS CAGR, ROIC, and relative TSR .
- Pay benchmarking and governance: 2025 LTI for Brunk set at $3.5M (below market median), suggesting disciplined benchmarking versus 20-company CPG; 2024 say-on-pay approval ~86% supports program design continuity .