
Jonathan Witter
About Jonathan Witter
Chief Executive Officer and Director of SLM Corporation since April 2020, with prior senior leadership roles spanning Hilton (Chief Customer Officer), Capital One (President, Retail & Direct Banking), Morgan Stanley (COO, Retail Banking Group; President, Morgan Stanley Private Bank), and Wachovia (EVP, Head of General Bank Distribution). Expertise includes banking, financial services, capital markets, operations, and customer experience . Under SLM’s 2024 performance, net income was $590M, diluted EPS $2.68, originations $7.0B (+10% YoY), net charge-offs fell to $332.5M, and 11.6M shares were repurchased; three‑year TSR (12/31/21–12/31/24) was 51.23% vs 4.83% for the peer group, reflecting execution and capital return discipline . Witter serves as principal executive officer, signing the company’s SOX 302/906 certifications .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| SLM Corporation | Chief Executive Officer; Director | Apr 2020–present | Leads banking/financial services strategy, operations, and capital return; focuses on profitable private education lending and stakeholder engagement . |
| Hilton Worldwide Holdings | EVP & Chief Customer Officer | 2017–2020 | Drove customer experience at scale . |
| Capital One Financial | President, Retail & Direct Banking; President, Retail & Small Business Banking; EVP, Retail Banking | 2010–2017 | Led consumer banking growth and operations . |
| Morgan Stanley | COO, Retail Banking Group; President, Morgan Stanley Private Bank | 2009–2010 | Built bank operating capabilities . |
| Wachovia (now Wells Fargo) | EVP, Head of General Bank Distribution | 2004–2009 | Led branch/distribution strategy . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sallie Mae Bank (wholly owned subsidiary) | Director | 2020–present | Affiliate bank board service . |
Fixed Compensation (CEO – 2024)
| Item | 2024 Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | $1,100,000 | No change vs 2023 (0.0%) . |
| Target Bonus % of Salary (AIP) | 150% | CEO target opportunity . |
| Actual Annual Incentive Paid | $3,052,500 | Based on 150% AIP funding and individual goals . |
Performance Compensation
2024 Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – Funding Metrics and Outcomes
| Metric | Weight | Target | Actual | Award Factor | Funding Contribution |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Income Per Share | 40% | $8.07 | $8.41 | 146% | 58% . |
| Loan Originations | 25% | $6.862B | $7.013B | 160% | 40% . |
| Adjusted Non‑interest Expenses | 20% | $551.5M | $536.0M | 162% | 32% . |
| Net Charge‑Offs | 15% | $355.2M | $332.5M | 145% | 22% . |
| Total AIP Funding | 150% (cap) . |
AIP design used four balanced, formulaic metrics—Adjusted Income Per Share, Originations, Adjusted Non‑interest Expenses, and Net Charge‑Offs—with CRO risk assessments, clawback provisions, and committee discretion to mitigate excessive risk-taking .
2024 Long‑Term Incentive (LTI) Design and CEO Grants
| Component | CEO Weighting | 2024 Grant Value | Vesting / Metric |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs | 40% | $2,900,000 | Vests 1/3 annually over 3 years . |
| PSUs (Relative TSR) | 60% | $4,350,000 (target) | Cliff vests in 2027 based on relative TSR vs defined peer indices; 0–200% payout; 1‑year holding post‑vesting . |
| Grant Timing | — | — | Annual grants made Feb 16, 2024 during open window; committee‑approved schedule . |
| CEO 2024 LTI Total | — | $7,250,000 | As approved by Compensation Committee . |
Realization Check – 2022 PSU Vesting (occurred in 2025)
| Item | Witter |
|---|---|
| PSU Performance Period | Feb 18, 2022–Feb 18, 2025 . |
| Payout vs Target | 170% at ~85th percentile relative TSR . |
| Target Shares | 141,971 . |
| Actual Shares Delivered (incl. DEUs) | 241,351; subject to 1‑year holding until Feb 24, 2026 . |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Holder | Shares Owned | Vested Options | Total Beneficial Ownership | % of Class |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jonathan W. Witter | 1,131,035 | 441,501 | 1,572,536 | <1% . |
- Stock ownership guidelines: CEO must hold 6× base salary; EVP level 3×. All current NEOs (incl. CEO) were in compliance as of 12/31/24 .
- Hedging and pledging of company stock by directors/executives are prohibited under the Securities Trading Policy, supporting alignment and risk control .
- Equity award practices: annual, pre‑scheduled grant timing; no option backdating; company currently does not grant options broadly; no timing around MNPI .
Employment Terms
- Change‑in‑Control (CIC) Severance (Amended and Restated CIC Severance Plan, effective Jun 18, 2024): Double‑trigger coverage for terminations without cause/for good reason occurring within 6 months before or 24 months after a CIC; CEO multiple = 2.5× (base salary + target bonus); COBRA subsidy for a specified period; outplacement; equity awards generally continue if assumed, but if not assumed they vest at the greater of target or actual performance (as determined) .
- Executive Severance/CIC frameworks govern potential payments outside CIC and at CIC (see Potential Payments section), with award acceleration terms set in the 2021 Omnibus Plan and award agreements .
- Clawbacks: Company maintains an Adjustment Standard and a Financial Restatement Compensation Recovery Policy, enabling recoupment or reduction of incentive compensation and severance in specified misconduct/restatement scenarios; policy filed as Exhibit 97.1 to the 2024 10‑K .
- Tax gross‑ups: Company indicates no excise tax gross‑ups as part of compensation practices (“What We Don’t Do”) .
Board Governance (Director Service, Committees, Independence)
- Board service: Director of SLM since April 2020; also Director of Sallie Mae Bank .
