Shannon Versaggi
Executive Vice President, Marketing, Category Management and Pricing at 
SiteOne Landscape Supply
SiteOne Landscape SupplyExecutive
About Shannon Versaggi
Shannon Versaggi (age 46) is Executive Vice President, Marketing, Category Management and Pricing at SiteOne Landscape Supply (SITE), promoted to EVP in April 2024 after serving as SVP (and previously CMO) . She holds an MBA from the University of Georgia’s Terry College of Business and a BSBA from UNC Kenan‑Flagler; earlier roles include VP Integrated Marketing at Lowe’s and Portfolio Specialist at SunTrust Banks . Company performance in 2024: net sales $4.54B (+6% YoY), gross profit $1.56B (+5%), Adjusted EBITDA $378.2M (−8%), NPS 85.2 (up from 84.9); five‑year TSR value of fixed $100 was 147.8 vs peer 248.5 . SITE’s incentive design emphasizes pay for performance (Adjusted EBITDA, customer metrics, organic daily sales, and strategic targets), with PSU metrics tied to relative EBTA growth and ROIC .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| SiteOne Landscape Supply | EVP, Marketing, Category Management & Pricing | Apr 2024–present | Implemented improved customer lifecycle system and digital CX; led marketing effectiveness improvements |
| SiteOne Landscape Supply | SVP, Marketing, Category Management & Pricing; previously CMO | Jan 2023–Apr 2024 (SVP); CMO prior to 2023 | Built category/pricing capabilities; increased bilingual branches via employer-of-choice initiatives |
| Lowe’s Companies | VP Integrated Marketing; VP Media & Planning; Director roles in Media & Marketing Strategy; Product Marketing Director | ~16 years | Led integrated marketing and media planning (company-wide marketing leadership) |
| SunTrust Banks | Portfolio Specialist | Early career | Finance/portfolio management foundation |
External Roles
No public company directorships or external board roles disclosed for Versaggi in the proxy .
Fixed Compensation
| Item | 2024 |
|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $400,000 |
| Target Bonus (% of salary) | 65% |
| Actual Bonus Paid ($) | $60,878 |
Performance Compensation
Short-Term Annual Cash Incentive (2024)
| Metric | Weight | Target | Actual | Payout (% of target) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA | 70% | $480M (post-acquisition adjustment) | $376.6M | 0% | Threshold $429M; structure capped at 250% for this component |
| Organic Daily Sales Growth | 5% | 5% | −1% | 0% | Component capped at 150% |
| Customer Performance (composite) | 5% | NPS 83; Retention 1.75; Per‑Customer Value 1.75 | NPS 85.2; Retention 1.20; Per‑Customer Value 1.12 | 41% | Each sub‑metric equally weighted; component capped at 150% |
| Strategic Performance (individual goals) | 20% | Category targets per HRCC | Marketing 150%; Employer‑of‑Choice 100%; Category Mgmt 90%; Pricing 90% | Contributed to overall 24% payout | Component capped at 150%; subjective assessment |
| Overall Bonus Outcome (2024) | Eligible Earnings ($) | Target % of Salary | Target Bonus ($) | Payout (% of target) | Actual Bonus ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Versaggi | $397,981 | 65% | $258,688 | 24% | $60,878 |
Long-Term Incentives (Equity)
| Grant Date | RSUs (#) | PSUs Target (#) | RSU Vesting | PSU Performance Design |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Feb 7, 2024 | 2,062 | 2,062 | 4 equal annual installments starting Feb 7, 2025 | Relative EBTA growth with ROIC modifier; payout capped at 200% |
| PSU Cycle (Award Date) | PSUs Awarded | Payout (% of target) | Shares Settled | Value of Earned PSUs ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Feb 2021 (settled May 2024) | 902 | 111.6% | 1,007 | $159,227 |
Design changes: Beginning FY2025 grants, PSUs earned on 70% relative EBTA and 30% absolute ROIC (ROIC moved from modifier to independent metric) . 2025 PSU schedule: EBTA threshold/target/max 25th/50th/≥75th percentile; ROIC threshold/target/max 12%/16%/≥20%; EBTA capped at 100% if absolute EBTA growth is negative .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Measure | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership | 25,817 shares as of Mar 14, 2025; less than 1% of outstanding |
| Shares acquirable within 60 days | 19,739 shares (options/RSUs by May 7, 2025) |
| RSUs Not Vested by Grant | 2,062 (2024), 1,004 (2023), 464 (2022), 225 (2021) |
| PSUs Unearned by Grant | 2,062 (2024), 1,339 (2023) |
| Options Outstanding | 703 ex./2,108 unex., $149.36, exp 2/9/2033 (2023 grant); 1,482 ex./1,481 unex., $179.40, exp 2/10/2032 (2022); 2,336 ex./778 unex., $166.15, exp 2/11/3021 (as printed); 7,094 ex./— and 5,903 ex./—, $105.71, exp 2/17/2030 (2020) |
| 2024 Vesting/Exercises | 2,550 shares vested from stock awards; $388,706 realized; no option exercises reported for Versaggi |
| Ownership Policy | Executives (Covered Executives) must hold ≥2x annual base salary in stock; must retain 50% of after‑tax shares from awards until compliant; Company states CEO and Covered Executives comply |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited; no pledged SITE stock by directors/executive officers |
Employment Terms
| Scenario | Cash Severance | Bonus Treatment | Benefits | Equity Treatment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination without cause / good reason (outside CIC) | 18 months base salary (monthly installments) | Prorated annual bonus for year of termination based on actual results (paid with executive bonuses for fiscal year) | 18 months COBRA at active rates (premium reimbursed monthly) | Pro‑rata vesting of options/RSUs to next vest date; PSUs prorated by months employed with performance at end of cycle |
| Termination without cause / good reason (within 12 months of CIC) | Lump‑sum 2x (base salary + target bonus) | Prorated annual bonus for year of termination based on actual results | Benefit continuation (COBRA) | Double‑trigger: substitute awards must vest upon such termination; if not substituted, all awards vest for CIC consideration; PSUs convert to RSUs and vest per rules |
| Death/Disability | Base termination compensation; 18 months benefits for disability | — | COBRA for disability | All unvested options/RSUs vest; PSUs vest pro‑rata based on target |
Notes:
- “Cause” includes felony conviction, willful/gross negligence, material policy violations, material breach, or willful conduct harming company (notice and cure apply) .
