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R. Matthew Johnson

R. Matthew Johnson

President and Chief Executive Officer at SILICON LABORATORIESSILICON LABORATORIES
CEO
Executive
Board

About R. Matthew Johnson

R. Matthew Johnson (age 49) is President, Chief Executive Officer, and Director of Silicon Laboratories (Silicon Labs) since January 2022; he has served as President since April 2021 and previously led the company’s IoT business from July 2018 to April 2021. He holds a B.S. in Electrical Engineering Technology from the University of Maine and completed executive programs at Harvard Business School and Stanford University . Under his tenure, 2024 revenue was $584.4 million (down ~25% YoY amid an industry correction), GAAP gross margin was 53%, and GAAP operating loss was $165 million; management highlighted a strong exit to 2024 with Q4 revenue nearly doubling YoY and improved order patterns as inventories normalized . Pay-versus-performance disclosures show 2024 company TSR of 109.66 on a $100 base (vs 294.12 for the PHLX Semiconductor Index), GAAP net loss of $191.0 million, and “compensation actually paid” to the CEO of $5.6 million .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
Silicon LabsCEO and DirectorJan 2022–presentLeads strategy and execution; board member ensuring oversight alignment
Silicon LabsPresidentApr 2021–presentCompany-wide leadership during portfolio focus on IoT
Silicon LabsSVP & GM, IoT BUJul 2018–Apr 2021Drove IoT product and market leadership
NXP SemiconductorsSVP & GM, automotive processing & software— (prior to 2018)Led automotive processing and software development

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYears
Novanta (NASDAQ:NOVT)DirectorCurrent
Semiconductor Industry AssociationBoard memberCurrent
Dell Children’s Medical Center FoundationBoard of TrusteesCurrent

Fixed Compensation

Metric20232024
Base Salary ($)689,000 689,000
Annual Cash Incentive – Target ($)895,700 target; threshold $53,742; max $1,343,550
Annual Cash Incentive – Actual Payout ($)$0 (2024 bonus opportunity canceled; no bonuses paid based on 2024 results)

Performance Compensation

  • Pay mix: ~91% of CEO target pay is at-risk (equity and performance-linked) .
  • Key corporate performance measures used for executive pay: Adjusted Revenue, Adjusted non-GAAP operating income margin, Revenue CAGR, and Sustainability Goal Achievement .

PSU program design and targets

Grant datePerformance periodMetrics & weightsThresholdTargetMaximum
Dec 22, 2021 & Feb 15, 20223-year through FY20243-yr Revenue CAGR (50%); FY2023 non-GAAP OI margin (25%); FY2024 non-GAAP OI margin (25%)>10.0%; >14.0%; >17.7%20.0%; 15.8%; 19.5%30.0%; 17.6%; 21.4%
Feb 15, 20233-year through FY20253-yr Revenue CAGR (50%); FY2024 non-GAAP OI margin (25%); FY2025 non-GAAP OI margin (25%)>10.0%; >22.0%; >26.2%20.0%; 24.5%; 27.7%30.0%; 26.0%; 29.2%
Feb 15, 20243-year through FY2026Annual Revenue Growth Rate (50%) and annual non-GAAP OI Margin averaged across 3 years (50%; dynamic target linked to revenue level)>10.0%; >0.5x%20.0%; x%30.0%; 1.5x%
  • 2022 PSU cohort outcome: due to the industry downturn, 2022 grants (performance period through FY2024) did not meet thresholds and earned 0% .

2024 equity grants for Johnson

Award typeTarget shares (#)Grant date fair value ($)
PSUs (3-year)23,6843,361,944
RSUs (time-based)23,9563,151,891

Equity Ownership & Alignment

  • Beneficial ownership: 7,226 shares (<1% of outstanding) as of Feb 15, 2025; shares outstanding 32,472,957 .
  • 2024 stock vested: 23,829 shares acquired on vesting (value $3,135,181); no option exercises .
  • Outstanding/unvested awards at FY2024 year-end (Johnson):
    • PSUs unearned: 25,014 (granted 12/22/2021; vests 2/15/2025; $3,196,289), 14,424 (granted 2/15/2022; vests 2/15/2025; $1,843,099), 21,976 (granted 2/15/2023; vests 2/15/2026; $2,808,093), 23,684 (granted 2/15/2024; vests 2/15/2027; $3,026,342) .
    • RSUs unvested: 6,066 (5/15/2022; $775,113), 10,662 (5/15/2023; $1,362,390; vests 50% on 5/15/2025 and 50% on 5/15/2026), 23,956 (5/15/2024; $3,061,098; vests one-third on 5/15/2025, 5/15/2026, 5/15/2027) .
  • Ownership guidelines: CEO must hold 6x base salary; RSUs count, options/PSUs do not; all NEOs comply or are on track within phase-in .
  • Hedging/pledging: prohibited for all employees, including executives .