- Independence: Witter is not independent (Executive); Board was 91% independent as of 12/31/24; all key committees comprised solely of independent directors .
- Board leadership: Independent Board Chair (Mary Carter Warren Franke); roles of Chair and CEO are separated; regular executive sessions of independent directors .
- Committees: Witter does not serve on Board committees; committee memberships and chairs are fully independent (e.g., Compensation Chair: Mark L. Lavelle) .
- Attendance: Board met 14 times in 2024; all incumbent directors met ≥75% attendance except a documented one‑time variance for another director due to a family emergency; 12/12 attended the 2024 annual meeting .
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
| Year | Say‑on‑Pay Support |
|---|---|
| 2020 | 94.4% |
| 2021 | 89.3% |
| 2022 | 98.6% |
| 2023 | 98.1% |
| 2024 | 96.6% |
Sustained high support reflects investor alignment and responsiveness; program features include high at‑risk pay, formulaic AIP, 60% PSU weighting for CEO, double‑trigger CIC, and independent consultant (Aon) without conflicts .
Compensation Peer Group (Benchmarking; used for NEO pay-setting)
Ally Financial (ALLY); Axos Financial (AX); BankUnited (BKU); Commerce Bancshares (CBSH); Credit Acceptance (CACC); Enova (ENVA); F.N.B. (FNB); LendingClub (LC); LendingTree (TREE); OneMain (OMF); Prosperity Bancshares (PB); SoFi (SOFI); Synovus (SNV); Upstart (UPST) .
Performance & Track Record (Selected disclosures)
- 2024 highlights: Net income $590M; diluted EPS $2.68; originations $7.0B (+10% YoY); total non‑interest expenses $642M (down YoY); net charge‑offs $332.5M (down YoY); total assets $30.1B; repurchased 11.6M shares .
- Three‑year TSR through 12/31/24: 51.23% vs 4.83% peer group, 56.30% S&P Supercomposite Consumer Finance Sub‑Industry, and 11.11% S&P 400 Regional Bank Sub‑Industry; ranked ~60th percentile vs peer group .
Compensation Structure Analysis (Signals)
- Mix and risk: CEO LTI 60% PSUs tied to relative TSR with 3‑year performance and 1‑year hold; RSUs vest 3 years. This raises performance and retention linkage while limiting windfalls .
- AIP emphasis: Four balanced metrics (earnings, growth, cost discipline, credit quality) with CRO risk reviews and clawbacks; 2024 funded at 150% with strong performance across all metrics .
- CIC economics: CEO 2.5× base+target under double‑trigger; equity acceleration only if not assumed and at target/actual—guardrails reduce entrenchment risk while preserving retention through uncertainty .
- Governance protections: No excise tax gross‑ups; hedging/pledging prohibited; independent comp committee and advisor .
Vesting Schedules & Insider Selling Pressure
- Near‑term unlock: 2022 PSUs vested at 170% in Feb 2025 with a mandatory hold until Feb 24, 2026—creating a potential liquidity window thereafter; annual RSU tranches continue vesting over 2024–2026 .
- Ownership guidelines and trading policy (including pre‑clearance and hedge/pledge prohibitions) moderate opportunistic selling risk .
Employment Terms (Severance/Change‑of‑Control Economics)
| Provision | CEO Terms |
|---|---|
| CIC protection window | 6 months pre‑CIC to 24 months post‑CIC . |
| Cash severance multiple | 2.5× (Base Salary + Target Bonus) . |
| Equity on CIC | If not assumed: time‑based vests; PSUs at greater of target or actual; if assumed: continue per award terms . |
| Benefits | COBRA subsidy (specified period) and outplacement services . |
| Clawbacks | Adjustment Standard and Restatement Recovery Policy . |
| Tax gross‑ups | None (per program practices) . |
Director Service: History, Committees, Independence Implications
- Dual roles: CEO and Director; not independent; mitigated by independent Board Chair and fully independent key committees (Audit/Comp/Nominating) operating with regular executive sessions .
- Board/committee attendance practices and independence thresholds appear robust; no director‑specific independence exceptions disclosed for Witter beyond executive status .
Other Policies/Programs Relevant to Alignment
- Share ownership guidelines: CEO 6× salary; compliance confirmed at year‑end 2024 .
- Deferred comp and supplemental 401(k) plans available to executives; no pension/SERP benefits disclosed; limited perquisites .
- Related‑party transactions policy and Regulation O adherence; no specific RPTs disclosed for Witter .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: High at‑risk mix (60% TSR‑linked PSUs; AIP tied to earnings/growth/cost/credit) plus strict hedging/pledging ban and robust clawbacks support investor alignment and reduce asymmetry risk .
- Retention/Transition: CIC double‑trigger at 2.5× base+target with equity treatment only if not assumed provides competitive, market‑standard protection without single‑trigger acceleration—adequate retention with limited governance overhang .
- Trading signals: Watch the Feb 24, 2026 PSU hold release as a potential liquidity event; ongoing RSU vesting could add periodic supply—tempered by ownership guidelines and policy constraints .
- Governance overhang: Strong say‑on‑pay support (96.6% in 2024; ≥89% past 5 years) and independent committee/advisor reduce risk of shareholder pushback on pay .
- Execution risk: AIP metrics emphasize adjusted EPS, origination growth, operating expense control, and credit outcomes; sustained achievement is necessary to maintain elevated AIP/LTI realizations; CRO oversight and clawbacks provide downside controls .
Note: All compensation, ownership, policy, and governance data above are sourced from SLM’s 2025 DEF 14A unless otherwise indicated. Earnings certifications are from the Q3 2025 Form 10‑Q exhibits .