- “Good Reason” includes material reduction in salary/bonus opportunity, material diminution in authority/duties, relocation >50 miles, or company breach (notice and cure apply) .
- CIC definitions under 2016/2020 plans cover >50% voting power change, board turnover thresholds, asset sale, and liquidation approval (with differing time windows) .
- Clawback: broad discretionary clawback for fraud/misconduct/illegal activity in addition to mandatory restatement clawback per NYSE rules .
Compensation Structure vs Performance Metrics
- Annual incentive metrics weightings: Adjusted EBITDA 70%; Customer Performance 5% (NPS, retention, per‑customer value); Organic Daily Sales Growth 5%; Individual strategic performance 20%; caps: 250% for Adjusted EBITDA, 150% for others .
- 2024 setting of Adjusted EBITDA target at $470M (later $480M with acquisition adjustment) reflected aggressive goals versus 2023 actual $411M; EBITDA shortfall delivered 0% payout on 75% of weighted components across NEOs .
- PSUs emphasize three‑year relative EBTA growth with ROIC modifier (cap 200%); 2021 cycle paid 111.6% based on EBTA CAGR 33.0% (46.5th percentile) and average ROIC 23.1% .
Vesting Schedules and Insider Selling Pressure
- RSUs vest annually in four equal tranches starting Feb 7, 2025 for 2024 grants; additional unvested RSUs from 2023/2022/2021 indicate predictable vesting cadence that can create periodic settlement events .
- PSUs from 2024 cycle run through Jan 3, 2027; 2023 PSUs also outstanding; PSU settlement is contingent on performance and can amplify equity settlement amounts .
- Insider trading policy prohibits hedging/pledging, and executive ownership/retention guidelines require holding 50% of after‑tax shares until 2x salary compliance, mitigating immediate selling pressure from vesting .
Equity Ownership Alignment and Pledging
- Beneficial ownership of 25,817 shares (<1%) with significant in‑the‑money or at‑the‑money option grants outstanding across vintages; none of SITE’s directors/executive officers have pledged stock; hedging and margin pledging prohibited .
- Executive stock ownership guidelines at 2x salary and retention requirements indicate aligned incentives and reduce short‑term disposal of shares .
Employment Contracts, Severance, and Change‑of‑Control Economics
- Separation Agreement (Nov 2023) provides 18‑month salary severance and prorated actual bonus, plus 18 months COBRA outside CIC; within 12 months post‑CIC, lump‑sum 2x salary+target bonus, prorated actual bonus, COBRA; double‑trigger acceleration for substituted awards; PSUs convert to RSUs upon CIC with vesting rules .
- Equity acceleration and Rule of 65 retirement provisions (age+service) add clarity on long‑tenure transitions, with pro‑rata vesting for PSUs and continued vesting for options/RSUs under specified conditions .
Performance & Track Record, Execution Risk
- 2024 business outcomes: net sales +6%, gross profit +5%, Adjusted EBITDA −8%, NPS 85.2; acquisitions completed (7) with ~$200M TTM net sales .
- Versaggi’s 2024 strategic scores: Marketing 150%; Employer‑of‑Choice 100%; Category Management 90%; Pricing 90%; noted misses on overall category growth and decline in gross margin percentage—signals execution risk within category/pricing despite marketing gains .
- Pay‑vs‑performance data: Company TSR at 147.81 vs peer 248.51 for five‑year window; CAP relationships reported per SEC rules .
Compensation Committee, Peer Group, and Say‑on‑Pay
- HRCC advised by FW Cook; executive target TDC generally set near 50th percentile of peer group; 2024 LTIP split 50% PSUs/50% RSUs; 2025 PSU redesign adds independent ROIC metric (30%) .
- Compensation peer group includes distributors/building products names (e.g., POOL, FAST, WSO, IBP); regular benchmarking to maintain robust sample .
- Say‑on‑pay support >93% at 2024 annual meeting, indicating shareholder approval of program design .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Strong retention and ownership policies (2x salary; hold 50% of after‑tax shares) and anti‑hedging/pledging reduce near‑term selling pressure and align incentives to long‑term value creation .
- Incentive mix: 50% PSUs/50% RSUs in 2024 with 3‑year EBTA/ROIC performance and 2025 addition of independent ROIC weighting increases accountability for capital efficiency; favorable for margin/returns discipline .
- Near‑term cash payout muted (24% of target) due to EBITDA shortfall; expect focus on improving category margin and organic sales to unlock variable comp—execution in pricing/category management is key risk to payout realization .
- Calendar signals: RSU tranches (beginning Feb 2025) and PSU settlements (2023/2024 cycles) create predictable equity vesting; however, retention guidelines and no pledging reduce likelihood of immediate large disposals around vest dates .