Employment Terms

ScenarioSeverance ($)Target Bonus Payment ($)Equity Acceleration ($)COBRA ($)Total ($)
Change in control + involuntary termination (double trigger)1,378,0001,791,40016,072,42470,59119,312,415
Non-CIC involuntary termination689,000895,7002,476,63235,2954,096,627
  • Structure: CEO Severance Agreement approved July 2024 provides double-trigger CIC benefits of 2x salary and 2x target bonus, full vesting of RSUs/options, PSUs vest at greater of actual or 100% target, and 24 months COBRA; non-CIC termination provides 1x salary, 1x target bonus, 12 months COBRA, and RSUs vesting for grants that would vest within 12 months .
  • 280G/4999: “Best after tax” cutback—no excise tax gross-ups .
  • Clawback: Nasdaq-compliant recoupment policy covering erroneously awarded incentive comp; also recovery for fraud/willful misconduct .

Board Governance

  • Role and independence: Johnson is a management director (Class II) with term expiring 2027; board policy separates Chair and CEO; Lead Independent Director is Sumit Sadana; independent directors held four executive sessions in 2024 .
  • Committees: CEO is not on board committees; Audit (Bock—Chair; Luther; Richardson), Compensation (Wyatt—Chair; Bock; Lowe), Nominating & Corporate Governance (Lowe—Chair; Sadana; Luther), Corporate Development & Finance (Sooch—Chair; Richardson; Wyatt) .
  • Board activity: Each incumbent director attended ≥75% of board and committee meetings in 2024 .

Compensation Process, Peer Group, and Shareholder Feedback

  • Process and consultant: Compensation Committee (all independent) sets NEO pay with Mercer as independent advisor; CEO provides recommendations (not on his own pay) .
  • Market positioning: Target base salaries at median; total direct compensation above market when stringent performance goals are achieved .
  • Peer group used for 2024: Advanced Energy Industries; Alpha & Omega Semi; Cirrus Logic; Diodes; Knowles; Lattice; MACOM; MaxLinear; Monolithic Power; National Instruments; NETGEAR; Power Integrations; Semtech; Synaptics; Universal Display; Wolfspeed .
  • Say-on-Pay: ~93% approval at 2024 Annual Meeting .

Performance & Track Record

MetricFY2020FY2021FY2022FY2023FY2024
Company TSR (cumulative index on $100 base)109.29177.15116.43113.52109.66
GAAP Net Income ($)12,531,0002,117,399,00091,402,000(34,516,000)(191,010,000)
Adjusted Revenue ($)886,677,000926,572,0001,024,106,000782,258,000584,386,000
  • 2024 business context: revenue fell ~25% to $584 million; GAAP gross margin 53%; GAAP operating loss $165 million; Q4 revenue nearly doubled YoY as inventory digestion eased; improved bookings and distribution trends .

Vesting Calendar Highlights (insider selling pressure lens)

  • PSUs: 12/22/2021 and 2/15/2022 grants vest on 2/15/2025 (subject to performance); 2/15/2023 grant vests 2/15/2026; 2/15/2024 grant vests 2/15/2027 .
  • RSUs: 5/15/2023 grant vests 50% on 5/15/2025 and 50% on 5/15/2026; 5/15/2024 grant vests one‑third on 5/15/2025, 5/15/2026, 5/15/2027 .
  • 2024 vesting activity: 23,829 shares vested to Johnson (value $3.14m) .
  • Policy backdrop: hedging/pledging prohibited; insider trading policy mandates pre-clearance and blackout periods .

Compensation Structure Analysis (alignment signals)

  • Equity-heavy, at-risk mix (≈91% for CEO), with multi-year PSUs tied to revenue growth and non-GAAP operating margin; 2022 PSU cohort paid 0% amid downturn, demonstrating downside risk sharing .
  • No 2024 cash bonus paid; committee also froze base salaries for 2024 in response to conditions (after temporary 2023 salary reductions) .
  • CIC protections are double-trigger with PSU vesting at greater of target or actual; “best after tax” 280G treatment; no tax gross-ups—generally shareholder friendly but with meaningful acceleration value ($16.1m intrinsic equity acceleration as of FY2024 close) .

Director-Service Addendum (dual-role implications)

  • Johnson is CEO and a director, but not Chair; board maintains separation of Chair/CEO and a Lead Independent Director, with independent committees and regular executive sessions—mitigating independence concerns tied to combined roles .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: High equity at-risk with rigorous multi-year metrics and a clawback; 2022 PSU zero payout and no 2024 bonus indicate strong pay-for-performance linkage through the cycle .
  • Overhang/flow: Material scheduled vesting dates (Feb and May in 2025–2027) and sizeable unvested PSUs/RSUs could create episodic supply from tax withholding or sales; policy restrictions (no hedging/pledging) and pre-clearance mitigate adverse optics .
  • Retention/CIC: Robust double-trigger CIC package and non-CIC severance promote continuity but embed meaningful potential acceleration value at higher stock prices; governance mitigants include no excise tax gross-ups and “best after tax” approach .
  • Governance sentiment: Strong Say‑on‑Pay support (~93%) and independent compensation oversight with Mercer suggest investor acceptance of program design despite cyclicality and 2024 losses .